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2.1 PRESENTATIONS 
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 Off-Campus Officer for UWA PSA, 2014 
 Attended the Perth Epidemiology Group  Annual Scientific Meeting, Perth, 
September 2013 
 Completed “Introduction to Applied Statistics” short-course, UWA Centre for 
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 Attended OzFoodNet Face-to-Face Meeting , Perth, March 2014 
 Surveyor, WA Safety and Quality Point Prevalence Survey, Sir Charles Gardiner 
Hospital, May 2014 
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3. OVERVIEW AND PLACEMENT 
“...The more I learned the more I realized how very much one has to know before one is in-
the-know at all.” ― Julia Child, My Life in France  
I first heard of the MAE from my Epidemiology lecturer when I questioned what I was 
going to do after my Master of Infectious Diseases degree. However I still had to complete 
a small research project for that degree. Somehow I convinced everyone that I would be 
able to complete the research project for the MInfecDis at the same time as participating 
full-time in the MAE program and, whilst I don’t regret this decision, I would definitely 
recommend against such craziness.  
Over the past two years I’ve learnt you don’t just do an MAE, you are an MAE, and what 
you do during your two years will not only strengthen your own career, but those of your 
supervisors, your peers and colleagues, and future MAEs.  
3.1 PERTH, WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
Western Australia (WA), covering 2,529,875 km2, or 1/3 of Australia, is the largest 
jurisdiction in Australia. WA is bordered by the Indian Ocean to the north and west, the 
Great Australian Bight to the South and the Northern Territory and South Australia to the 
east. The capital city, Perth, boasts the largest city park in the world, Kings Park and is 
home to 2 million people. It is in this wonderful city that I was placed for my MAE. 
I was lucky to have two placements with a field supervisor at each placement; Professor 
Tom Riley, head of the Bacteriology Research and Development Laboratory at PathWest 
Laboratory Medicine (PathWest), and Dr Paul Armstrong, head of the Communicable 
Disease Control Directorate (CDCD) at WA Health, along with A/Prof Martyn Kirk as my 
academic supervisor at ANU. 
3.2 BACTERIOLOGY R&D, PATHWEST LABORATORY MEDICINE 
I started working on the 25th of February 2013 in the Bacteriology Research and 
Development (R&D) laboratory of PathWest Laboratory Medicine (PathWest) at the QEII 
Medical Centre (QEIIMC) in Perth. PathWest provides diagnostic services for a network of 
approximately 50 branch laboratory and collection centres and a comprehensive courier 
system. There are four main divisions in PathWest: 
 Division of Clinical Pathology 
 Division of Microbiology and Infectious Diseases 
 Division of Tissue Pathology 
 Division of Branch Laboratories 
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The Division of Microbiology and Infectious Diseases is accredited by National Association 
of Testing Authorities (NATA), as well as by the Australian Quarantine and Inspection 
Service (AQIS). The division is further split into sections: 
 Molecular Diagnostics and 
Serology 
 Clinical Bacteriology 
 Mycobacteriology 
 Mycology 
 Enterics 
 Foods and Waters 
 Bacteriology R&D 
I had previously been working as a Technical Assistant in the Clinical Bacteriology 
laboratory of PathWest for the previous 18 months so I already knew my way around. 
During my placement, PathWest moved into their new premises on the QEIIMC site. The 
new R&D office location meant that everyone was in one room, rather than split across 
three separate offices, which made for lots of communal effort, not only in work activites, 
but at lunch and being sociable after hours.  
The focus of my work whilst at the Bacteriology R&D Laboratory was my epidemiological 
project. Following on from my previous work, I performed a cross-sectional survey of 
gastrointestinal carriage of and environmental contamination with C. difficile in aged care 
facilities. For this project, I was able to perform all the field and laboratory work. This 
research was performed with a prominent not-for-profit care organisation, located in the 
northern suburbs of metropolitan Perth. In November 2014, I presented these findings at 
the ACIPC Conference in Adelaide, South Australia.   
3.3 COMMUNICABLE DISEASE CONTROL DIRECTORATE, WA HEALTH 
The CDCD is part of the Public Health division of WA Health, which contains five program 
groups; Epidemiology and Surveillance, Prevention and Control, Healthcare Associated 
Infection Unit (HAIU), Sexual Health and Blood-Borne Virus, and Case Management.  
My placement at the CDCD, I worked with the HAIU to evaluate the HISWA system in 
accordance with the Centers for Disease Prevention and Control (CDC) guidelines for 
evaluating a public health surveillance system. I also assisted the HAIU in investigating an 
outbreak of community-associate methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (CA-MRSA) 
associated with an abattoir.  
Whilst at the CDCD I attended weekly Surveillance Team meetings where the weekly 
notification report was discussed amongst the Surveillance and Epidemiology team 
members. I worked with the OzFoodNet team to investigate an outbreak of norovirus in 
the Kimberley and attended the OzFoodNet face-to-face meeting in Perth. I also joined Dr 
Armstrong as a member of the working group investigating a pseudo-outbreak of Barmah 
Forest virus (BFV) for the Communicable Disease Network of Australia (CDNA).  
8 
 
4. SUMMARY OF PROJECTS 
The following paragraphs are overviews of the projects contained within this thesis; each 
one of these projects involves analysis of infectious diseases which effect the West 
Australian population. 
4.1 GASTROINTESTINAL CARRIAGE OF AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION 
WITH CLOSTRIDIUM DIFFICILE IN AGED CARE RESIDENTIAL FACILITIES 
The aim of this study was to determine the prevalence of asymptomatic C. difficile 
gastrointestinal carriage and the prevalence of environmental contamination with C. 
difficile within aged care facilities and residents in WA.  
4.2 EVALUATION OF THE HEALTHCARE INFECTION SURVEILLANCE WESTERN 
AUSTRALIA (HISWA) SYSTEM 
An overall evaluation of the entire HISWA system had not been performed since the 
inception of the program in 2005. By evaluating HISWA, areas of improvement were 
identified to ensure robust surveillance of healthcare associated infections across WA 
health care facilities. This evaluation also coincides with the proposal of upgrading HISWA 
and introducing a standardised automated surveillance technology for the capturing of 
infection surveillance data.  
4.3 INVESTIGATION OF A PSEUDO-EPIDEMIC OF BARMAH FOREST VIRUS 
(BFV) ACROSS AUSTRALIA 
From October 2012 the rate of BFV notifications noticeably increased across all 
jurisdictions and peaked in April 2013. These notifications came from areas which did not 
traditionally experience arboviral disease. This was especially noted within the suburbs of 
Perth, WA. 
In July 2013, the Communicable Disease Network of Australia (CDNA) formed the BFV 
Working Group (WG) to identify reasons for dramatic increases in BFV notifications across 
Australia. Investigations by the WG included a survey of laboratories regarding their 
testing procedures, several laboratory evaluations of the test kit, and an analysis of 
national notification data from 2001 – 2013. 
This chapter is a combination of two bodies of work; 1) the analysis results from the 
national notification data for BFV from 1 January 2001 – 31 December 2013, and 2) a 
report to the CDNA on the findings from the working group investigating the pseudo-
outbreak. 
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4.4 OUTBREAK INVESTIGATIONS 
4.4.1 MRSA 
This report discusses a cluster of community-acquired methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (CA-MRSA) cases associated with an abattoir. All MRSA cases are 
notifiable within WA.  
4.4.2 NOROVIRUS 
This is report of a small outbreak investigation after six people attended the emergency 
department with diarrhoea and vomiting after eating at a hotel restaurant in Northern 
WA. 
4.5 TEACHING EXERCISES 
For the teaching assignment of “Issues in Applied Epidemiology” I worked with Tim Sloan-
Gardiner to present a lesson on “Critical Appraisal of Scientific Literature” during our 3rd 
course-block in March 2014.  
For my Lesson from the Field, I presented on “Sample Size and Power Calculations”, 
creating an overview document on the why and how of sample size and power 
calculations, and three example exercises for participants to complete.” 
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PROLOGUE 
MY ROLE 
My role in this study was as key researcher. I designed the study, applied for ethical 
approval from the appropriate committees, co-ordinated and conducted the collections of 
specimens and data in the field, performed all laboratory experiments, entered and 
analysed the data and wrote the final report.  
The method for environmental sampling used in this project was developed and evaluated 
as part of my Master of Infectious Disease (2013) research project “An Environmental 
Survey of Clostridium difficile in Seven Residential Aged Care Facilities”.  
LESSONS LEARNT 
In this project, I learnt a lot about time and resource management, for example, liaising 
with the facilities for the most suitable time for testing, ensuring that I had enough 
supplies for testing, and working around regular diagnostic laboratory testing 
requirements. I learnt that methods must be flexible, and that research projects which 
involve other people will not go to plan. I also learnt the value of a data dictionary, 
especially when you return to your data several months later.  
PUBLIC HEALTH IMPACT 
Asymptomatic carriage of and environmental contamination with C. difficile in aged care 
facilities in Australia is poorly understood, with few investigations currently published in 
scientific literature. This project has identified a potential reservoir for C. difficile within 
aged care facilities, which may undermine current infection prevention and control 
policies. The results of this project may influence policy makers regarding C. difficile 
infections in aged care facilities.  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This study was performed with supervision from Prof Thomas Riley and A/Prof Martyn 
Kirk, with advice from Dr Niki Foster, Dr Kate Hammer, Karla Seaman, and Marilyn 
McCarthy. Deidre Collins, Stacey Hong, Pim Putsathit, Grace Androga and Dr Peter Moono 
assisted with me with field work, Alan McGovern helped with the molecular laboratory 
work, and Deirdre Collins and Dr Briony Elliot helped with the assignment of ribotypes.  
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ABSTRACT 
Clostridium difficile is a major cause of antibiotic-associated diarrhoea, and C. difficile 
infections (CDI) occur at higher rates in the elderly. Overseas studies have found rates of 
asymptomatic carriage of C. difficile in elderly persons living in residential from 4% to 
20%, but few studies have determined the carriage rate in Australian aged-care facilities 
(ACFs). Carriers of C. difficile may shed spores into the environment, potentially putting 
other residents at risk.  
This cross-sectional study was conducted to determine the prevalence of C. difficile in 
residents of seven ACFs, and with the extent of environmental contamination of the 
facilities with C. difficile. All residents were eligible to participate by supplying a faecal 
sample for testing. If a resident passed a bowel movement between 6am and 12pm on the 
selected day of testing, it was collected. If the resident participated in the prevalence 
study, environmental samples were taken from the floor and door handles of their 
bathroom.  
A total of 118 stools were collected across the six days of testing, representing 33.6% of all 
residents. The prevalence of asymptomatic carriage of C. difficile in the ACF residents 
tested to be 7.6% (95%CI 3.1 – 12.2) among those who supplied samples. From the 95 
environmental samples collected, five residents’ rooms tested positive for C. difficile either 
on the floor, door handles or both locations (5.3%, 95%CI 0.9 – 9.6). Floors were more 
likely to be contaminated than doors (4:1 respectively). Residents with a positive faecal 
sample were significantly more likely to have a living environment that was positive for C. 
difficile (RR 36, 95%CI 8.5 – 151.8, p <0.01). 
Undetected carriage, shedding and transmission of C. difficile are clearly occurring in 
Australian ACFs. This may result in outbreaks of serious CDI due to the high risk profiles of 
residents in these facilities. Continuing contact precautions after the resolution of 
diarrhoeal symptoms may be beneficial to limit spread of infection.  Current routine 
cleaning procedures may not be adequate for C. difficile contamination and should be 
reconsidered to improve environmental control.  
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ABBREVIATIONS 
Acronym Full text 
ACF Aged care facility 
AIHW Australian Institute for Health and Welfare 
ASID Australasian Society for Infectious Diseases 
BA Blood agar 
CA ChromID C. difficile agar 
CDI C. difficile infection 
CDT C. difficile toxin 
CFR Case fatality rate 
CFU Colony forming units 
CHOC Chocolate agar 
DNA Deoxyribonucleic acid 
EIA Enzyme immunoassay 
ESBL Extended spectrum β-lactamase producing organisms  
FBC Full blood count 
GDH Glutamate dehydrogenase 
HREC Human Research Ethics Committee 
IBS Irritable Bowel Syndrome 
PCR Polymerase chain reaction 
PMC Pseudomembranous colitis 
PSU Population sampling unit 
rcf Relative centrifugal force 
RCM + GCC Robertson’s Cooked Meat + 5 mg/L gentamicin, 10 mg/L cefoxitin, 200mg/L cycloserine 
RNA Ribonucleic acid 
RR Risk ratio 
rtPCR Real-time polymerase chain reaction 
TA Taurocholic acid 
VRE Vancomycin resistant Enterococcus 
WCC White cell count 
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1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1 AGEING AND AGED CARE 
1.1.1 AGEING IN AUSTRALIA 
Data published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics in June 2014 showed that Australia is 
getting older; three decades ago the median age of the Australian population was 30.5 
years, today it is 37.3 years and in 2044 it is projected to be 40 years.  The proportion of 
‘older Australians’ in the population, defined as those aged 65 years and older, has 
increased over the past 25 years, from 10.5% to 14.4% in 20131.  
Older Australians are generally healthier and have longer life expectancies than previous 
generations, with men aged 65 today expected to live for a further 19.1 years and women 
a further 22.0 years2. The life expectancy of Australians is one of the highest of any country 
in the world, with Australia ranking seventh among Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development countries3.  
The Australian Institute for Health and Wellbeing (AIHW) defines an aged care facility 
(ACF) as “a special-purpose facility which provides accommodation and other types of 
support, including assistance with day-to-day living, intensive forms of care, and 
assistance towards independent living, to frail and aged residents”4. The proportion of 
older Australians who resided in some form of ACF was approximately 5% (166,717) in 
2013. For those in long-term residential care, nine of 10 residents will remain in care until 
death1,4.  
1.1.2 AGEING AND THE GASTROINTESTINAL SYSTEM 
Ageing has been defined as “the regression of physiological function accompanied by the 
development of age”5. Ageing in a biological sense is referred to as “senescence” and is 
classified as the declining ability to respond to stress, increasing homeostatic imbalances 
and risk of disease5,6. In the gastrointestinal system, ageing results in a decline in intestinal 
motility, increasing transit time and thereby increasing the risk of constipation5. The 
reduction in intestinal motility affects the gut fermentation process adversely. The 
dominant bacterial species present in faeces changes significantly in elderly people when 
compared to younger adults (aged 25-40 years), reducing biodiversity, compromising the 
stability of the gut microbiota and increasing the overall number of facultative anaerobes. 
Despite this, there is no increase in the numbers of strict anaerobic bacteria5,7-9, such as 
Clostridia spp. The changes due to ageing in the gastrointestinal tract lead to dramatic 
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changes to the homeostatic equilibrium between microbiota and host, causing 
immunosenesence and chronic activation of the immune system or “inflamm-ageing”5,10.  
Not only does the biodiversity of gut microbiota change with ageing, but also between 
people and their environment. The microbiota of elderly people within the same 
ethnogeographic region differs between those living long-term in ACFs and those living in 
the community10. It is thought that the differences in microbiota composition is due to the 
dietary habits of those living in ACFs with decreased dietary diversity leading to decreased 
faecal microbiota range10.  
Reduced bacterial diversity has been linked with C. difficile infections (CDI) and 
asymptomatic carriage of C. difficile8,9. It has been hypothesized that commensal 
microbiota may exert a protective role by preventing potentially pathogenic C. difficile 
from overcoming colonisation resistance, proliferating in the colon and producing 
toxins8,9.   
1.1.3 AGED CARE AND GASTROENTERITIS 
Residents of ACFs are commonly of poorer health status than those of similar age residing 
within the community11. Along with the decrease in health comes an increased use of 
medication, including antibiotics. High rates of antibiotic use may contribute to enteric 
illness by decreasing harmless, competing gut flora11. Poorer health of ACF residents 
means it is often difficult to distinguish between faecal incontinence, faecal impaction with 
encopresis, irritable bowel syndrome (IBS), and laxative or drug induced diarrhoea12.  
Table 1 indicates some of the potential causative pathogens for diarrhoeal outbreaks in 
ACFs13. In Australia during 2007, it was estimated that reports of gastroenteritis to health 
departments from ACFs accounted for 54% (1,010) of all gastroenteritis outbreaks (1,882) 
notified Australia-wide. Overseas, 12-57% of gastroenteritis outbreaks are reported from 
ACFs13. Transmission of enteric pathogens in ACFs is frequently by the person-to-person 
route, and close contact during care-giving or touching of common surfaces11.  
Whilst not commonly reported, C. difficile is also a cause of gastroenteritis in ACFs, with 
recent studies suggesting colonisation with toxigenic C. difficile is significantly higher in 
residents of ACFs than in the general population14-16. More than 80% of reported cases of 
CDI occur in adults aged 65 and older17. Detection of the causative agent in a diarrhoeal 
outbreak is important as infection prevention and control management strategies are 
different for various pathogens12,18. A misdiagnosis may hamper the efforts of the infection 
prevention and control team in ceasing the outbreak, as well as lead to incorrect treatment 
and management of patients19,20.  
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Table 1. Potential causative pathogens of diarrhoeal outbreaks in aged care facilities12,13 
Agent Signs and Symptoms Incubation 
Period 
Shedding  
post-infection 
Transmission Comments 
Norovirus 
 
Vomiting, nausea, abdominal pain, 
anorexia, diarrhoea 
24 – 48 hours 2 – 45 days Person-person 
Foodborne 
Major cause of gastroenteritis in facilities 
Rotavirus Diarrhoea, vomiting, fever 24 – 72 hours 1 – 20 days Person-person Outbreaks most common during winter 
Salmonella 
enterica 
Diarrhoea, vomiting, abdominal pain, 
blood in stool, fever 
24 – 72 hours 
(or longer)  
1 – 21 days Foodborne Has been known to cause deaths in elderly 
Campylobacter 
spp. 
Diarrhoea with blood, vomiting, 
abdominal cramps, fever 
2 – 5 days 1 – 69 days Foodborne Uncommon cause of sporadic infections 
Clostridium 
perfringens 
Watery diarrhoea, abdominal pain, 
nausea 
8 – 16 hours N/A Foodborne Routine laboratory testing will not detect as 
illness is toxin mediated 
Clostridium 
difficile 
Diarrhoea, colitis, abdominal pain, 
fever, leucocytosis 
1 – 10 days 1 – 28 days Person-person 
 
Common cause of antibiotic-associated 
diarrhoea 
Listeria Headache, myalgia, fever, abdominal 
pain, chills, coma 
>30 days  N/A Foodborne Comprehensive investigation of food history 
and clinical records. CFR in elderly 20-30%. 
CFR: Case Fatality Ratio N/A: Not available 
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1.2 CLOSTRIDIUM DIFFICILE 
C. difficile is a Gram positive, spore forming, rod-shaped bacillus that has a distinct “horse 
stable” odour when cultured in the laboratory (Figures 1a and b). C. difficile is a strict 
anaerobe, meaning it cannot grow in the presence of oxygen and must be incubated in 
anaerobic conditions. C. difficile was first described in 1935 when it was named Bacillus 
difficilis, due to the difficulties in isolating it21. It is estimated that 1x104-1x107 vegetative 
cells of C. difficile are excreted per gram of faeces in active CDI patients22.  
 
Figure 1a) Gram stain of C. difficile (magnification x1500) b) C. difficile colonies on blood 
agar after 48h incubation at 37°C in anaerobic conditions (A Williams, 2013) 
C. difficile can produce three toxins – A, B and binary toxin. C. difficile strains are either 
toxigenic or non-toxigenic; only those that are toxigenic can cause disease.  
1.3 ASYMPTOMATIC CARRIAGE OF C. DIFFICILE IN ACFS 
The definition of an asymptomatic carrier is someone who “harbours the pathogen and is 
able to transmit it but shows no clinical signs of infection”23. Asymptomatic carriage of 
non-toxigenic C. difficile is not considered a risk factor for the development of CDI, but 
instead may be protective24,25. Exposure to asymptomatic individuals with toxigenic C. 
difficile may be the potential source for unexplained CDI cases in close contacts25. Many 
studies report epidemiological and molecular links between asymptomatic carriers and 
CDI cases within facilities25-29. 
The reported rate of asymptomatic carriage for C. difficile varies10; carriage rates of C. 
difficile in ACF residents have been reported from as low as <1%30 to as high as 51%31 
(Table 2). However, it is necessary to note that diagnostic methods and case definitions for 
carriage differ between studies, making meaningful comparison of rates in these studies 
difficult14. Table 2 lists both reports of CDI and investigations of asymptomatic carriage, 
demonstrating that C. difficile represents a significant burden for ACFs.  
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Table 2. Articles regarding prevalence of Clostridium difficile in the elderly 2009 – 201414 
1st Author,  
year 
Study type Setting 
Country 
Samples/data collected Results Other Information 
Campbell32  
2009 
Descriptive study 
 
210 HCFs + 955 NHs  
Ohio, USA 
Active public reporting,  
Jan 1- Dec 31, 2006 
14,329 CDI cases: 6,376 HCF 
(44.5%), 7,953 NH (55.5%) 
Mean of initial cases in NH  
407 cases/month 
Goldstein33 
2009 
Observational  LTCF admissions 
Los Angeles, 
California, USA 
36 admissions; 31 samples 
collected  
4 of 31 (12.9%) of patients tested 
positive on admission;  
2 (6.5%) asymptomatic carriers,  
2 (6.5%) active CDI 
20/36 (55.5%) developed 
diarrhoea 
Ryan34  
2010 
 
Prevalence Long term care and 
rehabilitation wards  
Cork, Ireland 
175 patients   
100 stool samples 
 
17 putative C. difficile ; 10 
toxigenic C. difficile (10%),  
7 C. sordelli 
Non-carriers were less likely to 
have recently used antibiotics  
(p 0.0046).  
Archbald-
Pannone35  
2010 
Observational  180-bed LTCF 
Charlottesville, 
Virginia, USA 
46 stool specimens 
convenience sampling 
2 positive (4.3%) 
 
 
Miyajima36  
2011 
 
Cross-sectional cohort 
longitudinal study 
Community-based  
Manchester, UK 
206 residents 
149 stool specimens  
 
6 carriers (4.6%) 
  
Most common ribotypes UK003, 
UK005 and UK106 
All aged ≥70 (median 81 years) 
Rea8  
2011 
 
Prevalence  ELDERMET cohort37 
Cork, Ireland 
317 specimens: 123 
community members, 43 
outpatients, 48 
rehabilitation patients, 103 
long-term hospitalised 
28 (8.8%) CDI; Community: 1.6%,  
Outpatients: 9.5%, Rehabilitation: 
8%, Long-term hospitalised: 13% 
Most common ribotype UK072 and  
UK027 
Stuart30  
2011 
Point-prevalence  3 RACFs, 164 beds 
Melbourne, Australia 
164 stool samples 1 positive for C. difficile (0.6%) Also tested for prevalence of VRE 
(2%) and ESBL E. coli (12%) 
Arvand15  
2012 
Cross-sectional  LTCF + community 
volunteers  
Hesse, Germany 
240 LTCF + 
249 Community 
stool specimens 
Asymptomatic carriage of C. 
difficile in 11 (4.6%) LTCF 
residents and in 2 (0.8%) 
community participants 
Ribotypes UK014 and UK001 most 
common 
Di Bella38  
2013 
Retrospective cohort 5 urban hospitals 
Rome, Italy 
4951 routine stool samples 
submitted for testing 
402 CDI episodes over 6-year 
period 
77% in > 60 years of age  
CDI increased with age 3.4% in 18-
14  to 16.1% in > 80  
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1st Author,  
year 
Study type Setting 
Country 
Samples/data collected Results Other Information 
Eckert39  
2013 
Descriptive study 
 
105 HCF acute wards  
95 LTCF wards  
France 
Active public reporting to 
the French Public Health 
Surveillance Institute over 6 
months 
 
1316 cases HCF (2.28 per 10,000) 
295 cases LTCF (1.15 per 10,000) 
The five major PCR-ribotypes were 
UK014/020/077 (18.7%), 
UK078/126 (12.1%), UK015 
(8.5%), UK002 (8%), and UK005 
(4.9%). 
Guerrero28  
2013 
 
Point-prevalence  
 
215-bed, 8 ward HCF 
Cleveland, Ohio, USA 
160 patients 
149 rectal swabs 
18 asymptomatic carriers of 
toxigenic C. difficile  
(12.1%, 95%CI 7.8% – 18.3%) 
Age range: 55 -73 years’ old 
 
Marwick40 
2013 
Prospective cohort with 
nested case-control 
 
All residents ≥65 
years  
Tayside, Scotland 
79, 039 eligible residents 
 
156 CDI in 137 persons  
CDI incidence was 20.3/10,000 
person years 
Increased risk of CDI with 
increased age, comorbidity, prior 
HCF admission, care home 
residence  
[HR: 1.96, 95%CI 1.14–3.34] 
Mylotte41  
2013 
Retrospective cohort Community NH 
Buffalo, NY, USA 
75 incident CDI cases 
 
52 (69%) CDI within ≤30 days of 
admission, 23 (31%)CDI  ≥30 
days after admission 
 
Rogers42  
2013 
 
Cross-sectional 
Point-prevalence 
2 LTCF wards 
1 spinal injury ward  
Cleveland, Ohio, USA 
60 inpatients, 50 swabs 
32 LTCF residents, 18 
spinal injury 
20 positive toxigenic C. difficile 
(40%)  
 
Performed comparison of perirectal 
and rectal swabs 
 
Galdys43, 
2014 
Descriptive study Healthy adult 
residents (≥18 years) 
Pittsburgh, PA, USA 
130 participants 
106 stool specimens 
7 (6.6%) positive for toxigenic C. 
difficile, no non-toxigenic strains. 
Compared molecular assays to 
anaerobic culture methods 
CDI: Clostridium difficile infection CI: Confidence Interval ESBL: Extended Spectrum β-lactamase producing organisms GDH: Glutamate Dehydrogenase HR: Hazard Ratio 
HCF: Healthcare facility LTCF: Long Term Care Facility NH: Nursing Home RACF: Residential Aged Care VRE: Vancomycin resistant Enterococci  
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There is also an increase of CDI cases reported across the world38. Asensio et al. reported 
an increase in CDI from 3.9 to 12.2 cases per 10,000 hospitalised patients from 1999 
through 2007 in Spain44; Burckhardt et al. reported an increase from 1.7 to 14.8 cases per 
100,000 people from 2002 to 2006 in Germany45; whilst Di Bella et al. reported an 
increase from 0.3 in 2006 to 2.3 per 10,000 patient-days in 2011 in Italy38 (Table 2). In 
Australia the annual rate of CDI has increased from 3.25/10,000 patient-days in 2011 to 
4.03/10,000 patient-days in 201246. However, it was estimated that 30-40% of CDI cases 
were community-associated as C. difficile is not solely a nosocomial issue. Data from the 
United States, Canada, and Europe suggest that approximately 20%–27% of all CDI cases 
are community associated, with an incidence of 20–30 per 100,000 persons47. Reports of 
increasing rates of CDI cases around the world may be due to a range of causes including 
an ageing population, increase in elderly living within residential care facilities, changes in 
virulence of infecting agents, or increased screening leading to a reporting artefact. 
In the ELDERMET prevalence survey investigating the association between gut microbiota, 
food and health of the elderly in Ireland37, the rate of asymptomatic carriage of C. difficile 
in those that lived in the community was 1.6%, whilst those that lived in ACF long term 
had carriage rates of 13%8. A difference in rates of carriage between community and ACF 
residents was also found in the UK40, Germany15 and USA32 (Table 2). This difference is 
thought to be due to the variance in microbiota of elderly people between those living in 
ACFs and those living in the community10.  
1.4 TRANSMISSION OF C. DIFFICILE 
C. difficile is spread from person-to-person or via contact with contaminated surfaces31,48. 
C. difficile produces spores; resistant structures that can tolerate unfavourable conditions 
such as extreme temperatures or chemical products. These characteristics mean spores 
can persist in the environment for months to years before germination22. There is 
evidence that carriers of C. difficile shed spores into the environment31 and that C. difficile 
is spread through the dissemination of these spores22.  
C. difficile can be recovered from multiple skin sites, including groin, chest, abdomen, 
forearms and hands of colonised patients31,48. C. difficile can also be recovered from 
investigators’ hands after contact with colonized individuals, which can then spread onto 
equipment, surrounding environment, and other residents31,49,50. Whilst disinfectants may 
kill vegetative cells, spores can last on surfaces after disinfection51; the contaminated 
environment then becomes a reservoir52. 
Riggs and colleagues performed parallel environmental and skin sampling and found that 
those who were asymptomatic carriers were more likely to have C. difficile on their skin 
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than those who did not (p=0.001)31. Despite lower levels of skin and environmental 
contamination compared to symptomatic cases, asymptomatic carriers of C. difficile had 
statistically higher percentages of recovery of C. difficile from skin (p=0.001) and 
environmental samples (p=0.004) than non-carriers31. Curry et al. found that 
approximately 29% of hospital-associated CDI cases were highly related (by molecular 
typing) to isolates found in patients with asymptomatic carriage of C. difficile, suggesting 
that asymptomatic carriers are involved in the transmission of C. difficile27. 
1.5 INFECTIONS CAUSED BY C. DIFFICILE 
For a CDI to be diagnosed, at least one of the following must be found18,53,54: 
1. Diarrhoeal stools (Bristol Stool types 5-7) (Appendix 1) are C. difficile toxin 
positive or toxigenic C. difficile is detected in stool without reasonable evidence of 
another cause of diarrhoea 
2. Toxic megacolon or ileostomy where a specimen is C. difficile toxin positive 
3. Pseudomembranous colitis is diagnosed during endoscopy, after colectomy or on 
autopsy  
4. Colonic histopathology is characteristic of CDI (with or without diarrhoea or toxin 
detection) on a specimen obtained during endoscopy or colectomy 
5. Faecal specimens collected post-mortem are C. difficile toxin positive or tissue 
specimens collected post-mortem where pseudomembranous colitis is revealed or 
colonic histopathology is characteristic of CDI 
1.5.1 MILD AND MODERATE INFECTION 
Mild CDI is not associated with any systematic toxicity or rise in white cell count (WCC), 
and results in ∼3 diarrhoeal stools per day (type 5–7 Bristol Stool Chart) (Appendix 1). 
Moderate CDI is typically associated with 3–5 diarrhoeal stools per day as well as a raised 
WCC (greater than 15x109 cells/L)18,53,54.  
1.5.2 SEVERE INFECTION 
Many studies have attempted to determine clinical indicators as predictors of severe CDI 
(Table 3). Overall, patients aged over 65 years who present with ≥20,000 WCC/μL, 
increased serum creatinine greater than 1.5 times baseline levels and hypoalbuminaemia 
are at the greatest risk of developing severe CDI. Kyne et al. found that patients with 
severe underlying co-morbidities at the time of admission were at higher risk of severe 
CDI55.  
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1.5.3 FULMINANT INFECTION 
Cases of fulminant CDI present with the symptoms of severe CDI as well as systemic 
toxicity, shock, and toxic ileus or megacolon. Usually these patients require admission to 
ICU as well as surgical intervention18,56. An urgent colectomy increases survival rates of 
fulminant CDI cases56,57 and is recommended by ASID18. 
Table 3. Clinical indicators of severe C. difficile infections 
First Author/ 
Year 
WCC Serum  
Albumin 
Serum  
Creatinine 
Other 
Brandt58 
1999 
>10,400 cells/mm3 hypoalbuminaemia --  
Dubberke59  
2007 
-- Low (2.5-3.5g/dL)  
Very Low (<2.5g/dL) 
-- mechanical 
ventilation 
Henrich60  
2009 
>20,000 µL <2.5g/dL >2g/dL  
Fujitani61  
2011 
≥20,000 cells/mm3 
 
hypoalbuminaemia 
 
-- abdominal 
distension, fever 
Lungulescu62  
2011  
>20,000 cells/dL 
 
<3.0mg/dL 
 
>1.5 times  
baseline  
history of 
malignancy 
Kelly63 
2012 
>20,000 cells/mm3 
>50,000 cells/mm3  
for mortality 
-- increasing   
Shivashankar64  
2013 
≥15x109/L  
 
-- ≥1.5 times  
baseline  
Narcotic and 
H2A/PPI use 
Hypoalbuminaemia: abnormally low serum albumin. Fujitani (2011) considers <3mg/dL to be 
low. Creatinine: common indicator of renal function. Normal ranges: Women: 0.5-1.0mg/dL. Men: 
0.7-1.2mg/dL H2A/PPI: Histamine-2 antagonist, protein-pump inhibitor WCC: white cell count 
1.5.4 PSEUDOMEMBRANOUS COLITIS 
Pseudomembranous colitis (PMC) is a severe, acute exudative colitis more often seen in 
patients with severe CDI. Differential diagnosis of PMC often requires further investigation 
including abdominal radiography, colonoscopy, and histological samples (Figure 2)65,66. 
Abdominal radiography can aid in diagnosis of severe complications of PMC, including 
toxic megacolon and rupture (Figure 2a). The macroscopic appearance of PMC upon 
colonoscopic investigation shows plaques (Figure 2b). Biopsies of the plaques are used for 
histological confirmation of PMC (Figure 2c)65,66. 
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1.5.5 DEATH 
Severe complications of CDI that may lead to death include bowel perforation, 
hypotension, partial or complete ileus or toxic megacolon. In separate studies, both 
Sailhamer56 and Dudukgian57 found that there are three predictors of mortality with CDI: 
1. Older age: patients who are over 70 years of age 
2. Severe infection: patients with WCC counts of less than 4,000 cells/µL, greater than 
35,000 cells/µL, or had neutrophil bands greater than 10% 
3. Cardiorespiratory support: patients who required vasopressors and/or intubation  
Wilson et al.67 found that ischaemic heart disease and hypoalbuminemia were also 
predictors for death, and that treatment with metronidazole in severe cases was 
associated with higher rates of treatment failure and death67.  
 
Figure 2. Pseudomembranous colitis a) X-ray showing inflamed colon, b) Endoscopy showing 
characteristic plaques, c) Histological biopsy stained to show infiltration of neutrophils in the 
lamina65 
1.5.6 RECURRENT INFECTION 
Recurrent CDI is defined as a return of signs and symptoms of CDI after a period of 
wellness68. Recurrence often occurs four weeks after cessation of antibiotic therapy63,69. A 
meta-analysis completed by Garey et al. found the following three factors as increasing the 
risk of recurrence of a CDI68:  
1. Older age  
2. Continued use of antibiotics after diagnosis of infection with C. difficile  
3. Concomitant use of antacid agents  
It is thought that antacids increase the pH of gastric acid, allowing the transit of vegetative 
cells and spores beyond the stomach into the intestines to cause infection68. Patients who 
have had a previous recurrent episode of CDI are at greater risk of subsequent recurrence 
with each episode63,70. Other conditions to be considered when a patient presents with 
  
26 
 
recurrent CDI include post-infectious IBS, microscopic colitis, and inflammatory bowel 
disease69.  
1.6 DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT OF C. DIFFICILE 
Diagnosis of CDI should be considered in any patient presenting with diarrhoea up to two 
months after the use of antibiotics or within three days of hospital admission18,71. 
Differential diagnosis of diarrhoea is important as treatment regimens may differ. The 
differential diagnosis of antibiotic-associated diarrhoea includes infection with other 
pathogens, the use of laxatives, tube feeding, ischaemic colitis and inflammatory bowel 
disease13,18,72. Testing for C. difficile is recommended only for unformed (liquid) stools 
(Bristol scale 5-7) (Appendix 1), as a positive result from a formed stool may only signify 
carriage18.  
Diagnostic tests for C. difficile in specimens fall into five groups18:   
 faecal culture 
 enzyme-immunoassay (EIA) for detection of C. difficile glutamate dehydrogenase 
(GDH)  
 EIA for detection of toxins A and/or B 
 cell culture cytotoxicity assays 
 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) based assays  
A common method used for detection of C. difficile in stool is a two-step algorithm 
employing a rapid sensitive screening test, such as GDH, followed by a more specific test, 
such as PCR or EIA for toxin. The detection of GDH by EIA has a higher sensitivity than 
toxin EIA, as the metabolic enzyme is produced by both toxigenic and non-toxigenic 
strains. GDH, encoded by the gluD gene, is highly conserved in all ribotypes of C. 
difficile73,74. 
A survey of laboratories across Australia and New Zealand performed by ASID in late 2009 
– early 2010 identified the main test method used to detect C. difficile in stool was toxin 
detection by EIA or immunochromatography75. However, surveillance of CDI based solely 
on the use of an EIA assay is most likely to significantly underestimate numbers as the 
sensitivity of EIA is reported between 48-79% when compared to toxigenic culture75.  
When CDI is diagnosed, where possible, any treatment with antibiotics, anti-peristaltic or 
opiate treatments should be ceased53. Treatment options for CDI include support therapy 
(hydration and electrolyte replacement)18, antibiotics active against C. difficile (e.g. 
metronidazole or vancomycin)76,77, and faecal microbiota transplantation53,78.  
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1.7 INFECTION PREVENTION AND CONTROL 
1.7.1 HAND HYGIENE 
The WA Department of Health requires that ACFs comply with the National Hand Hygiene 
Initiative which includes the “5 Moments for Hand Hygiene” framework advised by the 
World Health Organisation (WHO)79,80. Alcohol-based hand rubs do not prevent the spread 
of C. difficile spores, as washing hands with water and soap is significantly more effective 
in reducing the number of C. difficile spores on hands72,81. However, differences in hand-
hygiene procedures specific for spore-forming organisms may cause confusion, possibly 
decreasing compliance with hand hygiene policies18,81.   
1.7.2 CLEANING 
The use of disinfectants for cleaning environments where C. difficile is present requires the 
active agents that not only kill vegetative cells but also destroy spores. The effectiveness of 
biocidal cleaning agents can be affected by several different factors including 
concentration, contact time, pH, temperature, organic matter, number and condition of the 
bacteria (e.g. vegetative cells, biofilms, spores)82. 
The UK Health Protection Agency guidelines recommend chlorine based disinfectants at 
least 1000ppm when cleaning areas potentially contaminated with C. difficile51. The most 
effective agents against C. difficile spores are oxidising agents and peroxygens, as these 
agents damage DNA, proteins and lipids, and interfere with spore coats rendering them 
unviable51. Fawley and colleagues82 found that only chlorine containing agents (such as 
bleach) were active against spores, recommending dischloroisocyanurate as their choice 
of cleaning agent. Whilst Fawley and colleagues82 found that that neither hydrogen 
peroxide nor non-ionic surfactants with phosphate showed any observable effect on 
spores, Best and colleagues83 found that hydrogen peroxide decontamination after deep 
cleaning with a chlorine agent was highly effective for removing environmental C. difficile 
contamination. However, long-term follow-up found that colonised patients rapidly re-
contaminated the surrounding environments83. The use of chlorine-based disinfectants 
has many occupational health and safety issues including safety concerns for 
housekeeping staff11.  
1.7.3 BEHAVIOUR MODIFICATION 
Isolation and/or cohorting of C. difficile infected residents until 48 hours after the 
cessation of symptoms is recommended by the WA Department of Health and has been 
proven effective in the control of gastroenteritis caused by a variety of pathogens84. The 
allocation of separate equipment and facility staff should also be considered to reduce the 
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spread of infection as the dispersal of spores can be airborne22,84,85. Whilst interaction 
between infected and non-infected patients should be reduced, the psychological effects of 
isolation should be considered86.  
For any gastroenteritis infection, visitors or staff members who has had symptoms of 
vomiting and/or diarrhoea should be excluded from the facility until at least 48 hours 
after their last episode84,87. Facility staff, nurses and doctors should apply the SIGHT 
protocol when managing suspected potentially infectious diarrhoea (Table 4)53. Patients 
should be monitored daily for frequency and severity of diarrhoea using the Bristol Stool 
Chart (Appendix 1).  
Table 4. SIGHT protocol for managing potentially infectious diarrhoea53 
S Suspect that a case may be infective where there is no clear alternative cause for diarrhoea 
I Isolate the patient and consult with the infection control team (ICT) while determining the 
cause of the diarrhoea 
G Gloves and aprons must be used for all contacts with the patient and their environment 
H Hand washing with soap and water should be carried out before and after each contact with 
the patient and the patient’s environment 
T Test the stool for toxin, by sending a specimen immediately 
 
1.7.4 ANTIBIOTIC GUIDELINES 
Whilst increased cleaning and modifying human behaviour may have some effect on the 
spread of C. difficile, the antibiotic prescribing guidelines in an establishment also need to 
be addressed in order to reduce the risk of antibiotic associated diarrhoea. McNulty and 
colleagues88 reported the alteration of antibiotic therapy guidelines at an ACF after the 
implementation of strict infection control measures and increased ward cleaning failed to 
curb an outbreak of CDI, which reduced antibiotic costs without an increase in patient 
mortality or length of stay88. In a prospective controlled interrupted time-series study 
over 21-months, three acute medical wards for elderly people in a teaching hospital were 
involved in a study looking at the effects of reinforcing a narrow-spectrum antibiotic 
policy on antibiotic prescription and the rates of CDI, and saw a reduction in the incident 
rate ratios to 0.35 (0.17 - 0.73, p= 0.009)89. 
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2. INTRODUCTION 
Both asymptomatic carriage of and environmental contamination with C. difficile in ACFs 
in Australia is poorly understood, with few investigations currently published in scientific 
literature. The goal of this study was to answer two main questions; 1) is there is 
undetected asymptomatic carriage of C. difficile within the population of residents of the 
ACFs in WA, and 2) do asymptomatic carriers of C. difficile contaminate their 
environments more than those that do not carry C. difficile. By answering these questions, 
we aimed to determine the prevalence of asymptomatic C. difficile gastrointestinal carriage 
in ACF residents and the prevalence of environmental contamination with C. difficile 
within ACFs.  
3. METHODS 
3.1 FACILITIES AND POPULATION 
3.1.1 FACILITIES 
This project was performed in co-operation with one of Western Australia’s largest not-
for-profit providers of residential care for elderly and disabled people. Of the 13 ACFs 
within this organisation, six participated in this project, all located in the northern 
metropolitan region of Perth.  
Within each facility, each resident had their own room with an adjoining private 
bathroom, containing a shower, toilet and wash basin. The organisation allows personal 
belongings and furnishings within each room. There are communal areas within the 
facilities, and all meals are prepared onsite.  
3.1.2 POPULATION 
Residents of the ACFs have different care needs, ranging from low care or “ageing in 
place”, to high care, with varying requirements including dementia care. The organisation 
also provides transitional care between the hospital and home. Each facility had a diverse 
population of care needs, except for the dementia care facility, which was specifically 
designed for the needs of the residents. The level of care required by each resident was not 
recorded in this study.  
3.2 ETHICS 
Ethical approval was obtained from the Human Research Ethics Committees (HREC) at the 
University of Western Australia (UWA) and the Australian National University (ANU). 
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Written informed consent of the residents was not required for this study as it was 
considered ethically defensible to not seek consent, as there would be no risk, benefit or 
detriment to collect faeces from the residents. All care was taken to inform the residents 
and/or their legal guardians of the study, with letters and information brochures being 
distributed to residents and/or legal guardians (Appendix 2 and 3), allowing the 
opportunity to opt-out of participating in the project. Letters and information for staff 
were distributed by the registered nurse allocated to the project at each site. All residents 
were eligible to participate, unless deemed unfit to participate by site management and/or 
care staff. 
3.3 COLLECTION OF SAMPLES AND DATA 
3.3.1 SAMPLE SIZE CALCULATION 
The mean of previous studies which have estimated the prevalence of C. difficile carriage 
in residents of ACFs is approximately 15-20%. The total number of residents across the six 
ACFs at the time of this study was 351. In order to detect a 20% prevalence of 
asymptomatic gastrointestinal carriage of C. difficile with 95% confidence, 145 residents 
were required to participate, and at 99%, 192 residents were required.  
In a pilot study, the background contamination rate of the environment with C. difficile at 
the ACFs involved in this study was approximately 4% (A Williams, MInfecDis project, 
2013). Riggs et al. found that 40% of patients with asymptomatic carriage of C. difficile 
contaminated their environments31. Using these figures, it was estimated that 51 samples 
would need to be collected to determine if carriers of C. difficile contaminated their 
environments more than non-carriers, at a confidence level of 95%. The type I error 
probability associated with testing this hypothesis was 0.05.  
3.3.2 FAECAL SPECIMENS 
Samples from one ACF were collected on one day, i.e. there were six days of sampling, one 
day for each ACF. Faecal samples were collected from any resident who passed a bowel 
movement between the hours of 6am and 12pm on the day of testing. Samples were not 
collected from residents who had opted-out or were deemed unfit to participate.  
On the day of testing, care workers at each ACF placed liners within the toilets which 
captured the faecal sample in the toilet. Care workers went to each room throughout the 
morning to collect any bowel movements. Where residents used incontinence pads, care 
workers collected the faecal sample from the pad. Care workers transferred samples into 
specimen pots and labelled the pots with a unique study identifier. The unique study 
identifier was cross-checked with a list of residents, ensuring that only one specimen per 
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resident was collected, and that no samples were collected from any resident who had 
opted-out. The labelled sample pots were then put into a cooler box and taken to the 
laboratory for processing.  
3.3.3 MEDICAL INFORMATION 
A registered nurse assigned from each facility photocopied the required medical 
information from the residents’ medical and prescription charts, being careful not to 
include any information that could identify the resident. This information was then coded 
with the matching study identifier on the faecal sample. Nurses also filled in a brief 
medical questionnaire for each resident (Appendix 4) which was also labelled with the 
unique study identifier. The questionnaire sought information about patient 
demographics, functional status, devices or aids, episodes of diarrhoea within the previous 
six weeks, chronic infections, and any hospitalisations and procedures within the previous 
three months. Drugs of interest for this study were any drugs administered in the last six 
weeks which targeted the gastrointestinal system, or any class of antibiotics.  
3.3.4 ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLES 
Rooms of residents who provided faecal samples were tested across 5 ACFs until 95 rooms 
were sampled (the sixth ACF did not participate in environmental sampling). Within each 
of the residents’ rooms, two sites were tested - the bathroom floor next to the toilet and 
the door handles into the bedroom and bathroom. Sampling occurred on the day of faecal 
collection, between 12 and 1pm, whilst the residents were at lunch.  
To sample the floor next to the toilet, a 5 x 2cm pre-moistened sponge was wiped across a 
surface area of 10x10cm. The entire surface of both door handles into the bedroom and 
bathroom were wiped with the sponge.  Each sponge was then placed into a labelled bag, 
placed in a cooler box and transported to the laboratory. Throughout sample collection, 
sterile disposable gloves were worn by the individuals performing the sampling and 
changed between each room.  
3.4 DETECTION AND ISOLATION OF C. DIFFICILE FROM SAMPLES 
All samples were stored at stored at 4°C until processed. All samples were processed in 
the laboratory within 24h of the sample being collected. 
3.4.1 MOLECULAR DETECTION OF C. DIFFICILE IN FAECAL SAMPLES 
The BDMAX™ rtPCR platform90 was used to detect the C. difficile tcdB gene from faecal 
specimens, as per the routine method employed by the Enteric Laboratory of PathWest 
Laboratory Medicine.  
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3.4.2 ISOLATION OF C. DIFFICILE BY CULTURE FROM FAECAL SAMPLES 
3.4.2.1 Direct Culture 
Faecal samples were inoculated onto bioMerieux ChromID C. difficile chromogenic agar 
plates (CA) and incubated anaerobically for 48h91.  
3.4.2.2 Enrichment Culture  
A pea-sized amount from the original faecal sample was placed into Robertson’s Cooked 
Meat + 5mg/L Gentamicin, 10mg/L Cefoxitin, and 200mg/L Cycloserine (RCM + GCC) with 
Taurocholic Acid (TA) and incubated aerobically for 48h at 370C. After 48h, 1mL of RCM 
was mixed with 1mL of absolute ethanol and left for 1h to all vegetative cells, also known 
as “shocking”. Using a disposable 10mL loop, this fluid was plated for single colonies on CA 
plates and incubated anaerobically for 48h at 370C, checking for growth at 24h and 48h. 
The enrichment stage and increases the yield of recovery of C. difficile from faeces92. 
3.4.3 ISOLATION OF C. DIFFICILE BY CULTURE FROM ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLES 
3.4.3.1 Direct Culture 
The sponge was placed into the provided plastic bag along with 10mL of 0.1% peptone salt 
solution and stomached (pummelled) for 30 seconds in a Stomacher (Colworth Stomacher 
400). The fluid was squeezed from the sponge, transferred into a 10 mL tube and 
centrifuged for 20 minutes at 3000rcf. All but 2mL of the liquid was discarded. A 100µL 
aliquot was taken from the deposit and spread-plated onto CA plates, which were 
incubated anaerobically for 48h. 
3.4.3.1 Enrichment Culture 
In addition to direct culture, 500µL of deposit was added to RCM + GCC broths, which were 
sealed and incubated at 35°C for 7 days. After 7d, broths were “shocked” as above in 
section 3.4.2.2.  
3.5 IDENTIFICATION OF C. DIFFICILE 
Typical growth of C. difficile appears on CA as black colonies, with rough edges and a 
“ground glass” texture91. Any putative C. difficile colonies on CA were sub-cultured onto 
pre-reduced blood agar (BA) plates and incubated for 24h. Isolates were identified as C. 
difficile if after 24h incubation on BA they appeared off-white, flat with rough edges, had 
an odour described in the literature as “horse dung”, had chartreuse colony fluorescence 
on BA under UV light and had a positive reaction to proline-amino peptidase due to the 
ability to produce L-amino peptidase93,94.   
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3.6 MOLECULAR CHARACTERISATION OF C. DIFFICILE ISOLATES 
3.6.1 DNA EXTRACTION 
A full 1 µL loop of colonies from a 24h BA culture was emulsified into a 100µL pre-
prepared 5% Chelex solution before being heated at 100°C for 12min and centrifuged at 
10,000g for 12min at 4°C. The supernatant (approx. 50µL) was pipetted into a fresh 1.5mL 
biofuge tube and stored at -20°C until further use. DNA amplification was performed on 
the Gene Amp® 2720 Thermo Cycler (Applied Biosystems, Foster City, California) with the 
cycle parameters outlined in Table 5 and the primers listed in Table 694,95.  
Table 5. DNA amplification cycle parameters used in this study 
 Ribotyping Toxin Typing 
 Temp Time Cycles Temp Time Cycles 
Initial Cycle 95°C 10min  95°C 10min  
Denaturation 94°C 1min 25 94°C 30sec 35 
Annealing 55°C 1min 25 55°C 30sec 35 
Extension 72°C 2min 25 72°C 1min 30sec 35 
Final Extension 72°C 7min  72°C 7min  
Hold 4°C ∞  4°C ∞  
3.6.2 PCR TOXIN PROFILING 
All isolates were tested by PCR for the presence of toxin A (tcdA and tcdArep), toxin B 
(tcdB) and binary toxin (cdtA and cdtB) genes by methods described in Kato et al.96 and 
Stubbs et al.97 using the DNA templates as prepared in section 2.4.3.1 and primers in Table 
2.6. Banding patterns were visualised by a QIAxcel automated capillary electrophoresis 
system (QIAGEN) using a QIAxcel Screening DNA Gel Cartridge and method AL320. 
3.6.3 RIBOTYPING 
Isolates of C. difficile were ribotyped as per the methods of Stubbs et al.99, however, the 
PCR products were concentrated using the QIAGEN MinElute PCR purification kit and 
resolved on the QIAxcel using a High Resolution DNA Gel Cartridge and method OL50095. 
The DNA templates used were as per section 2.4.3.1.  
The PCR ribotyping banding patterns were imaged using QIAxcel ScreenGel software 
(v1.0.2.0, Ambion Inc., Austin, Texas) and analysed using BioNumerics software package 
v7.1 (Applied Maths, Saint-Martens-Latem, Belgium). The interpretation of band patterns 
was performed by dendrogram and cluster analysis using the Ranked Pearson co-efficient.  
The ribotyping patterns were matched against the Riley Laboratory library of reference 
strains, which included strains from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and  
  
 
 
Table 6. Primers used in to detect target genes in C. difficile 
Gene/target Primer Sequence (5’ – 3’) Positions Product Size (bp) Reference  
tcdA NK2 CCC AAT AGA TTC AAT ATT AAG CTT 2479-2505 252 Kato (1991)98 
 NK3 GGA AGA AAA GAA CTT CTG GCT CAC TCA GGT 2254-2283   
tcdA rep NK9 CCA GCT GCA GCC ATA 8043-8060 1,266 Kato (1991)98 
 NK11 TGA TGC TAA TGA ATC TAA AAT GGT AAC 6795-6824   
tcdB NK104 GTG TAG CAA TGA AAG TCC AAG TTT ACG C 2945-2972 203 Kato (1998)96 
 NK105 CAC TTA GCT CTT TGA TTG CTG CAC CT 3123-3148   
cdtA cdtApos TGA ACC TGG AAA AGG TGA TG 507-526 375 Stubbs (2000)97 
 cdtArev AGG ATT TAC TGG ACC ATT TG 882-860   
cdtB cdtBpos CTT AAT GCA AGT AAA TAC TGA G 368-389 510 Stubbs (1999)99 
 cdtBrev AAC GGA TCT CTT GCT TCA GTC 878-858   
16S rRNA  CTG GGG TGA AGT CGT AAC AAG G 1445-1466 various Stubbs (1999)99 
23S rRNA  GCG CCC TTT GTA GCT TGA CC 20-1   
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Control (ECDC), and a collection of the most prevalent PCR ribotypes currently circulating 
in Australia (B. Elliott, unpublished data).  
3.7 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Data were entered, stored, transformed and analysed in EpiInfo 7 (CDC, Atlanta). Risk 
ratios (RR) and p-values were calculated using Fisher’s exact test statistic. Where 
proportions were compared, z-tests and/or Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon tests were used. 
Prevalence was calculated using a complex sample frequency was taken into account. The 
95% confidence intervals (CI) around prevalence figures were calculated by accounting 
for possible clustering of cases within ACFs.  
4. RESULTS 
A total of 118 residents from six ACFs provided faecal samples. There were significantly 
more women than men in this study – 73 versus 45 respectively (p= 0.01). The median age 
of residents was 83 years (range 49 – 98 years), and men (80.0 years) were significantly 
younger than women (85.0 years) (p= 0.003).  
4.1 FAECAL RESULTS 
Nine residents were found to be asymptomatic carriers of C. difficile. The overall 
prevalence of C. difficile carriage in ACF residents was 7.6% (95%CI 3.1 – 12.2). The 
median age of C. difficile carriers was 80 years (range 62 – 95 years), and was not 
statistically different to non-carriers (p= 0.3). Four of the C. difficile carriers were male and 
five were female.  
The majority of faecal samples (n= 46, 39.0%) were “soft”, or type 4 on the Bristol Stool 
scale (Appendix 1). Of the nine samples that were positive for C. difficile, four were “soft”, 
three were “loose”, one was “watery” and one was “firm” (Table 7).  
Table 7. Macroscopic appearance of faecal samples collected in this study with 
corresponding Bristol Stool scale scores 
Macroscopic appearance C. difficile positive [%] C. difficile negative [%] 
Hard (Type 1) 0 [0.0%] 19 [17.4%] 
Firm (Type 2-3) 1 [11.1%] 21 [19.3%] 
Soft (Type 4) 4 [44.4%] 42 [38.5%] 
Loose (Type 5-6) 3 [33.3%] 22 [20.2%] 
Watery (Type 7) 1 [11.1%] 5 [4.6%] 
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4.2 CLINICAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
Questionnaires for 117 of the 118 residents were fully filled in by the registered nurses; 
one questionnaire was incomplete but the samples were still tested. Fifty-eight residents 
were chair-fast (49.2%), whilst 55 residents were ambulatory (46.6%). Three residents 
were bed-fast and one resident’s mobility status was not reported. 
Similar proportions of mobility status were found for those with C. difficile carriage; three 
were ambulatory (33.3%), five were chair-fast (55.6%) and one resident’s mobility status 
was not reported (11.1%). Seven residents reportedly had a diarrhoeal episode within the 
previous six weeks; however, no specimens were collected for any resident. Eight 
residents had been admitted to hospital in the previous three months, ranging from one 
day to nine days, however, none were carriers of C. difficile.  
4.3 MEDICAL INFORMATION 
Medical information for all 118 residents who provided faecal samples was provided for 
analysis. No drugs were associated with carriage of C. difficile (Table 8). Eight of the nine 
residents that were positive for C. difficile had taken stool softeners (RR 6.5, 95%CI 0.8 - 
50.5, p= 0.04]. Seven residents were taking antibiotics at the time of the study, however, 
none were positive for C. difficile carriage. Three residents were reported to have been 
admitted to hospital during the previous three months to this study.  
4.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION 
Of those 118 residents who provided samples, 95 residents’ rooms were tested for 
environmental C. difficile across 5 facilities (Table 9). Due to time and resource constraints, 
it was decided that the sixth facility would not be tested for environmental contamination.  
Five residents’ rooms tested positive for C. difficile either on the floor, door handles or at 
both locations (5.3%, 95%CI 0.9 – 9.6). Floors were more contaminated than door handles 
(4:1 respectively); however due to the small number of positive results these were 
combined for analysis. Residents with a positive faecal sample were significantly more 
likely to have a positive environmental sample for C. difficile (RR 36, 95%CI 8.5 – 151.8; p 
<0.01). 
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Table 8. Association between specified medications and C. difficile positivity amongst 
residents who provided faecal samples 
Drug Number [%]prescribed RR 95%CI P 
Regularly     
Co-senna 53 [44.9%] 2.5 0.6 – 9.3 0.3 
Esomeprazole 16 [13.6%] 1.8 0.4 – 8.0 0.4 
Lactulose 25 [21.2%] 1.9 0.5 – 6.9 0.4 
Movicol 19 [16.1%] 0.7 0.08 – 4.9 1.0 
Ozmeprazole 7 [5.9%] 1.9 0.3 – 13.1 0.4 
Pantoprazole 16 [13.6%] 1.8 0.4 – 8.0 0.4 
When required     
Bisacodyl 27 [22.9%] 0.4 0.05 – 3.2 0.7 
Co-senna 14 [11.9%] 2.1 0.5 – 9.2 0.3 
Microlax 10 [8.5%] 1.4 0.2 – 9.7 0.6 
Movicol 18 [15.3%] 0.7 0.09 – 5.5 1.0 
Combined     
ANY antibiotic 7 [5.9%] 0.0 -- -- 
ANY -prazole 42 [35.6%] 2.3 0.6 – 8.0 0.3 
ANY co-senna 65 [55.1%] 6.5 0.8 – 50.5 0.04 
ANY movicol 36 [30.5%] 0.8 0.2 – 3.5 1.0 
ANY laxative 90 [76.3%] 2.5 0.4 – 19.1 0.7 
ANY drug 102 [86.4%] -- -- 0.6 
 “ANY –prazole” was defined as any drug from the prazole group which is used to treat 
gastroesophageal reflux disease. “ANY laxative” was defined as any laxative drug and administered 
either regularly or when required. This included lactulose, Microlax, Movicol and bisacodyl.  
Table 9. Number of environmental samples collected and results 
Facility  Number samples collected Number positive for C. difficile % positive 
A 17 0 0 
B 6 0 0 
C -- -- -- 
D 34 2 5.88 
E 17 1 5.88 
F 21 2 9.52 
Total 95 5 5.26 
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4.5 PCR RESULTS AND RIBOTYPES 
Six of the nine faecal samples positive for C. difficile were detected through the BD MAX™ 
rtPCR assay. All six samples that were BD MAX™ positive were also culture positive. Two 
of the three BD MAX™ negatives that were culture positives were non-toxigenic by PCF for 
toxin genes (Table 10). The third was a RT056 [A+/B+/CDT-] strain and was a false 
negative on the BD MAX™. None of the indeterminate or unresolved BD MAX™ results from 
were culture positive. All the environmental samples that had corresponding faecal 
samples were of the same ribotype.  
Table 10. Results of PCR toxin and ribotype from positive faecal and environmental 
samples 
study ID Specimen Type Ribotype tcdA tcdArep tcdB cdtA cdtB BDMAX™  
E006 Faecal QX327 - - - - - - 
 Floor QX327 - - - - - * 
 Door QX327 - - - - - * 
E014 Faecal UK002 - - - - - - 
A002 Faecal UK014 + + + - - + 
F003 Door UK005 + + + - - * 
F021 Faecal UK056 + - + - - - 
 Floor UK056 + - + - - * 
D038 Faecal UK010 - - - - - + 
 Floor UK010 - - - - - * 
D044 Faecal UK251 + + - - + + 
 Floor UK251 + + - - - * 
C013 Faecal -- + + - - - + 
C016 Faecal UK051 - - - - - + 
C020 Faecal -- + + - - - + 
(+) positive for target; (-) negative for target; * not tested 
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5. DISCUSSION 
The hypotheses of this study were that there is undetected carriage of C. difficile within the 
population of residents of the ACFs, and that asymptomatic carriers of C. difficile 
contaminate their environments more than those that do not carry C. difficile.  
5.1 DETECTION OF C. DIFFICILE IN FAECAL SAMPLES 
Nine residents were found to be asymptomatic carriers of C. difficile. The overall 
prevalence of C. difficile carriage in the tested ACF residents was 7.6% (95%CI 3.1 – 12.2). 
Our study found an overall prevalence of C. difficile carriage within the range of previously 
reported rates.  
5.1.1 COMPARISON OF DETECTION METHOD TO OTHER AUSTRALIAN STUDY 
In a survey of ACF residents in Victoria, Stuart et al. found only one of 164 residents 
colonised with C. difficile (0.6%)30. The Stuart et al. study used a two-step testing algorithm 
– screening for GDH, then a PCR assay on the positive samples to detect genes for toxin B, 
binary toxin and the tcdC gene deletion associated with the PCR ribotype UK027. This 
testing algorithm has a sensitivity of 86.1%, specificity of 97.8%, positive predictive value 
of 88.6%, and negative predictive value of 97.2%100.  
In this study, all faecal samples were run through the BD MAX™ Cdiff rtPCR assay and 
subsequently cultured on CA and enrichment culture regardless of the PCR results. In an 
evaluation by Le Guern et al. (2012), the BD MAX™ Cdiff rtPCR assay had a sensitivity of 
97.7% and specificity of 99.7%90. Whilst it is true that the molecular assay is more 
sensitive than the two-step algorithm, it is important to note that PCR assays do not 
differentiate between asymptomatic carriage and active CDI101. From the Stuart et al. 
paper, it is unclear if the investigators reported non-toxigenic strains or asymptomatic 
carriage, as their explanation for such a low rate of C. difficile is a lack of clinical evidence 
for CDIs in the ACF, which suggests that asymptomatic carriage was not considered30. 
5.1.2 PCR RESULTS 
The false negative result (F021) on the BD MAX™ rtPCR assay could be due to two reasons; 
1) there were not enough organisms in the faecal sample for detection or 2) PCR inhibitors 
within the faecal sample may have affected the assay.  
5.1.2.1 Limit of Detection 
BD estimates that the limit of detection for the BD MAX™ rtPCR Cdiff assay is 
approximately 1.2x104 – 2.6x104 CFU/g of faeces102. Whilst during an active CDI episode 
the faecal load of C. difficile is estimated between 1x104 – 1x107 CFU/g of faeces22, the 
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estimate of faecal load in asymptomatic carriage is approximately 4x103 CFU/g of faeces31. 
Therefore, asymptomatic carriage of C. difficile may be under the limit of detection by BD 
MAX™.  
5.1.2.2 Effect of Compounds on PCR Assay 
Certain compounds can impact the reliability of a PCR assay; in the evaluation of the BD 
MAX™ rtPCR assay, melasalamine rectal suspension enemas and calcium carbonate 
antacids were found to be inhibitors of the PCR reaction102. Over 75% of the participants 
in this study were taking some form of laxative or stool softening agent; the resident 
whose sample was a false negative for C. difficile on BD MAX™ was taking Movicol, calcium 
carbonate based antacid. It is possible that using the BD MAX™ rtPCR assay to screen for C. 
difficile in this population may give inaccurate results when patients are taking calcium 
carbonate.   
5.1.2.3 Faecal Consistency 
Whilst the majority of samples (5 of 6) in this study which tested positive for C. difficile 
were soft, loose or watery, one sample was firm (Table 7). In order to use the PCR assay 
for screening of asymptomatic carriage, further evaluation is required, as the BD MAX™ 
rtPCR assay has only been evaluated for soft and liquid stools and that the performance 
characteristics for other clinical specimen types has not be established102. It appears that 
consistency has no effect on C. difficile carriage or environmental contamination.  
5.1.3 RIBOTYPES 
Eighty percent of strains identified in this study were toxigenic, that is, has the genetic 
material required to produce toxins. The ribotypes identified corresponded with common 
strains isolated across WA; UK014 is the most commonly isolated ribotype in hospital 
samples within WA (HISWA Database 2011-2012, unpublished data). Both UK056 and 
UK251 are strains often isolated in WA patients, however, not as frequently as UK014/020 
(HISWA Database 2011-2012, unpublished data). The non-toxigenic strains identified are 
also commonly identified in WA (B Elliot, personal comm., 6 Nov 2014).  
Whilst asymptomatic carriage of non-toxigenic C. difficile is thought to be protective 
against CDI24,25, it is possible that contact with asymptomatic carriers of toxigenic C. 
difficile may lead to exposure and subsequent illness. Curry et al. found that approximately 
one quarter of isolates from hospital-associated CDI cases were highly related (by 
molecular typing) to isolates found in asymptomatic patients, suggesting that screening 
and isolating patients could reduce onward transmission and a reduction in CDI27. Non-
toxigenic C. difficile will not be detected by any test that specifically targets the toxin or 
toxin genes, either by PCR, EIA or toxigenic culture.  
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It is possible that one person could carry both toxigenic and non-toxigenic C. difficile 
strains. Eyre et al. reported that 7% of CDI are mixed infections103. Sample D038 was 
positive for the tcdB target when tested by the initial BD MAX™ rtPCR assay; however, 
when further molecular testing was performed on the cultures of C. difficile, the strain 
appeared to be non-toxigenic.  
5.2 MEDICATION AND CLINICAL QUESTIONNAIRE  
This study did not find associations between asymptomatic carriage and the use of PPIs, 
H2A blockers, antacids or anti-motility agents, which have previously been associated 
with CDI risk59,64,68,104,105. The association between acid suppression and CDI is thought to 
be as a result of the vegetative form surviving in decreased acid environments64. 
McFarland et al. previously found carriage to be associated with stool softeners (RR 2.0, 
95%CI 1.4 – 3.1)106. However, whilst stool softeners were far more commonly prescribed 
to those identified with C. difficile than those not, the difference was not statistically 
significant, most likely due to the small numbers in this study.  
It is interesting to note that none of those residents taking antibiotics or that had been 
admitted to hospital during the previous three months were identified as carriers of C. 
difficile as antibiotics and hospitalisations have been identified as risk factors for 
CDI14,68,105,107. Increased age has also been identified as a risk factor for CDI105; however, 
there was no significant difference in the median age between carriers of C. difficile and 
non-carriers. Ambulatory status appears to not affect C. difficile carriage, which is 
consistent with previous reports14,15.  
5.3 ASYMPTOMATIC CARRIAGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION 
It is thought that asymptomatic carriage is an after effect of CDI, shedding of spores in 
stool, on skin, and into the environment occurring 1–4 weeks after CDI treatment; Sethi et 
al., found that 56% of patients were asymptomatic carriers 1-4 weeks after treatment108. 
Limited data from 8 patients suggested that shedding might be much less common by 5–6 
weeks after treatment87. Whilst the questionnaire used in this study asked whether the 
resident had had any diarrhoea within the previous six weeks, the majority of residents 
were currently taking laxatives or stool softeners, so any episode of diarrhoea may have 
gone undiagnosed. Some studies suggest that contact precautions be continued for up to 
one-month post CDI treatment87,108,109; whilst logical in theory, the isolation and stigma of 
contact precautions may have financial and psychological impact on the resident and ACF 
that outweigh the benefits.  
Four of the six residents who had positive stool cultures also had positive results for 
environmental contamination in their room, which corresponds with previous studies; 
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Riggs et al., reported that asymptomatic carriers had significantly higher rates of skin and 
environmental contamination (p: 0.004) than non-carriers31. Best et al. showed that 
airborne dispersal of C. difficile is possible22, and Dubberke et al. found that those places 
which are more likely to be contaminated with faecal matter are those that are also more 
likely to harbour environmental C. difficile110. Floors were more likely to be contaminated 
then doors, which corresponds with our findings in the pilot study (A Williams, 
unpublished results, 2013). This finding is biologically plausible, as faecal matter may be 
dispersed from toilets when flushing, showering or changing continence pads.  
Current guidelines suggest using chlorine based disinfectants at 1000ppm when cleaning 
areas potentially contaminated with C. difficile51. Pathogens that can colonise the 
gastrointestinal tract share similar risk factors and pathogenesis, and as such, infection 
prevention and control procedures may be put in place that may limit multiple pathogens, 
for example, both C. difficile and norovirus111. Barker et al. found that in cleaning a surface 
with non-chlorine based detergent norovirus was still detectable on surfaces and could be 
spread via the wiping cloth to other surfaces. When a surface was treated with a combined 
hypochlorite/detergent formulation (with 5000ppm of available chlorine) applied for 1 
minute, no norovirus could be detected on the surface and cross-contamination was not 
observed112.  
The current cleaning products used at the facilities contain the active ingredients of 
neodol 1-9 and sodium xylene sulphonate, both of which are ineffective in killing spores. 
Neodol is a non-ionic surfactant, whilst sodium xylene sulphonate is a wetting agent that 
helps a formula spread more easily and ensures efficient cleansing. Fawley et al. found that 
when comparing commonly used hospital cleaning agents and germicides, only chlorine-
containing germicides inactivated C. difficile spores82, whilst Best et al. found that 
hydrogen peroxide decontamination after deep cleaning with a detergent/chlorine agent, 
was highly effective for removing environmental C. difficile contamination83. Deep cleaning 
was described as “intensive, prolonged, manual clean, which aimed to restore all surfaces 
to the best possible condition, leaving them free from ingrained dirt, debris and marks”83.  
5.4 LIMITATIONS 
The main limitation of this study is the sample size. The small sample size has affected the 
analysis of risk factors for asymptomatic carriage of C. difficile, as the findings in this study 
do not correspond with findings from previous studies. A larger sample size may have 
enabled the identification of risk factors associated with asymptomatic C. difficile carriage, 
and may have determined if there were clear associations with prescription medications 
and carriage. 
43 
 
This study took place across six ACFs from one not-for-profit organisation in WA. Only 
33.6% of the total number residents from the six ACFs participated and may not be truly 
representative of all residents within those facilities. This not-for-profit organisation has 
13 ACFs across metropolitan Perth. During the design of the study it was decided by the 
organisation that their facilities north of the Swan River would be tested for convenience 
of travel time. Because of this, the findings from this study may not be representative of all 
the facilities within this organisation or of the ACF residential population of Australia in 
general. However, it should be noted that the care needs of the population residing within 
the facilities south of the Swan River are not different to those which participated in this 
study.  
The method by which samples were collected was not random, but used a systematic 
selection based on whoever produced a faecal sample during the morning of collection. 
This may be biased against those who may not have bowel movements in the morning, or 
those who have infrequent bowel movements, however, the impact is most likely to be 
negligible. However, there may be confounding as those on stool softeners or laxatives 
were more likely to be included in this study. The mechanism in which stool softeners may 
impact C. difficile carriage rates is unknown, but may be related to osmotic changes in the 
gastrointestinal tract106.  
6. CONCLUSION 
This study demonstrates there is undetected carriage of C. difficile in a sample of residents 
of the ACFs sampled in this study, and that asymptomatic carriers of C. difficile 
contaminate their environments more than those who do not carry C. difficile. These 
results may impact upon infection prevention and control measures within ACFs, as 
current routine cleaning procedures may not be adequate to prevent transmission of C. 
difficile by undetected carriage and shedding by asymptomatic carriers.  
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8. APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1 – BRISTOL STOOL SCALE 
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APPENDIX 2 – LETTER TO RESIDENTS/POWER OF ATTORNEY 
 
 
Dear Resident/Power of Attorney 
This letter is to inform you of a clinical audit taking place within your residential care 
facility. Brightwater has established a relationship with UWA to perform this study in 
order to provide better care to our residents.  
During the months of March and April, a faecal sample will be collected and tested for 
Clostridium difficile, a bacterium known to cause diarrhoea. Your current medications will 
be noted, especially any recent courses of antibiotics. These will be used to identify if there 
are any risks associated with certain medications and the diarrhoea caused by Clostridium 
difficile. None of the information provided to the research team will have any personal 
details (e.g. name, phone numbers), and so cannot be traced back to you/relative.  
It is important to know that having the bacteria in your stool is not necessarily a bad thing; 
some people are known to be carriers of this bacterium without having any diarrhoea. If 
this bacterium C. difficile is found in your stool your care manager will know and be able to 
decide if any action is necessary.  In most cases, no treatment will be required.  
Your participation in this project is greatly appreciated, but completely up to you. If you 
have any questions about this study, or would prefer not to participate, please contact 
your care manager.  
Thank you 
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APPENDIX 3 – INFORMATION FLYER FOR STUDY 
 
 
 
 
55 
 
APPENDIX 4 – CLINICAL QUESTIONNAIRE FOR STUDY 
 
Clinical Questionnaire for C. difficile Study              Today’s date:______/______/______ 
 
Section ONE - Patient Demographics: 
This information will be gathered from the iCare printout 
Age: _______ Sex:  □M    □F   Date of admission to facility:  ____/_____/________ 
 
The following two sections can be completed by the Care Worker 
Section TWO - Functional Status: 
Mobility:  □Ambulatory  □Chair fast  □Bedfast 
Bladder □ Continent  □Incontinent  □Don‘t know 
Bowel  □ Continent  □Incontinent  □Don‘t know 
 
Section THREE - Devices/Aids 
Yes No  
□ □ Incontinence devices/aids 
□ □ Continence Management Plan 
□ □ Uses bed pan 
□ □ Other (please specify)__________________________________________ 
 
Any other comments about the Resident (i.e. demeanour, anything unusual etc.): 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Thank you 
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The following sections are to be completed by a Registered Nurse 
Section 4: Medical Questions: 
Does the resident currently have diarrhoea?   □Yes □No  □Don‘t know 
Has the resident had diarrhoea within the last 6 weeks? □Yes □No  □Don‘t know 
Was a faecal specimen sent off for laboratory tests?  □Yes □No  □Don‘t know 
If yes, what were the results? ___________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Did the resident receive treatment for the diarrhoea?  □Yes □No  □Don‘t know 
Date of initiation of treatment: ____/____/_____  
Date of completion of treatment: ____/____/_____ 
Compliance with treatment regime:    □Yes □No  □Don‘t know 
 
Does the resident suffer from recurring/chronic infections of any sort?  (e.g.. UTI’s, 
wounds, fungal infections)       □Yes    □No 
If yes, specify: ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Photocopy de-identified medicine chart for current drug use  
(apply unique identifier label) 
 
Section FIVE – Hospitalisations 
Has the resident been admitted to hospital in the past 3 months:  □Yes*  □No □Don‘t 
know 
If yes, for how long was the resident in hospital? _____________________________________________ 
* Discharge summary is required 
Section SIX - Procedures 
Has the resident undergone any of the following procedures in the past 4 weeks? 
Yes No Don’t know Procedure 
□ □ □ Surgery 
□ □ □ Enema 
□ □ □ Endoscopy (specify from medical notes) 
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PROLOGUE 
MY ROLE 
My role in this study was as the key researcher, in which I designed the study, co-
ordinated and conducted surveys, entered and analysed data and wrote the report which 
was provided to the stakeholders. I worked with the staff of the Healthcare Associated 
Infection Unit at the Communicable Disease Control Directorate for this project.  
LESSONS LEARNED 
Through this evaluation project, I learnt a lot about healthcare-associated infections, 
infection prevention and control programs, and the importance of a well-structured and 
solid surveillance system. I learnt about survey design, data analysis and interpretation of 
qualitative data, public health writing skills and collaboration with stakeholders.  
PUBLIC HEALTH IMPACT 
The results from this evaluation have been used to assist in the bid to Treasury to upgrade 
patient management system software to automated surveillance technology across WA, 
which will impact infection prevention and control practices within WA healthcare 
facilities.  
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SUMMARY OF EVALUATION 
OVERVIEW 
The Healthcare Infection Surveillance of Western Australia (HISWA) system is a state-
wide surveillance system that collects data on 12 indicators and four denominators 
relating to healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) or exposures in healthcare facilities 
(HCFs) across Western Australia.  
This evaluation of the HISWA system was performed using the US Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines for evaluating a public health surveillance 
system.  This evaluation coincides with the proposal for upgrading HISWA to a 
standardised automated system for capturing infection surveillance data, and so informs 
the development of that proposal.  
ATTRIBUTES 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
HISWA has appropriate technology in place for secure transmission of patient data. Rates 
are published as aggregates and patient-identified data are not released.  
USEFULNESS 
HISWA data are used at HCFs, state and national level for the identification of trends, 
reporting to appropriate authorities and publications by the Healthcare Associated 
Infection Unit (HAIU) and national bodies. Data are also used to inform clinicians and 
administrators at HCFs, direct health policies, assess the impact of interventions, guide 
antimicrobial stewardship practices, conduct research, and in scientific publications.  
SIMPLICITY  
The current structure of data flow through HISWA is straightforward; however, data 
collection at HCFs for submission to HISWA is complex and time-consuming, utilising 
several sources for information, with no consistent processes across all HCFs.  
FLEXIBILITY 
The HISWA system has the capacity to be flexible if small changes to the database are 
required. However, if large changes are required, the system is inflexible due to time and 
cost restraints.  
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DATA QUALITY 
The quality of data collected in HISWA is based upon three key factors: meeting the 
definition of a HAI for the specific indicator, internal validation of data collected by the 
HAIU and zero-reporting of data.  
ACCEPTABILITY 
The overall HCF participation rate for submission of data to HISWA from both public and 
private facilities is 97%. Public facilities and private facilities contracted to treat public 
patients are mandated to participate in HISWA as written in the WA Health Operational 
Directive 0527/14. Of the 18 private HCFs who are not mandated to submit data, 15 
facilities voluntarily submit data to HISWA.  
SENSITIVITY AND POSITIVE PREDICTIVE VALUE 
The overall sensitivity and positive predictive value (PPV) for the HISWA system has not 
been evaluated. Informal validation exercises currently involve those cases for which 
laboratory diagnosis is performed through PathWest Laboratory Medicine, and as a result, 
the sensitivity and PPV of HISWA cannot be accurately calculated. In order for both 
sensitivity and PPV to be calculated for the entire HISWA system, a large-scale evaluation 
of these two attributes would have to be performed. This would be expensive and labour 
intensive, and may not be beneficial overall.  
REPRESENTATIVENESS 
Approximately 92% of all beds in WA are within HCFs that submit data to HISWA. This 
indicates that the HISWA system is highly representative of the burden of HAIs across WA 
HCFs.   
TIMELINESS 
Two main components affect the timeliness of the HISWA system – the data collection and 
entry and the publication of reports. HISWA is not a timely system; however this is not a 
necessarily a problem, as most infection prevention and control (IPC) activities do not 
require real-time reporting.   
STABILITY 
The HISWA database entry is web-based and any planned maintenance work is performed 
out-of-hours. The introduction of automated surveillance technology (AST) would replace 
manual data collection and some out-dated IPC technologies currently in use at some WA 
HCFs. 
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RESOURCES FOR SYSTEM OPERATION 
In 2012-13, IPC professionals (IPCPs) spent more than 2,850 hours and over $190,000 of 
attributable costs investigating HAI events for data submission to HISWA. This is a gross 
underestimation of the real amount of time and money spent investigating HAIs as only 11 
infections are reported to HISWA, whilst IPC teams would investigate other HAI events 
that are not reported to HISWA.  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Automated harvesting and reporting of data 
2. Addition of new indicators  
3. Update the HISWA “Terms of Reference” 
4. Change of data analysis and reporting graphs to allow for better comparison with 
other jurisdictions 
5. For greater representativeness, HCFs with beds less than 25 beds to report 
independently, or to a regional centre to report on their behalf 
6. Increased capacity of HAIU for analysing, reporting, timeliness and use of data in 
publications by increasing staff and technology  
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ABBREVIATIONS  
Acronym Full Text 
ABF/M Activity Based Funding/Management 
ACHS Australian Council for Healthcare Standards  
ACSQHC Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care 
AIHW Australian Institute for Health and Welfare 
ANZICS Australia and New Zealand Intensive Care Society 
AST Automated Surveillance Technology 
BSI Bloodstream infections 
CABG Coronary artery bypass grafts  
CAI Community-associated infection 
CDC US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
CDCD Communicable Disease Control Directorate 
CDI Clostridium difficile infection 
CI Confidence interval 
CLABSI Central line-associated bloodstream infection 
COAG Council of Australian Governments 
CRE Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae 
DG Director General 
EAG Expert Advisory Group 
eICAT electronic Infection Control Assessment Technologies  
ESBL Extended spectrum beta-lactamase 
HAI Healthcare-associated infection 
HAIU Healthcare Associated Infection Unit 
HCF Healthcare facility 
HD-BSI Haemodialysis-access bloodstream infection 
HICWA Healthcare Infection Council of Western Australia 
HIN Health Information Network 
HISWA Hospital Infection Surveillance Western Australia 
ICD-10-AM International Classification of Diseases - version 10 - Australian Modification 
ICU Intensive care unit 
IDM Information development and management 
IDSA Infectious Diseases Society of America 
IPC Infection prevention and control 
IPCP Infection prevention and control professional  
IV Intravenous 
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Acronym Full Text 
MRO Multi-resistant organism 
MRSA Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
MSSA Methicillin-susceptible Staphylococcus aureus 
NEAT National emergency access target 
NHHI National Hand Hygiene Initiative 
NHPA National Health Performance Authority 
NHSN National Healthcare Safety Network 
NSQHS National Safety and Quality Health Service  
OD Operational Directive 
OE Occupational exposure 
PAQ Performance and Quality 
PDS Post-discharge surveillance 
PPV Positive predictive value 
SABSI Staphylococcus aureus bloodstream infection 
SHEA Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America 
SSI Surgical site infections 
VAP Ventilator-associated pneumonia 
VRE Vancomycin resistant enterococci 
WA Western Australia 
WACHS Western Australia Country Health Service 
WAMRO EAG Western Australia Multi-Resistant Organism Expert Advisory Group 
WebPAS Web-based patient administration system 
TMS Theatre management system 
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LIST OF TERMS  
Term Definition 
ACCESS Australian Collaborating Centre for Enterococcus and 
Staphylococcus Species (ACCESS) Typing and 
Research  
Contributor A person, typically an IPCP or data manager, who 
contributes data to HISWA for a HCF 
eICAT Software used by the IPCP in WA to store and analyse 
infection control data including surveillance data. It 
was developed by Qld health and purchased by WA 
Health in 2000. It is not an integrated system and 
requires manual data entry into databases. It no 
longer has external IT supports. 
HCare, IMS, TMS, TOPAS and 
WebPAS 
Various patient management systems used in WA 
hospitals that hold patient demographic data and 
medical information  
Healthcare-associated infection 
(HAI) 
An infection acquired by a patient as a result of the 
provision of healthcare 
Indicator A standardised measure to compare health status and 
health system performance 
Infection prevention and control 
professional (IPCP) 
A professional, usually a nurse or epidemiologist, who 
works to prevent and control infections within HCFs 
PathWest Laboratory Medicine 
WA  
The state public sector pathology and laboratory 
service in WA  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1 HEALTHCARE ASSOCIATED INFECTION SURVEILLANCE IN AUSTRALIA 
Surveillance and prevention of HAIs in Australia are coordinated within each jurisdiction; 
Australia does not have a uniform surveillance approach. As such, benchmarking and 
comparison of incidence and prevalence of HAIs are hard to perform1.  
The first jurisdiction to implement a state-wide surveillance program was New South 
Wales where a program was piloted from 1998 until 2000. Queensland followed in 2000 
with the Centre for Healthcare Related Infection Surveillance and Prevention (CHRISP) 
program, then Victoria in 2002 with the Victorian HAI surveillance system (VICNISS). The 
Northern Territory has been collecting HAI incidence data informally for the past 20 years, 
and has only recently commenced jurisdictional reporting to NT Health. Only major 
hospitals in South Australia report HAI data to the state health department. The 
Tasmanian Infection Prevention and Control Unit (TIPCU) was established in 2008 and 
conducts state-wide surveillance1.  
In 2003, the National Strategy to Address Healthcare Associated Infections was published 
by the Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Healthcare and was endorsed by all 
state and territorial health ministers. In 2009 the Australian Commission for Quality and 
Safety in Health Care (ACSQHC) was established and, with it, mandatory reporting of all 
Staphylococcus aureus bloodstream infections (SABSI) by public hospitals began. In 2011, 
hospital-identified Clostridium difficile infections (CDI) and central line-associated 
bloodstream infections (CLABSI) were added as indicators to be reported nationally.  
National reporting of hand hygiene compliance, SABSIs and hospital-identified CDI has 
been mandatory under the National Healthcare Agreement2 since 2009. Data are reported 
by the states and territories to the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), 
which provides state-wide hospital data to the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) 
reform meetings, and to the National Health Performance Agency (NHPA) for publishing 
hospital identified SABSI rates on the MyHospital website as a quality performance 
indicator3.  
1.2 HEALTHCARE INFECTION SURVEILLANCE IN WESTERN AUSTRALIA  
The HISWA system first commenced in 2005, with data voluntarily submitted by both 
public and private healthcare facilities (HCFs) to the Communicable Disease Control 
Directorate (CDCD) of the Department of Health WA. Mandatory reporting of HAI events 
was introduced in 2007 for all public HCFs and those private HCFs contracted to provide 
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care for public patients in WA, as stipulated in the Operational Directive [OD]: Healthcare 
Infection Surveillance in Western Australia OD 0527/144. Other private HCFs voluntarily 
contribute data to HISWA.  
In 2007, the HAIU was established within the CDCD in the Department of Health WA. The 
HAIU is the co-ordinating body for the HISWA system. The Healthcare Infection Council of 
WA (HICWA), consisting of senior medical and nursing personnel, was founded in 2007 by 
the HAIU to provide executive governance and accountability for HAIs across the health 
system in making policy recommendations relevant to the monitoring, prevention and 
control of HAIs across all of WA Health5,6.  
1.3 CURRENT STRUCTURE OF HISWA 
Data are collected on 11 HAI events as well as occupational exposures, and four 
denominator categories in HISWA as outlined in Tables 1a and 1b. The nine mandatory 
indicators and two voluntary indicators reported to HISWA are outlined in the OD 
0527/14 Appendix A: HISWA Program and Reporting Requirements4.  
Table 1a. Indicators (numerators) collected in HISWA 
Indicators 
Surgical site infections following hip arthroplasty 
Surgical site infections following knee arthroplasty 
Surgical site infections following elective or emergency caesarean section 
All methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) infections 
Hospital-identified Clostridium difficile infections (CDI) 
S. aureus bloodstream infections (SABSI) 
Haemodialysis access-associated bloodstream infections (HD-BSI) 
Central-line associated bloodstream infections (CLABSI) in adult intensive care units (ICU) 
CLABSI in Haematology unit 
CLABSI in Oncology unit 
Vancomycin-resistant Enterococci (VRE) sterile site infections 
Occupational exposures 
 
Table1B. Denominators collected in HISWA 
Denominators 
Bed-days and separations (multi-day and same-day) 
Central line-days (central, peripheral) 
Haemodialysis patient-months 
Number of surgical procedures (hip and knee arthroplasty, caesarean sections) 
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Other HAIs that frequently occur but are not collected as indicators by HISWA include 
urinary tract infections (UTIs), bloodstream infections (BSI) with organisms other than S. 
aureus, ventilator-associated pneumonia (VAP), surgical site infections for other 
procedures such as coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) infections, and infections from 
multi-resistant organisms (MROs) including carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae 
(CREs) and extended-spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL) producing organisms. These 
infections can also increase the morbidity and/or risk of mortality to the patient and the 
burden upon the healthcare system.   
The current structure and flow of data through HISWA are straightforward and is 
illustrated in Figure 1. Infection prevention and control teams within HCFs contribute data 
to HISWA. The HAIU team analyses data for the State and generates reports that are sent 
to members of HICWA, WAMRO and to the contributors. Validation of data is performed by 
comparison of data from PathWest, TOPAS/WebPAS and the ACCESS database, and in 
discussions with contributors. The data are the property of the individual contributing 
HCF and are not used without their permission. HISWA complies with the WA Health OD 
0487/14 Data Stewardship and Custodianship Policy7. 
1.4 THE PUBLIC HEALTH IMPORTANCE OF HAIS 
Those people who attend a HCF typically do so as they are undergoing a procedure or 
treatment which puts them at a greater risk of contracting a HAI. Underlying illness i.e. the 
reason for needing a procedure or treatment also increases the risk of contracting a HAI. 
There are several factors that have influence on an individual’s risk of developing a HAI 
including: 
 their immune status at the time of exposure – those who are receiving treatment 
at HCFs are more likely to be immune-compromised 
 their age – neonates and the elderly are more susceptible to HAIs 
 their health status – underlying conditions such as diabetes or cancer, or being a 
smoker increase the risk of contracting a HAI 
 the virulence of the infectious agent and the degree to which it is resistant to 
antimicrobial agents 
There is also a range of other risk factors, such as the presence of an indwelling devices, 
invasive procedures, treatment regimens, and the length of stay in a HCF8.  
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LABORATORIES 
ACCESS data 
HISWA aggregate and annual 
reports (de-identified data) 
published on WA Health website  
 
 DG MRSA report for Health 
Information Division 
 NEAT MRSA report for Performance 
and Quality  
 Area Health Service (Hospital 
Identifiable) 
 HISWA Aggregate Report 
 Hospital Executive Reports 
 ANZICS ICU CLABSI report 
 ABM/F (SABSI/CDI data only) to 
P&Q 
 National Healthcare Agreements 
(SABSI data only) 
 MyHospital (SABSI data only) 
 HISWA Annual Report  
PathWest data 
HAIU 
AT 
CDCD 
HAIU Validation 
DEADLINE:  
Internal validation 
Finalise data  
(zero reporting) 
Does the event 
meet definition of 
criteria for 
notifiable HAI? 
YES 
NO 
Enter into HISWA 
database 
HEALTH 
CARE 
FACILITIES 
Enter denominator 
data into database 
Reports used for  
Infection Control 
Activities 
Contributors 
Infection Control Lab result flags 
in system 
Active Surveillance 
DATA ANALYSIS 
GENERATE REPORTS 
ANNUAL QUARTERLY MONTHLY 
REPORTS 
DISREGARD 
LAB DATA 
Figure 1. Flow of data through HISWA and reports produced by HAIU  
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Within a HCF, patients may be exposed to infectious agents from two sources, from 
themselves (endogenous infections), or from other people, instruments, equipment, or the 
environment (exogenous infections) through contact (direct, indirect), from droplet and 
airborne spread. Endogenous infections may be preventable by decolonizing the patient, 
antibiotic prophylaxis and adequate wound care, whilst exogenous infections may be 
prevented through infection prevention strategies, such as isolation and contact 
precautions, aseptic technique, hand hygiene compliance and environmental cleaning8.  
The impact of HAIs includes an increased risk of morbidity and mortality, reduced quality 
of life, and prolonged hospital stays with additional bed-days and cost of consumable 
items. HAIs are a considerable burden for both the individual patient and the health 
system9. It is estimated that each year in Australia approximately 200,000 patients 
contract HAIs and occupy more than 2 million additional hospital bed days during 
treatment10,11. In WA, it was estimated that in the 2012/13 reporting period, the cost of 
HAI events reported to HISWA was more than $12 million and contributed an additional 
5,000 bed-days12,13.  
Not only is the treatment of HAIs an economic burden, but the prolonged use of antibiotics 
that are often required to treat HAIs increases the risk of resistance to the antibiotic 
developing. Resistance to antibiotics occurs as a natural mechanism of survival for 
bacteria against selective pressures, such as the prolonged and/or unnecessary use of 
broad-spectrum antibiotics in healthcare and agriculture14. This encourages the 
production or acquisition of resistance determinants. Resistance to multiple antibiotics 
occurs, resulting in MROs, such as MRSA, VREs and ESBLs. These MROs are known to 
increase morbidity and mortality, length of stay and overall cost of treatment compared to 
those that are susceptible to antibiotics. Neidell et al., found that infections caused by 
MROs cost significantly more than infections with susceptible organisms ($25,573; 95%CI 
$9,331–$41,816 and $15,626; 95%CI, $4,339–$26,913, respectively) and Cosgrove 
estimated infections due to MROs cost approximately $6,000–$30,000 more to treat than 
those with non-resistant organisms15,16. In WA, both MRSA and sterile site VRE infections 
(both important MROs) are indicators collected by HISWA and, since the early 1980s, 
MRSA has been a notifiable condition. Since 2005-6, there has been a significant decrease 
in the rate of MRSA infections reported to HISWA, from 0.95 infections per 10,000 bed-
days in 2005-06 to 0.74 infections per 10,000 bed-days in 2012-13 (p = <0.01, mid-p 
exact) (Figure 2). CRE infections are not common in WA and, as such, are currently 
monitored by a separate mechanism via the HAIU and Western Australia Multi-Resistant 
Organism Expert Advisory Group (WAMRO EAG).  
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Figure 2. Number and rate of MRSA infections reported to HISWA, 2006/06 – 2012/13. Data 
obtained from HISWA database, July 2014 
Surveillance of HAIs can also be used to assess the quality of care and IPC methods 
provided within a HCF17. Collecting data on bloodstream infections may improve quality of 
care received in hospitals as it can identify areas of improvement in preventing HAIs, and 
the associated systemic problems within HCFs18. SABSI data reported to HISWA are sent 
annually to the Performance and Quality Division (PAQ) of WA Health for activity-based 
management and funding (ABM/F).  
In order to prevent HAIs, it is important to know how many infection events there are. An 
effective surveillance system is central to HCF’s IPC teams’ ability to understand the 
effectiveness of preventative measures currently in place19. It is estimated that up to 70% 
of all HAIs are preventable with appropriate infection prevention and control measures20, 
which include a robust surveillance system. The peak professional bodies for IPC in the US, 
along with the CDC have come together to suggest that HAIs can be eliminated, as has been 
achieved for smallpox, and is hoped for measles and polio, by the “implementation of 
evidence-based practices, alignment of financial incentives, the closing of knowledge gaps, 
and the acquisition of information to assess progress and to enable response to emerging 
threats”21. Whilst Umscheid et al. argue that the goal of preventing 100% of HAI events is 
not practical, the comprehensive implementation of strategies aimed at achieving this goal 
could prevent hundreds of thousands of HAI events22. As stated in the Western Australian 
Strategic Plan for Safety and Quality in Healthcare 2008-2013, “put simply, preventable 
adverse events create an additional unnecessary resource burden on an already strained 
health system and its people” and that after taking into account the cost of preventative 
action, WA Health could save $170 million annually in preventing HAI events23.  
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1.5 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 
“The evaluation must first determine whether the surveillance system meets its primary 
objectives” 9 
1.5.1 PURPOSE 
HISWA was established to undertake standardised monitoring of HAIs in WA, in response 
to the National Strategy to Address Healthcare Infections, 2003. Whilst there is no clearly 
defined purpose of HISWA written in one overarching document, there are several 
documents and websites which describe why there is a system6,24,25. These points include: 
1. to ensure all WA hospitals utilise standardised definitions and methodology 
2. to ensure the validity of data through formal and informal validation exercises 
3. to provide support to surveillance personnel contributing data to HISWA 
4. to reflect the importance of HAIs within the WA Clinical Governance Framework  
5. to provide high quality comparative data 
6. to help inform system-level priority 
7. to evaluate prevention programs in WA  
1.5.2 OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of the HISWA program are to5,24,25:  
1. identify trends and engage clinicians to review clinical care and processes to 
minimise infection risks 
2. ensure activities are aligned, where possible, with Australian and international 
surveillance programs to allow for relevant external benchmarking 
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2. EVALUATION 
2.1 RATIONALE FOR EVALUATION 
Surveillance is the cornerstone of prevention of healthcare associated infections9 
Whilst the HAIU recommends that periodic internal validation of hospital level data by the 
HCF is performed to ensure the continued validity of data submitted to HISWA (Appendix 
1), an overall evaluation of the entire HISWA system has not been performed since the 
inception of the program in 2005. Evaluating a surveillance system ensures that the 
conditions and diseases of public health importance are being monitored efficiently and 
effectively, and that data used for public health action results in reduced morbidity and 
mortality, and overall improvement of health9. By evaluating HISWA, we can identify any 
areas of improvement required to ensure robust surveillance of HAIs across WA HCFs. 
This evaluation also coincides with the proposal of upgrading HISWA and introducing a 
standardised AST system for the capturing of infection surveillance data.  
To effectively reduce the rates of HAIs, a multi-faceted approach is required, which 
includes an efficient surveillance system. Prevention of HAIs is the responsibility of all 
who care for patients, and can cost less than treating such infections. Surveillance of HAIs 
underpins quality improvement in the HCFs26.  
2.2 ENGAGING STAKEHOLDERS 
System stakeholders should be engaged in a discussion to ensure that the evaluation of a 
system addresses appropriate questions and assesses pertinent attributes and that its 
findings will be acceptable and useful 9 
The stakeholders of HISWA include those who collect and enter data, those who analyse 
and report from the data, and those who receive reports from the HAIU. Table 2 shows the 
groups of potential stakeholders involved with HISWA and the activities in which each 
group of stakeholders were invited to participate in for this evaluation.  
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Table 2.  Stakeholder groups of the HISWA System 
Groups Method of Consultation 
Contributors  Online survey participation1 
CDCD – HAIU Consultation throughout planning and evaluation stages 
In-depth interviews about system  
WAMRO EAG Email with four questions 
HICWA Email with four questions 
WACHS Executives Online survey with four questions 
1) Survey questions in Appendix 2, summary of answers in Appendix 3 
2.2.1 ONLINE SURVEY OF CONTRIBUTORS 
Contributors to HISWA - generally nurses, laboratory scientists, or data entry personnel – 
were invited to participate in an online survey questioning their experience with the 
HISWA system (Appendix 2). The survey was constructed in consultation with the CDCD-
HAIU.  
From the 78 contributors contacted, 37 completed the survey, giving an overall response 
rate of 47%. There was no difference in the response rate between metropolitan and rural 
healthcare services (43.3% metropolitan, 42.3% rural, p = 0.65) or in the representation of 
respondents from public and private healthcare facilities (43.8% public, 34.6% private, p = 
0.25). Reminder emails were sent out twice to participants in each survey, which may 
have increased the response rate. Results from this survey are discussed throughout this 
report, and a summary of the responses is in Appendix 3. 
2.2.2 EMAIL SURVEY OF THOSE WHO RECEIVE REPORTS 
An email asking the following four questions was sent to 30 WAMRO EAG and HICWA 
Executive members who regularly receive HISWA reports: 
1. How does your facility use data generated from HISWA? 
2. Do you find the HISWA reports useful? Why/why not? 
3. Is HISWA meeting its objectives? 
4. Are there any other indicators you believe would be useful for HISWA to collect and 
report on? 
The response rate for this survey was very poor (~20%); this may be due to the time 
constraints of those asked to respond. An online survey with the four questions was also 
sent to the Directors of WACHS who receive HISWA reports. The responses were 
anonymous and the response rate was 36.7% (n = 30). Results from this survey are 
discussed throughout this report, whilst a summary of the responses is in Appendix 3. 
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3. ATTRIBUTES 
This evaluation was based upon the CDCs Updated Guidelines for Evaluating Public Health 
Surveillance Systems. Attributes are the characteristics which make up a surveillance 
system9. 
3.1 CONFIDENTIALITY  
There is a need to balance between having adequate data to inform public health practice 
and the ability to protect confidentiality of personal health information9 
Whilst individual patient data are collected and entered into the HISWA system, 
confidentiality of individual events is maintained as no identifiable patient data are 
released, and only de-identified aggregated hospital data are released for reports. The 
security of the online HISWA entry is made up of several layers, combining to provide an 
industry recognised standard of security. These layers include several safety measures as 
outlined in Table 327. 
Table 3.  Security measures for HISWA online data entry website, WA, 2013 
Security measure Protection provided 
SSL (Secure Sockets Layer)  
 
Provides a vehicle for encrypting data transfer 
between the application and the back end database; 
essentially all data requests and updates are 
encrypted before being transferred across the 
network/ internet so that any data that are 
intercepted will be unreadable.  
Authentication via username and 
password  
Ensures only authenticated users can access the 
system. 
Strong password policy  
 
Implementing a strong password policy ensures user 
passwords are harder to decipher.  
Data Validation  
 
All data entered into the system are validated for 
legitimacy. If any data fails to conform to 
predetermined formats, then that request will be 
denied. 
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3.2 USEFULNESS 
Whether useful actions are taken as a result of the analysis and interpretation of the data 
from the surveillance system9 
A public health surveillance system is useful if it contributes to the prevention and control 
of adverse health-related events. Data generated from HISWA is used to prevent HAI 
events at hospital, state-wide and national levels.  
At all three levels, the following of trends over time is the main use of the data generated 
by HISWA. The data can be used to convince clinicians and administrators of potential 
problems, direct hospital policy, assess the impact of interventions, guide antimicrobial 
stewardship practices, conduct research, and make comparisons of rates and practices 
within and between HCFs28. Ultimately, they are used to reduce rates of HAI events in WA 
HCFs.  
3.2.1 HEALTHCARE FACILITIES 
Whilst it may seem straightforward, it is the assessment of the effect of the prevention and 
control programs implemented by IPC teams that make surveillance systems useful9. The 
HISWA system is useful for HCFs as it allows for the benchmarking of HAI rates in their 
facility and evaluation of IPC programs within the HCF. Data collated in HISWA can 
provide an incentive for change leading to an improvement in the quality of care and the 
reduction of HAI events11.  
The majority of respondents commented that the system could be improved by adding the 
ability to amend one’s own errors and incorporating the capacity to extract monthly data 
for one’s own HCF after data submission, without having to contact the HAIU.  However, 
these functionalities already exist within the current HISWA structure, and are 
documented in the HISWA Users Database Manual29. The HAIU is frequently reminding 
IPCPs of these capabilities (HAIU Staff, personal comm., March 2013). Infection and 
exposure data can be modified up until the finalisation of the data at the end of the month 
via the HISWA website, after which the information can only be sighted. Changes to 
finalised data can only be made through communicating with the HAIU29. HISWA 
contributors can generate basic line-listings of infections and/or denominators over a set 
period of time, which can be exported into Excel. A maximum of 10,000 records can be 
extracted at any one time27.  
The data from HISWA have been used to implement changes to IPC practices across WA 
HCFs including increased hand hygiene auditor training and increased education in the 
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importance of hand hygiene compliance, highlighting the need for education sessions of 
aseptic techniques, (W McIntosh, personal comm., January 2014).  
3.2.2 STATE-WIDE 
The HAIU collates HISWA data on a monthly basis. A quarterly aggregated state-wide rate 
is reported for each of the indicators, allowing the tracking of trends over time. HISWA 
data are also used to inform the HAIU for training and education of IPCPs and in the 
development of resources for HAI prevention strategies. For example, trends noticed in 
HISWA, such as a reduction in data quality, or an increase in notifications of one indicator 
type, would be addressed with IPCPs at the relevant HCF, or at the HISWA quarterly 
forum.  
Since the 2005-06 reporting year, the rates of reported CLABSIs in adult ICU in WA have 
decreased significantly (p <0.001) suggesting a positive effect of the HISWA system 
(Figure 3a). However, this cannot be directly attributed to HISWA alone, as monitoring the 
effect of infection prevention measures is limited.  Figures 3a-f demonstrates the output of 
data from HISWA for various indicators with the number of infections reported, and a rate 
of infections per appropriate denominator. For each indicator there is a decrease in the 
rate of infections since 2005-06, with some decreases more distinct than others. The rate 
of CDI notifications has significantly increased; however, it needs to be noted that these 
are hospital-identified infections, which include both community and healthcare-
associated infections.  
Figure 3a. Notifications and rate of CLABSI reported to HISWA, 2005 – 2013. Rates of CLABSI 
reported to HISWA have decreased significantly, from 2.41 per 1,000 line days in 2005-06 to 0.46 
per 1,000 line days in 2012-13 (p <0.001). Data obtained from HISWA database, July 2014 
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Figure 3b. Notification and rate of SSI reported to HISWA, 2005 -2013. Rates of Hip SSIs reported 
to HISWA have reduced from 2.18 infections per 100 procedures in 2005-06 to 1.24 infections per 
100 procedures. Knee SSIs have also reduced, from 1.55 infections per 100 procedures in 2005-06 
to 0.78 infections per 100 procedures in 2012-13 (p= <0.001). Data obtained from HISWA database, 
July 2014 
Figure 3c. Notifications and rate of MRSA reported to HISWA, 2005 – 2013. The rate of MRSA 
infections reported to HISWA has decreased significantly, from 0.95 per 10,000 bed-days in 2005-
06 to 0.74 per 10,000 bed-days in 2012-13 (p <0.001). Data obtained from HISWA database, July 
2014 
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Figure 3d. Notifications and rate of HD-BSI reported to HISWA, 2005 – 2013. The rate of HD-BSI 
reported to HISWA decreased significantly, from 1.12 per 100 patient-months in 2005-06 to 0.38 
per 100 patient-months in 2012-13 (p <0.001). Data obtained from HISWA database, July 2014 
Figure 3e. Notifications and rate of hospital-identified CDI reported to HISWA, January 2010 - June 
2013. The rate of CDI reported to HISWA has significantly increased, from 1.47 per 10,000 bed-days 
in quarter 1 of 2010, to 3.36 per 10,000 bed-days in quarter 2 in 2013. CDI notifications peaked in 
quarter 1 of 2012, with 5.28 reports per 10,000 bed-days (p <0.001). Data obtained from HISWA 
database, July 2014 
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Figure 3f. Notifications and rate of SABSI reported to HISWA, 2007 – 2013. The rate of SABSI has 
decreased significantly, from 0.94 per 10,000 bed-days in 2007-08 to 0.68 in 2012-13 (p <0.001). 
Data obtained from HISWA database, July 2014 
3.2.3 NATIONAL 
The HAIU reports HISWA SABSI data to the AIHW, as it is a mandatory requirement under 
the National Healthcare Agreement. The NHPA uses the SABSI data submitted to AIHW as 
a quality indicator for effectiveness in safety and quality of healthcare provided in major 
and large hospitals. The NHPA publishes national aggregated data on the MyHospital 
website, where the public can view SABSI data for major and large hospitals in each 
jurisdiction26. National data were also useful in forming policy and standards, such as 
Standard 3 of the National Safety and Quality Health Service (NSQHC) Standards. The 
NSQHC Standards were developed by the Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in 
Healthcare (ACSQHC) to protect the public from harm and to improve the standard of 
quality of care provided by HCFs. The NSQHC Standard 3 provides a quality assurance 
mechanism to ensure minimum standards of safety and quality are met and a quality 
improvement mechanism which aims to aid HCFs in attaining quality development goals. 
HCFs that participate in HISWA meet the NSQHC standard section 3.2 “Undertaking 
surveillance of healthcare-associated infections” under the criterion “Governance and 
systems for infection prevention, control and surveillance”, as the action requirements of 
ensuring surveillance system is in place. Surveillance data monitoring is also a 
requirement of participation in HISWA30.  
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3.2.4 FEEDBACK FROM STAKEHOLDERS 
All stakeholders were asked “Is the HISWA system meeting its objectives, as described in 
the HISWA Surveillance Manual?” Almost 90% of the end-users and the majority of those 
who received HISWA reports agreed that the HISWA system is meeting its objectives as 
described in the HISWA surveillance manual (n= 33).  
3.2.5 DATA USED ELSEWHERE 
Data generated in HISWA have previously been used in scientific publications (Table 4). In 
discussing the potential of publishing further articles using HISWA data, the limited 
resources within the HAIU were stated as the main factor why more papers have not been 
published (HAIU staff, personal comm., April 2014).  
Table 4. List of peer reviewed publications wherein data from HISWA have been used, 
2008-2014.  
Authors Title Journal  Year Vol(Is) Page 
Van Gessel, H. Measuring the incidence of Clostridium 
difficile-associated diarrhoea in a group 
of Western Australian hospitals 
Healthcare 
Infect 
2008 13(2) 56 
Goggin LS, van 
Gessel H, 
McCann RL, 
Peterson AM, 
Van Buynder PG. 
Validation of surgical site infection 
surveillance in Perth, Western Australia 
Healthcare 
Infect 
2009 14(3) 101 
Dailey L. Two years of surgical site infection 
surveillance in Western Australia: 
analysing variation between hospitals 
Healthcare 
Infect 
2009 14(2) 51 
Van Gessel H, 
McCann R, 
Peterson A, 
Goggin LS. 
Validation of healthcare-associated 
Staphylococcus aureus bloodstream 
infection surveillance in Western 
Australian public hospitals 
Healthcare 
Infect 
2010 15 1-5 
Grayson ML, 
Russo PL, 
Cruickshank M, 
Bear JL, Gee CA, 
Hughes CF, et al.  
Outcome from the first two years of the 
Australian national hand hygiene 
initiative 
Med J Aust 2011 195 
(10) 
615-
619 
Tracey L, 
D’Abrera V, 
McCann R,  
Peterson A, 
Armstrong P 
Analysis of Hip and Knee Arthroplasty 
Surgical Site Infection Data in Western 
Australia: Null Effect of Stratification by 
Procedure Type 
Infect Cont 
Hosp Epi 
2012 33(3) 313-
315 
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Table 4 continued. List of publications wherein data from HISWA have been used 
Authors Title Journal  Year Vol(Is) Page 
Slimings C, 
Armstrong P, 
Beckingham WD, 
Bull AL, Hall L, 
Kennedy KJ, et al.  
Increasing incidence of Clostridium 
difficile infection, Australia, 2011-2012 
Med J Aust 2014 200(5) 272-
276 
Mitchell BG, 
Collignon P, 
McCann R, 
Wilkinson I,  
Wells A 
A major reduction in hospital-onset 
Staphylococcus aureus bacteraemia in 
Australia - 12 years of progress: an 
observational study 
Clin Infect 
Dis 
2014 ciu508 online 
 
3.3 SIMPLICITY 
The system’s structure and ease of operation9 
3.3.1 DATA MANAGEMENT 
The HISWA system application uses asp.net, an open source server-side web applicant 
framework created by Microsoft for web page development, as the “front end” or data 
entry website and an Oracle database for the “back end”. Data are stored off-site from 
CDCD at the Health Information Network (HIN) since late 2007. HIN is the support and 
maintenance provider of information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure 
and enterprise-wide applications for WA Health. HISWA is supported by Information 
Development & Management (IDM) under the PAQ Division and managed by HIN. Any 
modifications to HISWA are performed by IDM and implemented through HIN.  
3.3.2 DATA ENTRY 
For data entry fields which are completed by selecting a choice from a drop down menu, 
data are complete and consistent; whereas where data are entered in an open field 
textbox, data are often incomplete, inconsistent and error-prone. For example, laboratory 
numbers and patient identification numbers (UMRNs) are often incomplete or incorrect. 
These errors can cause significant delay and compromised reliability of data analysis 
(HAIU Staff, personal comm., 15 April 2014).  
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3.3.3 DENOMINATOR DATA 
Within HISWA, there are four types of denominator data collected – bed-days, central line-
days and haemodialysis patient-months, and the number of surgical procedures (hip and 
knee arthroplasty, C-sections) (Table 1b). Not all HCFs collect all denominator data types, 
as not all facilities perform the surgical procedures, and therefore, are not required to 
submit data regarding those procedures. Contributors reported in the survey that the 
retrieval of denominator data information from the TOPAS system or Business 
Management Unit is often difficult.  
3.3.4  DATA ANALYSIS 
The data extraction process from HISWA was designed so that no complex coding or 
programming was required. Data are analysed using both Microsoft Excel 2007 and Stata 
12.1 (StataCorp, College Station, Texas). Data are aggregated and converted to rates, with 
each indicator using a denominator and population size that is appropriate to it (Appendix 
4). Graphical representation is the most common display of the data in the quarterly and 
annual HISWA reports. Several types of graphs are used in the quarterly and annual 
reports, including bar graphs with 95% confidence interval (CI) lines, proportion bar 
graphs and pie graphs. Tables with large amounts of data regarding rates with 95% CIs for 
each indicator are also presented.  
3.3.5 DATA COLLECTION 
Data on HAI events are initially collected by the HCFs and investigated to determine if the 
event meets the definition of a HAI for specific indicators, and subsequently entered into 
HISWA. There is currently no standardised system in which these primary data are 
collected at the individual HCFs. Some HCFs currently use out-dated, unsupported 
electronic databases, such as the electronic Infection Control Assessment Technology 
(eICAT) MS access database, which does not interface with other WA Health patient 
information systems. Most continue to use manual data collection systems, which are 
error prone, labour intensive and time consuming. Regardless of the data collection 
system, the HCFs are required to manually re-enter the data into the HISWA database to 
allow for state-wide aggregation and analysis of data. If WA were to adopt AST, the 
interfacing with the current information management systems would need to be 
considered and may hamper the implementation process.   
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3.4 FLEXIBILITY 
The ability to adapt to changing information needs or technological operating conditions 
with little additional time, personnel or allocated funds9 
A flexible surveillance system can adapt to changing information needs or operating 
conditions with little additional time, personnel or allocated funds. The HISWA system has 
the capacity to be flexible if small changes are required; however, when changes are 
required by HIN, due to time and cost limitations, the system is inflexible.  
Data are categorised into six “indicator groups” in the HISWA database – specific organism 
bloodstream infections, CLABSIs, HD-BSIs, SSIs, occupational exposures and significant 
organisms (for MROs). Within those groups, indicator events appear on drop-down menus 
which the HAIU can alter from the front-end (website) of HISWA without requiring IT 
support.  Small edits to the back-end (oracle database) of HISWA by HIN are required 
when new indicators are added in order to ensure completeness in the automatic 
extraction of data. An example of this was when the C-Section SSI indicator was added to 
the SSI indicator group in January 2011; following the addition of the indicator by the 
HAIU to HISWA, HCFs were able to report instantly (HAIU Staff, personal comm., 17 April 
2014).  
Changes to the case definitions and data collection fields require changes to the drop-
down menus on the website, which is a simple procedure performed by HAIU, as it follows 
the same procedure as adding an indicator (as described above). However, the addition of 
a new indicator group requires considerable IT support due to changes required in the 
back-end of HISWA, which can be a drawn-out process due to competing priorities for HIN 
support.  
New indicator groups have been added since the inception of HISWA, SABSIs in October 
2007 and occupational exposures (OEs) in January 2008. Further indicator additions to 
HISWA have been through the add-on of drop-down menus and additional data fields. 
However, future requirements for more detailed information for CDI and VRE will require 
substantial changes to the back-end of HISWA, and therefore, are being postponed until 
the outcomes of a bid for the implementation of AST are known.  
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3.5 DATA QUALITY 
The completeness and validity of the data recorded in the system9 
Data quality within the HISWA system is based upon three key factors: meeting the 
definition of a HAI for each indicator, internal validation of data by HCFs and validation of 
submitted data by the HAIU, and “zero-reporting” of data. Correct numerator and 
denominator data are imperative in the setting of public reporting and comparison of 
rates between HCFs. 
3.5.1 ZERO-REPORTING 
Data entered into the HISWA system must be finalised at the end of each month by each 
contributing HCF, verifying that the data entered is correct and complete for the facility. 
This ensures that any zeroes reported are in fact zeroes and not incomplete or lack of 
entered data – i.e. “zero-reporting”27. If a contributor does not finalise their data at the end 
of a month, the HAIU cannot accurately report aggregated state-wide data; whilst HISWA 
reports are still issued, there are caveats to explain any non-validated or missing data.  
Zero-reporting reduces the possibility of reporting incomplete or incorrect information, 
and thus increasing the data quality of HISWA. 
3.5.2 INDICATOR DEFINITIONS 
The definitions of HAIs used in HISWA are analogous with the ACHS definitions, and where 
indicators are not defined by ACHS, the definitions are based upon those of the CDC/ 
National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN). Definitions for the indicators reported to 
HISWA can be found in the HISWA Surveillance Manual, which can be accessed online on 
the HAIU webpage with the Public Health Division website of the Department of Health 
WA6,31. Consistent applications of standardised definitions are essential for high-quality 
data.  
3.5.3 INTERNAL VALIDATION 
Both SABSI and CDI indicators undergo formal internal validation by the HAIU each 
month. Data for positive results for SABSI and CDI, which are downloaded from the state 
pathology service (PathWest Laboratory Medicine), are received two weeks following the 
end of the current calendar month, e.g. October data are received in mid-November. Data 
are cross-checked with data entered into HISWA and any discordant or irregular results 
within the system (e.g. one site reporting more than usual) of any indicator are further 
investigated with the contributing HCF. Data from private hospitals (both mandatory and 
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voluntarily submitted) reported to HISWA are not formally validated, as access to private 
laboratory results is currently unavailable.  
3.6 ACCEPTABILITY 
The willingness of persons and organisations to participate in the system9 
In WA, there are almost 10,000 beds across 113 HCFs, 87 public HCFs, 18 private HCFs 
and 8 haemodialysis-only facilities (Table 5). Of the 18 private HCFs that are not required 
to submit data to HISWA, 15 HCFs voluntarily submit data as they believe in the benefits of 
participating in state-wide HAI surveillance (HAIU staff, personal comm., Feb 2014).  
Table 5. Breakdown of facility types and bed numbers reporting to HISWA. Data obtained 
from HISWA database, July 2014 
Facility type Number of HCFs Number of Beds % Beds 
Public* 87 6,293  
Reports 37 5,695 90.5% 
Does not report† 50 598 9.5% 
Private 18 2,895  
Reports 15 2,797 96.6% 
Does not report 3 98 3.4% 
Haemodialysis only 8 --  
Total 113 9,188 92.4% 
*Public HCFs and private HCFs contracted to provide care to public patients †HCFs <50 beds 
 
The fact that most private HCFs voluntarily participate in HISWA indicates the usefulness 
and acceptability of the system. This may be because of the dissemination of aggregated 
data back to the HCFs, the cost-saving benefits of an effective HAI surveillance system, 
and/or the ability to benchmark with other HCFs.  
3.7 SENSITIVITY AND POSITIVE PREDICTIVE VALUE 
The proportion of cases of a disease detected by the system i.e. “completeness” (sensitivity) 
and the proportion of the events that actually have the event under surveillance (PPV)9 
The sensitivity and positive predictive value (PPV) of a surveillance system can be 
considered on two levels – case definition and detection of outbreaks. A system that has a 
low sensitivity may still be useful in monitoring disease trends as long as the sensitivity 
remains reasonably constant over time. A low PPV will lead to unnecessary intervention 
and wasted time32.  
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3.7.1 CASE DEFINITION 
The sensitivity of the case definition refers to identifying all possible cases in the 
community; a very sensitive case definition may not be very specific and thereby increase 
the number of false positives. The PPV of the case definition is the proportion of true cases 
who meet the case definition – the higher the PPV of the case definition, the better. The 
PPV of case definitions is affected by the sensitivity and specificity and prevalence of the 
condition in the community – a low PPV indicates that either the case definition is not 
adequate or is not being applied appropriately32. 
As an example of compliance with reporting cases that meet the case definition, Table 6 
shows the number of C. difficile events reported, added and/or deleted during each 6-
month period from 2011 to 2013. Overall, 91% of C. difficile events reported to HISWA 
were correctly reported, with an average of 9% of CDI needing to be adjusted over the 36-
month period showing a high level of concordance with the case definition for CDI.  
Table 6.  Validation data of C. difficile, 2011 – 2013. Data obtained from HISWA 
database, July 2014 
  Added Deleted Correct 
2011 Jan – Jun 12 (4%)  9 (3%) 250 (93%) 
 Jul – Dec 34 (7%) 27 (6%) 393 (87%) 
2012 Jan – Jun 17 (3%) 24 (5%) 481 (92%) 
 Jul – Dec 19 (4%) 25 (5%) 456 (91%) 
2013 Jan – Jun 34 (8%) 12 (3%) 396 (89%) 
 Jul – Dec 6 (3%) 1 (1%) 186 (96%) 
Total 2011-2013 122 (5%) 98 (4%) 2162 (91%) 
 
The high proportion of adjusted events were mostly due to the repeat reporting of CDI in 
patients within an 8-week period, which according to the HISWA definition is the same 
CDI event rather than a separate event. If a patient were to present at different HCFs, this 
patient would be reported more than once in HISWA as there is currently no patient 
tracking available for the HCFs to check previous reports for CDI in across both the public 
and private laboratory systems. HAIU performs internal validation of CDI events to 
remove these duplicate reports, thereby increasing the sensitivity and PPV of CDI 
surveillance (Appendix 1).  
From the total number of CDI reports from 2011 – 2013, the sensitivity of HISWA to detect 
CDI can be estimated at 95%, and the PPV at 96%. This indicates that the system is not 
detecting many false positives and is capturing the majority of cases that occur.  
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3.7.2 OUTBREAK DETECTION 
It should be noted that the HISWA system was not designed to be used for the timely 
detection of outbreaks within individual HCFs by the HAIU, as the analysis and reporting 
of HISWA is tailored towards observing longer trends (HAIU Staff, personal comm., April 
2014). HAIU reviews the overall trends state-wide; governance and accountability for 
HAIs lies with the individual HCF, and it is the responsibility of the IPCPs to detect 
outbreaks in a timely manner.  
3.8 REPRESENTATIVENESS 
The ability to accurately describe the occurrence of a health related event over time and its 
distribution in the population by place and person9 
Approximately 92.5% (n = 8492) of all beds in WA are within HCFs that report HAI events 
to HISWA. The other 7.5% (n = 696) of beds are within 52 HCFs that do not report to 
HISWA; 50 facilities are small country health services with the majority (92%) having less 
than 25 beds, whilst two facilities are smaller private hospitals (Table 5). The smaller 
HCFs do not report to HISWA as they have low volumes of acute patient activity, or 
capacity (e.g. doctors, technology) to provide acute inpatient services to contemporary 
standards and limited personnel to meet HISWA surveillance requirements. HCFs that are 
smaller than 25 beds are also exempt from national reporting (HAIU staff, personal comm., 
Feb 2014). 
That 92.5% of beds are within HCFs that report to HISWA indicates that the system is 
highly representative of the HCFs throughout the state, capturing the majority of HAI 
events and improving IPC practices within the majority of WA HCFs. Data are not 
representative of the whole population at risk of HAI. The HAIs that are currently collected 
in HISWA are only a small proportion of all infections that are healthcare-associated.  
Whilst the proportion of beds within HCFs throughout WA covered by HISWA is high, 
there is the potential that a HAI is not detected because it occurred post-discharge and the 
patient is not re-admitted to hospital for treatment of the infection. Post-discharge 
surveillance (PDS) is resource intensive for IPCPs and there is currently no standardised 
PDS methodology. HISWA data show that there is a high detection rate for HAIs on 
readmission to hospital for infection, e.g. SSI following hip or knee arthroplasty. In a study 
which performed PDS of C-section SSIs in the UK, there were complications which met the 
definition of a HAI SSI in 8.9% of cases33. Follow-up was performed during the routine 
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appointments with the community midwife. This was made possible due to the combined 
administration of healthcare throughout the UK; the current structure of healthcare in 
Australia means this may not be entirely feasible.  
3.9 TIMELINESS 
Reflects the speed between steps in a system9 
Two main components affect the timeliness of the HISWA system – the data collection and 
entry and the publication of reports.  
3.9.1 DATA COLLECTION AND ENTRY 
Data are submitted to HISWA by contributors at a time within the reporting month that is 
suitable to the HCF, either on an ad-hoc basis, weekly, fortnightly and/or monthly.  HISWA 
business rules require that data must be finalised by the HCF at the conclusion of each 
month (Figure 4).   
 
Figure 4. Timeline of data collection and entry to HISWA 
 
In order to identify whether a case is a HAI, investigation and assessment of the case 
according to the definitions are required. From the online survey it was found that the 
average time spent investigating each case was 30-60 minutes. This approximates to more 
than 1,469 hours spent investigating HAI events, and 1,382 hours spent investigating 
occupational exposures throughout the 2012-2013 financial years (2,851 events). 
However, this is a gross underestimation, as these hours are calculated on the number of 
events reported to HISWA and do not reflect the time spent investigating cases that do not 
fulfil the definition and subsequently are not reported as HAI events34. 
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Furthermore, the flow of data is hampered by the need to manually enter data onto the 
HISWA database. Most contributors to HISWA reported that they pool their cases and 
enter the data at the end of the month. Denominator data must also be collected and 
entered; however, most contributors reported that the entering of denominator data took 
less than one hour per month to perform.  
3.9.2 REPORTS 
Reports are issued by the HAIU every month, quarter and year (Figure 1) and are sent out 
to various organisations and committees (Appendix 4). In the online survey, contributors 
reported that they or their facility made use of both the data collected and the reports 
generated by HAIU by communicating back to the clinical workforce via a number of 
mechanisms and they are used for education and to improve IPC performance. The 
executives who were questioned about the use of reports in their HCFs mentioned that 
they are sent to their peak quality and safety governance committees. They are used for 
internal benchmarking, to identify increased rates of HAI events at their HCF and external 
benchmarking with other HCFs, aggregated WA rates, national and international rates.  
Analysis and interpretation of results of HISWA data takes time and experience. The 
reports are produced by the three staff members of the HAIU. Feedback from the 
executives who responded to the email survey indicated that the quarterly reports could 
be timelier in being released, as the following quarter is already over before any actions 
are able to be taken. However, quarterly data cannot begin to be collated and analysed 
until at least a month after the close of the quarter due to surveillance definitions that 
require a minimum follow-up period of 30 days following the procedure. Whilst the 
comments of the executives are valid, the HAI definitions and the current infrastructure of 
HISWA do not allow for real time reporting.   
3.10 STABILITY 
The system’s reliability and availability9 
The database entry for HISWA is web-based and available to those registered with a valid 
user name and password. Planned outages occur in order to update servers or repair 
hardware, and usually occur after business hours to reduce disruption to HISWA users (R 
McCann, personal comm., March 2014).    
Some HCFs in WA currently utilise eICAT to record and report IPC data, however, this 
program does not allow for automatic input from other WA Health systems, such as TOPAS 
and ULTRA. The eICAT system developers have ceased to provide support, so there will be 
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no further upgrades or new features available. WA Health proposes to introduce AST in 
each public sector HCF, which would replace this outdated software.  
3.11 RESOURCES FOR SYSTEM OPERATION 
With limited public health funding for detection and response, assessment of resources 
devoted to surveillance is critical9 
Prevention can cost less than treating HAIs11. A robust and updated surveillance system 
can reduce the incidence of HAIs, whilst out-dated and poorly supported systems take the 
IPCP away from IPC activities such as education, implementing evidence-based strategies 
to prevent HAIs, and auditing compliance.  
3.11.1 HUMAN RESOURCES 
Questions on time spent on data collection and reporting for the HISWA system were 
asked in the online survey in order to estimate the crude costs associated with gathering 
information.  
The pay rates of HISWA contributors can be used to estimate hourly costing; Registered 
Nurse at RN Level 2.4, the lowest level IPCP is paid $44.18 p/h whilst the senior IPCPs are 
paid up to $64.09 p/h (SRNs level 7). The majority of IPCPs are RN level 2.4, however at 
each tertiary hospital there are senior IPCPs who oversee the IPC teams, most of which are 
paid as either SRN level 4 or 7. As discussed earlier, the majority of contributors (n = 18) 
reported that they spend an average of 30-60 minutes collecting data on each event; the 
estimated time to collect and enter data for HISWA within the 2012-13 reporting period is 
estimated at 2,851 hours. Table 7 details the number of events and the associated costs 
reporting to HISWA in 2012-2013 for each indicator collected.  
This is most likely a lower estimate of the costs, as some IPCP may be paid at higher rates. 
The time allocation may be significantly under-reported as they are not likely to reflect the 
time spent investigating cases that do not meet the definition of a HAI35 and does not 
include investigations of HAIs not reported to HISWA. This estimate represents only the 
cost of the time spent investigating the case, this does not include the cost of the screening, 
laboratory investigations or treatment of the HAI.  
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Table 7. Estimated labour costs for time spent investigating healthcare associated 
infection events for reporting to HISWA by infection prevention and control professionals 
at Registered Nurse level 2.4 (ANF pay rates, 2014) in West Australian healthcare facilities 
Indicator No. events RN Level 2.4 
SSI Hip 42 $1,856 
 Knee 40 $1,767 
 C-section 57 $2,518 
HD-BSI AVF 3 $193 
 AVG 3 $133 
 Cuffed catheter 39 $1,723 
MRSA  176 $7,776 
CLABSI Haematology 18 $795 
 ICU 9 $398 
 Oncology 9 $398 
SABSI   161 $7,113 
CDI  912 $40,292 
Occupational  
Exposures 
Parental 1040 $45,947 
 Non parental 342 $15,109 
TOTAL COST FOR 2013 2,851 $190,858 
 
The costs for HAI surveillance were calculated by averaging the total number of events 
reported to HISWA in 2012-13 and multiplying it by the hourly rate of an ICP paid at RN 
level 2.4, assuming that each event takes 60 minutes to investigate. Many survey 
respondents commented that the resource-intensive nature of the HISWA system means 
that the time spent collecting data left little time to implement any IPC changes. 
3.11.2 INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
To determine if an infection meets surveillance definitions, various sources of data are 
required to gather case information, and the ease of accessing this information can vary 
greatly among hospitals. In the online survey, contributors were asked to list all the 
information sources their HCF uses to investigate HAIs (Table 8).  
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Table 8. Information sources currently in use in West Australian healthcare facilities for 
infection prevention and control purposes as of July 2013  
Database/Source % of HCFs  Database/Source % of HCFs 
TMS 43.2  eICAT 21.6 
ULTRA 37.8  WebPAS 18.9 
ICM 35.1  Pathology/lab results 18.9 
TOPAS 32.4  HCare 16.2 
Discharge summaries 29.7  Patient notes/records 16.2 
Facility Intranet 24.3  ACCESS database 5.4 
4. DISCUSSION 
“The purpose of evaluating public health surveillance systems is to ensure that problems 
of public health importance are being monitored efficiently and effectively”9. Most would 
agree that the surveillance of HAIs is of public health importance, and that HISWA is an 
effective monitoring system. However, there are ways in which the current HISWA system 
could be more efficient.  
4.1 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 
Purpose 1: Ensure all WA hospitals utilise standardised definitions and methodology 
HISWA provides a surveillance manual that includes surveillance definitions and 
methodology for each indicator. Standardised tools for collection of data have been 
developed, which are available on the HISWA website along with the surveillance 
manual6,31.  
Purpose 2: Ensure the validity of data through formal and informal validation exercises 
Since the inception of HISWA in 2005, there have been two formal validation exercises 
performed for SABSI and SSI data6,36,37. SABSI events reported to HISWA were evaluated in 
2008 by comparing all SABSIs diagnosed in public hospitals and found to be an HAI to 
those reported in the HISWA database. The system had a sensitivity of 77% (119/155) 
and specificity of 99% (258/259)36. However, it is important to note that these findings 
cannot be extrapolated, as the study was confined to only those SABSI events which 
occurred in public hospitals. It should also be noted that at the time of this study, not all 
haemodialysis units (including private satellite units) were reporting SABSI infections to 
HISWA. However, in January 2010 an Operational Circular (IC 0042/09: Healthcare 
Associated Infection Surveillance – Mandatory Reporting) mandated the reporting of all 
haemodialysis access-associated BSIs, including SABSIs. A formal validation study of SSI 
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events following hip and knee arthroplasty was conducted in November 2008, finding a 
sensitivity of 83% and specificity of 99%, with PPV and NPV at 94% and 97%, 
respectively37,38.   
As a result of those findings, the HAIU now performs on-going validation for SABSIs and 
CDI events at public hospitals (i.e. those infections that are diagnosed by PathWest 
laboratories), so that if an event is missed, the HAIU can add it to the data and 
subsequently follow up with the corresponding HCF to discuss why this may have been 
missed in their surveillance. This increases the sensitivity of the system in capturing SABSI 
events, with 87 of the 113 HCFs reporting to HISWA being serviced by PathWest 
laboratories. MRSA notifications are established to be true MRSA cases by confirming with 
the ACCESS Typing and Research Laboratory database.  
For both sensitivity and PPV to be calculated for the entire HISWA system, a large-scale 
evaluation of these two attributes would have to be performed. This would be expensive 
and labour intensive and this knowledge may not be beneficial overall.  
Purpose 3: Provide support to surveillance personnel contributing data to HISWA 
The HAIU invests considerable time and effort educating the contributors of HISWA on the 
surveillance requirements and definitions outlined in the HISWA Surveillance Manual and 
updates through formal education sessions, quarterly HISWA forums, and regular one-on-
one interactions with IPCPs. HAI events that are disputed as a result of HAIU internal 
validation are discussed with the HCF IPC team.  
Purpose 4: Reflect the importance of HAIs within the WA Clinical Governance Framework 
Pillar three of the WA Health Clinical Governance Framework concentrates on minimising 
clinical risk and improving overall clinical safety. The three aspects of clinical management 
as stated in the framework are integral to the structure of HISWA and are: 
i. Incident and adverse event reporting, monitoring and trend analysis 
ii. Sentinel event reporting, monitoring and clinical investigation 
iii. Risk profile analysis 
Purpose 5: Provide high quality comparative data  
HISWA data are analysed using risk-adjusted aggregated HAI rates where possible to 
better reflect differences in clinical case-mix between participating hospitals. The ability 
for benchmarking of HAI rates throughout WA was commented on as the major strength of 
the HISWA system in both surveys of contributors and executives.     
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Aggregation of data allows analysis of a larger dataset with increased statistical value, i.e. a 
pooled mean rate along with the cumulative incidence of infections as a proportion of the 
total number of patients at risk. HISWA monitors state-wide trends and may identify 
systemic problems, e.g. IVD-related SABSI, and informs on the need for comprehensive 
actions to be taken across all HCFs. HCFs can benchmark against the state aggregate rate 
(pooled mean rate), and the state aggregate rate can be used to benchmark with other 
jurisdiction rates, e.g. MRSA policies in WA are reflected in a low MRSA HAI rate compared 
to other jurisdictional rates. 
At present, HISWA data are presented as notifications and aggregated rates. Whilst this 
indicates changes from year to year, or facility to facility, it does not present the whole 
picture. Differences in notifications and rates could be due to “common cause variation” 
i.e. natural differences between facilities, or “special cause variation”, i.e. unusual or 
serious problems.  
Currently, the CDC/NHSN use risk-adjusted standardised infection ratios (SIRs) to 
compare HAI rates in a facility/state with baseline rates in the general US population. The 
SIR is calculated in a similar way to standardised mortality ratios; a ratio greater than one 
indicates the rate has increased, a ratio equal to one indicates the rate has remained 
constant, and a ratio less than one indicates the rate has decreased39. No jurisdiction in 
Australia currently analyses and/or presents their data in this manner, but this could be 
useful in the future (HAIU Staff, personal comm., 01 May 2014). Control charts can be 
useful for analysing the data at a facility or jurisdictional level.  Data are presented on a 
scatter graph, with three lines - the median across all facilities and the upper and lower 
control limits. Data points which lie outside of the control limit lines show “special cause 
variation” and require investigation. HISWA could easily change to publishing control 
charts for aggregated rates, which would allow for greater comparison between HCFs 
and/or other jurisdictions. Whilst education in the reading and interpretation of new 
graphs would be required, control charts present data in a way that communicates with 
ease whilst incorporating statistical thinking40. 
Purpose 6: Help inform system-level priority 
HISWA uses surveillance data presented at HICWA to identify issues and problematic 
trends in order to inform and prioritise change required to decrease HAIs in WA HCFs.  
Purpose 7: Evaluate prevention programs in WA 
The HAIU acknowledges that more can be done in bringing together HISWA data and IPC 
strategies/programs (HAIU Staff, personal comm., 21 May 2014). Examples of previous 
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evaluations include the monitoring of data post-introduction of prevention bundles at 
specific HCFs, surveys conducted by HAI, and participation within the West Australian 
Point Prevalence Survey (WAPPS) to determine issues surrounding intravenous line 
related phlebitis and BSIs.  
Objective 1: Identify trends and engage clinicians to review clinical care and processes to 
minimise infection risks 
There are multiple ways in which the HAIU utilise trends detected in HISWA to engage 
IPCPs, clinicians and HCF executives to review IPC processes. The quarterly HISWA Forum 
allows overarching issues to be discussed; whilst the WAMRO EAG and HICWA meetings 
discuss specific issues surrounding IPC. A recent example was an extraordinary meeting of 
the WAMRO EAG to discuss the issues surrounding on-going transmission of VRE within a 
metropolitan HCF.  
Objective 2: Ensure activities are aligned, where possible, with Australian and 
international surveillance programs to allow for relevant external benchmarking 
Depending on the surveillance indicator, HISWA uses HAI surveillance definitions utilised 
by the CDC/NHSN, the ACHS and the ACSQHC definitions. This signifies that HISWA data 
can be compared to jurisdictions that utilise the same HAI definitions, allowing for 
external benchmarking.  The indicators collected within HISWA are the same as those 
collected in most other jurisdictions in Australia, excepting CABGs and surgical antibiotic 
prophylaxis1. When compared to which HAI events are collected internationally, indicators 
cannot be compared directly without first giving consideration to the variations in 
professional culture or clinical practice41.  
4.2 LIMITATIONS 
The effectiveness of HISWA could be improved by reducing the time spent on data 
collection and entry by the introduction of AST throughout WA HCFs. The time taken in 
investigating each potential HAI is a heavy burden for the IPCP. Automatic harvesting of 
data by AST would decrease the time spent on fact-finding and data entry, as well as 
reduce the risk of human error17. Data quality would be improved through integrated 
checks written into the AST program. Whilst the cost of purchasing or developing AST is 
an obvious issue, the cost saved in staff time spent on data entry would be high, potentially 
increasing patient outcomes as the focus of IPC departments could be shifted from data 
collection, entry and analysis to putting into place practical infection control 
measures28,42,43.  
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The indicators collected currently for HISWA cover a range of serious infections; however, 
as the system only collects data for 11 HAI events and occupational exposures, HISWA 
may miss important indicators that represent possible gaps in infection prevention and 
control and reflect the true burden of HAI events within the HCF. However, it is not 
necessary that the system capture all HAI events that occur in a HCF, as the purpose of HAI 
surveillance is to give indication of the quality of care and success of IPC interventions. 
HAI surveillance is best targeted at indicators that are of large enough volume for 
meaningful statistical analysis and the HAIs that are amenable to intervention.  
As smaller HCFs are not currently required to report to HISWA, the representativeness of 
HAI rates across HCF facilities in WA is limited to larger HCFs.  Whilst smaller HCFs have 
lower volumes of acute patient activity, patients are still at risk of developing a HAI. Any 
understanding of HAIs derived from HISWA data or IPC intervention developed is thereby 
limited to the population within larger HCFs.  
In review of the final report, the potential for measurement bias for the questions 
regarding timing due to overlapping time categories was highlighted. For example, 
Question 5 asks “On average, how long (minutes) does it take for you to find and gather 
information on a single event?”, with the possible answers being less than 10 minutes, 10 
to 30 minutes, 30 to 60 minutes, greater than 1 hour and not applicable. The overlapping 
time for 30 minutes in two categories may have led to people nominating either category. 
It is unlikely that this would have had a major error, but does represent a problem with 
questionnaire design, which should have been identified prior to administration of the 
survey. Unfortunately, these errors were discovered after the conclusion of the study, and 
therefore the possibility of resurveying the stakeholders was impossible. The data 
presented in this chapter has not been manipulated to account for this potential bias. 
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5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 CONCLUSIONS 
Overall the HISWA system is well accepted by HCFs and IPCP across the state, both for 
those who are required to report and those who voluntarily report. However, the 
resources required in identifying HAI cases and information for HISWA are at capacity, 
and as such, limit the possibilities of adding other indicators, performing more analysis 
and improving report timeliness is currently unfeasible.   
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
These recommendations were developed in consultation with the members of the HAIU 
and Dr Paul Armstrong (Head of CDCD) in response to the results from the contributors’ 
survey and the evaluation of HISWA.  The feasibility of implementing these 
recommendations was beyond the scope of this evaluation.  
Recommendation 1: That AST is introduced for automated harvesting and 
reporting of data 
The standardisation of collection methods through a roll-out of AST, allowing for the 
automated information harvesting across WA HCFs would reduce data errors and time 
spent on data searching. The HAIU currently has plans to introduce such a program and is 
awaiting confirmation from Treasury.  
Recommendation 2: That there is the addition of new indicators  
Currently, HISWA collects data for 11 indicators, some of which are also collected in other 
jurisdictions/countries. In both the online survey of contributors and email survey of 
executives, the following infection events were suggested for indicators that could be 
collected in the future through the HISWA system: 
 SSIs from cardiothoracic procedures, e.g. CABGs 
 SSIs from colorectal surgery 
 VAP surveillance  
 CREs, ESBL organisms and other emerging MROs 
 Annual invasive device audits 
 Compliance with bundle processes/checklist 
 Surgical antibiotic prophylaxis 
Whilst is may not be necessary to collect data on each HAI event that occurs in a HCF, by 
increasing the scope of knowledge of HAI events in HCFs, IPC teams will be better 
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informed to work with nurses, clinicians and executives to reduce the rates of infection in 
their facility. 
Recommendation 3: That the HISWA “Terms of Reference” are updated 
The current “Terms of Reference” for HISWA is the original document from June 2005 and 
needs to be updated, especially if the purchase and integration of AST occurs.  
Recommendation 4: That there is a change of data analysis and reporting graphs 
to better allow for comparisons to other jurisdictions 
Change of graphs to control charts and scatter plots would allow for simple visual 
comparison of facilities and jurisdictional rates with baseline estimates.  
Recommendation 5: Those HCFs of beds less than 25 to report to a regional key 
to report on their behalf 
As stated earlier, smaller HCFs do not currently report to HISWA as they have very low 
volumes of acute patient activity and limited personnel to conduct surveillance activities. 
Also, HCFs that are smaller than 25 beds are exempt from national reporting (HAIU Staff, 
Personal Comm., Feb 2014). However, it is important to know that the quality of care 
delivered in these smaller HCFs meets the standards required of WA HCFs. Small HCFs are 
currently registered to submit data to HISWA, therefore increased coverage of HAI 
surveillance is possible. Small HCFs could either collate HAI event data and forward to a 
key regional HCF to submit the data on their behalf, or contribute independently.  
Recommendation 7: That there is increased capacity of the HAIU for analysing, 
reporting, timeliness and use of data in publications by increasing staff and 
technology  
The HAIU at the time of this report has three full-time staff who work on state-wide policy 
development, analysing and reporting and validating HISWA data, as well as training 
IPCPs in surveillance, as well as secretariat work for HICWA, WAMRO and the Micro-Alert 
Governance Group that oversees, the WA Micro-alert system and CA-MRSA surveillance. 
Appendix 4 lists the 13 reports published regularly by the HAIU for HISWA. HISWA is an 
effective system, and whilst the HAIU constantly publishes reports, the HAIU does not 
regularly publish its findings in the form of journal articles. The data collected in HISWA 
should be used to publish more in order to achieve a greater understanding of infection 
prevention and control strategies along with the epidemiology of HAIs within WA.  
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The addition of another Project Officer to the HAIU or the creation of student projects for 
Masters Students using pre-existing data could increase the capabilities of the HAIU to 
enhance analysis of the data, introduce new reporting methods such as control charts, and 
publish journal articles and scientific reports from the data collected in HISWA.  
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7. APPENDICIES 
APPENDIX 1 – INTERNAL VALIDATION METHODS 
The following are the internal validation procedures of the indicators collected in HISWA 
as per the HISWA Surveillance Manual31.  
Surgical Site Infections 
A surgical site infection (SSI) can be classified as either a superficial incisional, deep 
incisional or an organ / space infection. HISWA data combines deep incisional and organ / 
space infections to allow for more meaningful statistical analysis and align with published 
reports from other jurisdictions. 
Internal validation of SSIs 
Each infection that appears in HISWA is reviewed to determine if they are congruent with 
the definition of a SSI – meeting the set criteria or are deemed appropriate. Where the 
infections do not meet the definition, the site is contacted by the HAIU to discuss the case 
and is subsequently deleted.  
MRSA infection 
An MRSA infection is when MRSA is isolated from either: 
a) a sterile site 
b) a non-sterile site and MRSA-specific antibiotic therapy is administered by a 
clinician 
All MRSA strains (community or healthcare) are included in the surveillance. Note: 
Patients that are given empirical treatment for a suspected MRSA infection, even if known 
MRSA carriers, should not be included in the surveillance. 
Internal validation of MRSA infections 
Each case is determined if actual MRSA case by cross-checking with the ACCESS database. 
Typing and strain is identified and added to the database. The type of infection is reviewed 
to ensure that the infection meets the criterion of an infection and that it is being treated 
with MRSA drugs – followed up where necessary.  
Hospital-identified CDI case 
A hospital-identified CDI case is CDI identified in a patient attending any area of a hospital 
i.e. admitted patients and those attending emergency and outpatient departments. A 
hospital-identified CDI case reflects the burden of CDI on a hospital and describes 
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healthcare-associated infections, community-associated infections, as well as CDI of 
indeterminate or unknown origin 
Internal validation of CDIs 
The data of all cases of CDI detected by PathWest Laboratory Medicine is downloaded by 
HAIU. All non-HISWA cases and repeats are discarded, with the remaining cases looked at  
VRE sterile site infection 
A VRE sterile site infection is when VRE is isolated from a specimen obtained from a sterile 
site. Do not report VRE isolated from a specimen obtained from a non-sterile site e.g. 
wound, urine, and sputum. Note: Patients that are given empirical treatment for a 
suspected VRE infection, even if known VRE carriers, should not be included in the 
surveillance. 
Internal validation of VREs 
At the time of this report, ad-hoc validation was being performed by the HAIU 
Staphylococcus aureus bloodstream infection (SABSI) 
A patient episode of SABSI is defined as a positive blood culture for S. aureus. Only the first 
isolate per patient within a 14-day period is counted. If the same patient has a further 
positive blood culture reported greater than 14 days after the last positive blood culture, 
then an additional episode is recorded (14-day rule). The 14-day rule is to be applied to 
SABSI that occur in haemodialysis patients (not the 21 days specified for haemodialysis 
access-associated bloodstream infection surveillance).  
Internal validation of SABSIs 
All SABSI cases are validated by the HAIU. This involves an automatic download from 
PathWest (the state laboratory service) of all SABSIs once a month, from which each 
patient is cross-checked, using ICM, program to determine if they meet the criteria for a 
HA-BSI. This check is performed independently of what is entered in the HISWA database. 
Once the cross-check is complete, it is then compared to what is entered into HISWA and 
any discordant cases are formally discussed with the healthcare providers. The majority of 
the time cases are added to the list, not often are they removed.  
Central line-associated bloodstream infection (CLABSI) 
First, the criteria for classification as a BSI event must be met (refer to Appendix 5). A 
CLABSI is a laboratory confirmed BSI in a patient where a central line has been in situ 
within the 48-hour period before the detection of the BSI, and is not related to an infection 
at another body site i.e. there is no other identifiable focus of infection. 
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Internal validation of CLABSIs 
At the time of this report, no internal validations of CLABSI events were being undertaken. 
HD vascular access 
Refers to any intravascular access utilised for the purpose for haemodialysis e.g. cuffed or 
non-cuffed central venous catheters, arterio-venous grafts or fistulae (refer to section 4). 
Internal validation of HD-BSIs 
As the reporting of these events is few, follow-up on individual events is performed by the 
HAIU to ensure that this is a true event.  
Occupational exposure 
An occupational exposure is an incident that occurs during the course of a person’s paid or 
unpaid employment where there is a risk of acquiring a blood borne virus (BBV) following 
exposure to another person’s blood, tissue, or other body fluids that are potentially 
infected with a BBV. Occupational exposures are classified as parenteral or non-
parenteral.  
Internal validation 
Any HISWA event group as “Parental – other” is questioned by the HAIU Project Officer to 
determine what this is and whether it meets the criteria. No other validation is performed 
for OE’s as it is thought that this would be validated on-site. 
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APPENDIX 3 – SUMMARY OF HISWA SURVEY RESPONSES 
In October 2013, all end-users of the Healthcare Infection Surveillance Western Australia 
(HISWA) system, including infection control practitioners (ICPs), nurses and other end-
users, were invited to complete an online survey which asked for feedback on several key 
issues, such as 
 timeliness,  
 information sources, 
 simplicity and understanding,  
 the reports generated by Healthcare Associated Infection Unit (HAIU) and  
 opinion on the strengths and weakness of the system 
 
This report gives the findings from the survey, broken down into the relevant sections, 
with each question supplied as per the survey. All questions within the survey had 
comment boxes so that end-users could explain the reason behind their answer if they felt 
necessary. Where appropriate these comments have been added to this report. 
Respondents 
A total of 37 ICPs completed the survey, 26 from metropolitan locations, and 11 from rural 
locations, with an overall response rate of 47.31% across Western Australia (Table 1). 
There was no difference in the response rate between metropolitan and rural healthcare 
services (p = 0.46) or in the representation of respondents from Public and Private 
healthcare providers (p = 0.81) [using Fischer’s Exact] (Table 2).  
Table 1. Location of survey respondents 
 Total % of respondents % of WA facilities 
Metropolitan 26 70.3 43.3% 
Rural 11 29.7 42.3% 
    
Public 28 75.7 43.08% 
Private 9 24.3 37.5% 
    
Total 37  47.31% 
 
Table 2. Type of facilities respondents represented in HISWA survey 
Region Total (%) 
Metropolitan - Non-Tertiary Hospital 7 (18.9) 
Metropolitan - Tertiary Hospital 9 (24.3) 
WACHS - Integrated District Hospital 5 (13.5) 
WACHS - Regional Resource Centre 5 (13.5) 
Private Hospital - with Public patients 1 (2.7) 
Private Hospital - without Public patients 6 (16.3) 
Haemodialysis Unit - Private 2 (5.4) 
Other 2 (5.4) 
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Timeliness 
Questions about how long is spent on collecting and entering in data were asked to 
determine if the current HISWA system impacted upon data quality and time spent 
performing data collection and entry rather than performing infection prevention and 
control activities.  
Q5. On average, how long (minutes) does it take for you to find and gather information on a 
single event? 
The majority of respondents claim to take 30-60 minutes gathering information on a 
single event (Table 3); however, it was stated in several comments that the total time 
spent is dependent upon type of infection, and the availability of the patient 
notes/records.  
Table 3. Question 5 - average time spent gathering information for a single event 
Average time taken Count (%) 
<10 minutes 4 (10.8) 
10 - 30 minutes 10 (27.0) 
30 - 60 minutes 18 (48.7) 
> 1 hour 2 (5.4) 
Not applicable 2 (5.4) 
Did not answer 1 (2.7) 
 
Q6. How often is information at your facility entered into HISWA? 
Most respondents state that their facility enters the data at the end of the month (Table 4). 
Table 4. Question 6 - when information is entered into HISWA 
When information is entered to HISWA Count (%) 
At the end of each month 21 (56.8) 
At the end of each week 1 (2.7) 
Case-by-case basis 12 (32.4) 
Other 2 (5.4) 
Did not answer 1 (2.7) 
 
Q7. On average, how long does it take for you to complete data entry for a case? (Responses 
from those 12 who entered “on a case-by-case basis” in previous question) 
Of the 12 that responded that they entered their information to HISWA on a case by case 
basis, 10 responded that they spend less than 10 mins entering in data for each case. 
 
Q8. On average, how many hours per week do you spend entering data for HISWA?  
There was only 1 respondent who enters data the end of the week, and they claim to 
spend 1-2 hours per week on data entry.  
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Q9. On average, how many hours per month do you spend entering data for HISWA? 
All respondents were asked this question no matter their frequency of data entry. The 
majority of respondents spend less than 2 hours (Table 5). Those who stated it was not 
applicable said that their data was entered in by a data manager (who will be 
interviewed).  
Table 5. Question 9 - the average time spent data to HISWA each month 
Time spent entering data per month Count (%) 
< 1 hour 13 (35.2) 
1-2 hours 14 (37.8) 
2-3 hours 2 (5.4) 
> 3 hours 3 (8.1) 
Not applicable 4 (10.8) 
Did not answer 1 (2.7) 
 
Q10. On average, how many hours per month do you spend collecting and reporting 
denominator data? e.g. bed-days, patient-months 
Table 6 shows that the majority of respondents spend less than one hour a month 
collecting and reporting denominator data.  
Table 6. Question 10 - the average time spent collecting and reporting denominator data 
for HISWA 
Hours per month denominator data  Count (%) 
< 1 hour 21 (56.8) 
1-2 hours 5 (13.5) 
2-3 hours 5 (13.5) 
> 3 hours 5 (13.6) 
Did not answer 1 (2.7) 
 
Information Sources 
This section of questions asked the end-user about which computer programs they used in 
their facility for infection prevention and control activities. The answers to these questions 
will be useful for the team planning the new computer program in knowing what 
information sources need to be interfaced with for its implementation across the state.  
Q11. What computer databases/systems do you use at your facility for all your infection 
control activities (i.e. not just for HISWA)? (Multiple items can be selected) 
Question 11 asked about all the databases/systems and information sources end-users of 
HISWA employ to collect data for their infection prevention and control activities. These 
responses answered two questions, 1) which computer systems and information sources 
are being used (Table 7a), and 2) how many information sources are being used for 
infection prevention and  control purposes at each facility (Table 7b).  
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Table 7a. Question 11 – which computer databases/systems and information sources 
end-users of HISWA utilise to collect data for infection prevention and control activities. 
Source Count % of all HCFs Source Count % of all HCFs 
TMS 16 43.2 eICAT 8 21.6 
ULTRA 14 37.8 WebPAS 7 18.9 
ICM 13 35.1 Path/lab results 7 18.9 
TOPAS 12 32.4 HCare 6 16.2 
Discharge summaries 11 29.7 Patient notes/ 
records 
6 16.2 
Facility Intranet 9 24.3 Access database 2 5.4 
 
Table 7b.  Question 11 - Number of information sources used at facility  
Number of sources used at HCF Count (%) 
1-2 8 (21.6) 
3-4 18 (48.6) 
5-6 7 (18.9) 
7+ 3 (8.1) 
 
Q13. On average, how many databases do you need to access in order to complete one event 
report? 
Many respondents commented that the number of information sources required 
completing one event report for HISWA.  Despite these comments, the majority of 
respondents claim to use one or two programs (Table 8).  
Table 8. Question 13 - how many information sources are required to complete one event 
report for HISWA?  
Average number of sources required Count (%) 
1 4 (10.8) 
2 14 (37.8) 
3 7 (18.9) 
4 4 (10.8) 
5+ 2 (5.4) 
Don't know/Unsure 6 (16.2) 
 
Simplicity and Understanding 
The following questions asked end-users about their experience in using the HISWA 
system. Statements regarding the HISWA system were given, and end-users were asked to 
rank their agreement to the statement using the ranking scale 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neutral 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
 Not Applicable 
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Q14. The HISWA computer program is easy to use 
Whilst the majority of respondents were positive about their experiences whilst using the 
HISWA computer program (Table 9), one end-user who responded neutrally commented 
that “It’s not the best system and honestly needs an update” 
Table 9. Question 14 - agreement with the statement “The HISWA computer program is 
easy to use” 
Response Count (%) 
Neutral 3 (8.1) 
Agree 22 (59.5) 
Strongly Agree 10 (27.0) 
Did not respond 2 (5.4) 
 
Q15. I can easily update my HISWA data at any time 
The majority of respondents agreed with their ability to update their data at any time 
(Table 10), however, those who did not agree commented on the lack of capacity within 
the system to delete data and described bugs with the finalising of certain sections.  
Table 10. Question 15 - agreement with the statement “I can easily update my HISWA 
data at any time” 
Response Count (%) 
Disagree 2 (5.4) 
Neutral 5 (13.5) 
Agree 23 (62.2) 
Strongly Agree 5 (13.5) 
Did not respond 2 (5.4) 
 
Q16. The HISWA quarterly reports are easy to understand 
Although there was a higher proportion of responders disagreeing or being neutral with 
their opinions on this statement (Table 11), there were no comments to justify as to why 
they believe this. One end-user who agreed with the statement commented that the 
reports are “easy for IC staff to understand but others have difficulty”.  
 
Table 11. Question 16 - agreement with the statement “The HISWA quarterly reports are 
easy to understand” 
Response Count (%)  
Disagree 3 (8.1) 
Neutral 4 (10.8) 
Agree 24 (64.9) 
Strongly Agree 4 (10.8) 
Did not respond 2 (5.4) 
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Q17. I am able to get help if I don't understand things in the HISWA surveillance manual 
Almost 90% of respondents agreed with this statement – the two non-responders 
consistently did not respond to questions 14 – 17, and the two neutrals answered neutral 
or disagree for questions 14-17 (Table 12) 
Table 12. Question 17 - agreement with the statement “I am able to get help if I don't 
understand things in the HISWA surveillance manual” 
Response Count (%)  
Neutral 2 (5.4) 
Agree 17 (45.9) 
Strongly Agree 16 (43.3) 
Did not respond 2 (5.4) 
 
Q18. In your own opinion, the denominator data is simple to collect 
This question asks about the collection of denominator data. For the HISWA system, three 
types of denominator data are collected – Bed-days, Line-days and Patient months. Not all 
facilities collect the three different denominator data types, thus the reason behind the 
high proportion of N/A responses (Table 13). For those who disagreed with the 
statements for collection of denominator data, comments regarding the retrieval of 
information from WebPAS being difficult were common.  
Table 13. Question 18 - agreement with the statement “In your own opinion, the 
denominator data is simple to collect” 
Response Bed-days  
Count (%) 
Line-days  
Count (%) 
Patient-Months  
Count (%) 
Strongly Disagree 1 (2.7) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Disagree 3 (8.1) 4 (10.8) 3 (8.1) 
Neutral 3 (8.1) 6 (16.2) 5 (13.5) 
Agree 15 (40.6) 9 (24.3) 8 (21.7) 
Strongly Agree 4 (10.8) 2 (5.4) 1 (2.7) 
Not Applicable 9 (24.3) 14 (37.9) 16 (43.2) 
Did not respond 2 (5.4) 2 (5.4) 4 (10.8) 
 
Q19. In your own opinion, denominator data is simple to report 
Question 19 differs from question 18 as it asked about the reporting of denominator data 
to HISWA. As per question 18, not all facilities collect the three different denominator data 
types, thus the reason behind the high proportion of “not applicable” responses (Table 
14). There were no comments given to explain the neutral and disagreeing opinions to this 
statement.  
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Table 14. Question 19 - agreement with the statement “In your own opinion, the 
denominator data is simple to report”  
Response Bed-days  
Count (%) 
Line-days  
Count (%) 
Patient-Months  
Count (%) 
Strongly Disagree 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Disagree 2 (5.4) 1 (2.7) 1 (2.7) 
Neutral 2 (5.4) 4 (10.8) 4 (10.8) 
Agree 18 (48.6) 14 (37.8) 11 (29.7) 
Strongly Agree 7 (18.9) 4 (10.8) 3 (8.1) 
Not Applicable 6 (16.2) 13 (35.1) 15 (40.5) 
Did not respond 2 (5.4) 1 (2.7) 3 (8.1) 
 
Q20. If needed, would you know where to find the case definitions used to report for HISWA? 
Case definitions for the indicators reported to HISWA can be found in the HISWA 
surveillance manual. It is quite interesting that 4 end-users reported not knowing where 
to find the case definitions (Table 15), without giving any comment or reason as to why 
this is so. One of the non-respondents commented that “it depended on what it is” as to 
whether or not they could find the case definitions for HISWA.  
Table 15. Question 20 – does the end-user know where to find the case definitions used to 
report for HISWA?  
Answer Count (%) 
Yes 31 (83.8) 
No 4 (10.8) 
Did not respond 2 (5.4) 
 
Q21. Is the HISWA system meeting its objectives, as described in the HISWA Surveillance 
Manual? 
Almost 90% of respondents agreed that the HISWA system is meeting its objectives as 
described in the HISWA surveillance manual (Table 16). The one respondent who did not 
agree also did not know where to find the case definitions, with the three non-respondents 
commenting that they are “unable to comment” on whether or not the above statement is 
true.  
Table 16. Question 20 - the HISWA surveillance system is meeting its objectives, as 
described in the HISWA Surveillance Manual 
Answer Count (%) 
Yes 33 (89.2) 
No 1 (2.7) 
Did not respond 3 (8.1) 
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Reports Generated by HAIU 
HAIU generates reports for the end-users every quarter, as well as compiling an annual 
report. This section of questions were aimed at determining if these reports and the data 
collected for HISWA are useful, as well as any changes or inclusions that could be made to 
the reports and/or the data collected.  
 
Q22. Do you use the HISWA data and/or reports to improve infection prevention and control 
at your facility? 
The majority of end-users make use of both the data collected and the reports generated 
by HAIU (Table 16). Of those who use neither, one commented that “they personally don’t 
use them, but their facility does” and the other two end-users are from small facilities.  
Table 16. Question 22 - end-users make use of the HISWA data and/or reports to improve 
infection prevention and control  
Use Count (%) 
Data only 2 (5.4) 
Reports only 3 (8.1) 
Both Data and Reports 29 (78.4) 
Neither 3 (8.1) 
 
Open-ended questions 
A series of open-ended questions were posed to the end-users for feedback in various 
areas of the HISWA system. This report summarises the answers into the main findings for 
each question. 
Q23. Are there any other reports that you/your facility would find useful? e.g. Breakdown of 
SSIs into superficial and deep, trend lines of performance over time 
The examples given in the question were the most common answers to this question, 
along with comparison of data with other hospitals of similar types. 
Q25. In your opinion, are there any indicators you believe should be collected for the HISWA 
surveillance system? e.g. Other significant organisms, other SSIs (such as colorectal, 
cardiothoracic) 
The following answers were suggested as indicators that should be collected or events to 
take place for HISWA surveillance: 
 Cardiothoracic,  
 Colorectal surgery,  
 CRE and VRE 
 Annual invasive device audits 
 EBSL  Urinary 
 Compliance with bundle 
processes/checklist  
 IC nurse visiting other sites 
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Q26. In your opinion, what are the strengths of the current HISWA computer reporting 
program? 
“User-friendly” and “easy access to data” were the most common answers.  
Q27. In your opinion, what are the weaknesses of the current HISWA computer reporting 
program? 
Many end-users commented on the inability to amend errors or submit late data. There 
were also a lot of descriptions on the faults of the layout and flow of the computer 
program.  
Q28. If the HISWA computer reporting program were to be updated, what changes would you 
like to be made? 
The majority of respondents commented on adding the ability to amend one’s own errors, 
with several other practical suggestions including being able to view data in spreadsheet 
format before final submission and incorporating the capacity to extract monthly data for 
your own Health Care Facility.  
Q29. In your own opinion, what are the strengths of the HISWA surveillance system overall? 
Benchmarking and comparison to past performance were the two major points that 
respondents commented on as the strengths of the HISWA surveillance system. There was 
positive feedback in regards to the reports and the HAIU staff being friendly and available 
to answer questions.  
Q30. In your opinion, what are the weaknesses of the HISWA surveillance system overall? 
Many respondents commented that the HISWA surveillance system is resource heavy and 
time consuming, with all their time spent collecting data with no time to implement 
change. The inability to comment or provide reasons for increase in infections was also 
mentioned by several respondents, as infection rates can be influenced by outside factors.  
Q31. Are there any other comments/feedback about the HISWA surveillance system you 
would like to share? 
This question allowed for end-users to comment or give feedback on the HISWA 
surveillance system which wasn’t asked about earlier. The answers given included a lot 
positive feedback with smiley faces and exclamation marks.  
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SUMMARY OF EXECUTIVE RESPONSE 
Q1. How does your facility use data generated from HISWA? 
Data are reported to:  
 Quarterly Business Performance Meetings –Regional Executive Committees 
 Regional Safety and Quality Committees 
 Regional Infection Control Committees 
 Infection Control Governance Committee 
 Infection Control Advisory Group 
Data are communicated back to the clinical workforce via number of mechanisms 
including: 
 Performance dashboard 
 Reports emailed to Nurse Director of relevant region 
 Infection Control Advisory Group meetings 
 Existing communication networks including meetings, intranet, email 
 Clinical Essential Training 
 
Q2. Do you find the hospital specific reports useful? Why/why not? 
Majority of respondents (8) were aware of the hospital executive summary reports; 2 
were not; 1 was unsure. Majority (10) found the reports useful; one responded ‘no’ as had 
not seen the reports 
 
Q3. Is HISWA meeting its objectives? 
Majority (10) thought HISWA were meeting its objectives (as stated in the HISWA 
manual); one responded ‘no’ as had not seen the reports 
 
Q4. Are there any other indicators you believe would be useful for HISWA to collect and 
report on? 
 Given the national standards there is probably a role to play in appropriate 
antibiotic use rather than focus on infection - the two have an interdependent 
relationship.  
 UTIs 
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APPENDIX 4 – REPORTS SENT USING DATA COLLECTED IN HISWA 
Name Frequency Scope Identified Content Recipient 
NEAT MRSA report Monthly All hospitals with EDs that are 
publicly funded 
By HCF MRSA HAI rate Senior Data Analyst – Performance 
Directorate 
Individual Hospital Quarterly All public and private HCFs By HCF All indicators submitted  ICP via HISWA login 
HISWA Quarterly 
Aggregate report 
Quarterly All public and private HCFs Aggregate All indicators submitted HISWA / HICWA 
 HAIU website 
Hospital Executive Report Quarterly All public and private HCFs Aggregate All indicators submitted CEO/DON each hospital plus relevant 
HICWA rep  
OS&Q Quarterly report Quarterly All public HCFs By HCF All indicators submitted Program Officer OS&Q 
North Metro Quarterly 
report 
Quarterly All North Metro HCFs By HCF All indicators submitted A/Manager Governance & Performance - 
NMAHS 
South Metro Quarterly 
report 
Quarterly All South Metro HCFs By HCF All indicators submitted Manager, Clinical Governance - SMAHS 
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Name Frequency Scope Identified Content Recipient 
WACHS Quarterly report Quarterly All WACHS HCFs By HCF All indicators submitted Clinical Review & Audit Analyst - WACHS 
HISWA Annual report Annually All public and private HCFs Aggregate  
By region  
By size 
All indicators submitted HISWA / HICWA 
 HAIU website 
NHA Performance 
Indicators 
Annually All public HCFs Aggregate S. aureus BSI  AIHW 
MyHospital 
WA ABF / KPI  Annually All public HCFs By HCF S. aureus BSI ABF team and DG and State Health 
Executive Forum  
ANZICS CLABSI  Monthly All HISWA HCFs with ICU By HCF CLABSI ANZICS National Surveillance Project 
Quality Composite Score Quarterly All public HCFs By HCF SABSI, SSI, MRSA Senior Data Analyst – Performance 
Directorate 
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PROLOGUE 
MY ROLE 
I was invited by Dr Paul Armstrong to join a Communicable Disease Network Australia 
(CDNA) working group (WG) investigating a pseudo-epidemic of Barmah Forest virus 
(BFV). As a member of the WG, I developed meeting agendas, arranged teleconferences, 
and distributed information and meeting notes. I undertook a survey of the laboratories in 
Australia to determine the testing procedures for BFV. I wrote a report regarding the 
activities of the working group along with Dr Armstrong.  
In discussion with the WG, I requested notification data from the NNDSS. I analysed the 
data to determine if there were differences in the demographics for those notified with 
BFV during the outbreak period when compared to other times.  
Whilst this chapter is my own work, it contains material from the report to the CDNA on 
the activities of the BFV WG written in collaboration with members of the WG, and the 
PathWest kit evaluation report by written Dr David Smith. 
LESSONS LEARNED 
This project allowed me to utilise my understanding of laboratory procedures and 
knowledge of arbovirus epidemiology, especially when designing the laboratory survey. I 
learnt about collaboration and communication between the public and private 
laboratories, as well as the importance of the interpretation of case definitions. I also 
learnt how to analyse line listed notification data, and the coding for STATA to do this.  
PUBLIC HEALTH IMPACT 
The full impact of this investigation is yet to be seen. However this project improved the 
wider understanding of the limitations of testing for BFV, revealed discrepancies in the 
application of the national case definition across Australia, and provided evidence and 
stimulus to the TGA for the recall of the commercial test kit.  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Tim Sloan-Gardiner, Carolien Giele and Paul Saunders, and the members of the BFV WG: 
Dr Paul Armstrong CDNA  Katrina Knope Comm. Dept of Health 
Dr David Smith PHLN, NAMAC Linda Hueston Arbovirologist, NSW 
Dr Allen Cheng ASID Anita Williams MAE Scholar 
Peter Markey NT Dept of Health A/Prof Martyn Kirk NCEPH (ANU) 
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ABSTRACT 
Barmah Forest virus (BFV) is an alphavirus, similar to Ross River virus (RRV), but only 
found in Australia. Symptoms of a BFV infection include arthritis, rash, fatigue, joint pain, 
myalgia and fever – all of which are similar in presentation to RRV infection, rheumatoid 
arthritis or other viral infections. Due to the non-specific presentation of BFV there are 
several potential differential diagnoses to consider.   
In October 2012 the number of BFV notifications to the National Notifiable Disease 
Surveillance System (NNDSS) increased strikingly from October 2012 in locations which 
are not traditional areas of high arbovirus activity. From anecdotal information, this spike 
in notifications appeared to result from a faulty commercial serological test kit used by the 
majority of laboratories across Australia.  
A working group to investigate this pseudo-outbreak of BFV was convened by the 
Communicable Disease Network of Australia (CDNA). Investigations by the working group 
included a survey of laboratories regarding their testing procedures, several laboratory 
evaluations of the test kit, and an analysis of NNDSS data from 2001 – 2013.  
This chapter is a combined report of two bodies of work; 1) the results from the analysis of 
notification data for BFV from 1 January 2001 – 31 December 2013, and 2) a report to the 
CDNA on the findings from the working group investigating the pseudo-outbreak. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
Acronym Full text 
ASID Australian Society for Infectious Diseases 
BFV Barmah Forest virus 
BFV WG Barmah Forest virus Working Group 
CDNA Communicable Disease Network Australia 
CHIKV Chikungunya virus 
EIA Enzyme immunoassay 
ELISA Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay 
HI haemagglutination inhibition 
ICPMR  Institute for Clinical Pathology and Medical Research 
IFA Immunofluorescence assay 
Ig Immunoglobulin  
NAMAC National Arbovirus and Malaria Advisory Committee 
NCEPH National Centre for Epidemiology and Public Health 
NNDSS National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System 
NPV Negative predictive value 
NT Northern Territory 
PCR Polymerase chain reaction 
PHLN Public Health Laboratory Network 
PHU Public Health Unit 
PPV Positive predictive value 
RA Remoteness area 
RRV Ross River virus 
SA4 Statistical area level 4 
TGA Therapeutic Goods Administration 
WANIDD West Australian Notifiable Infectious Diseases Database 
WG Working group 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Barmah Forest Virus (BFV) is an alphavirus of the Togavirdae family that was first 
discovered in Victoria in 19741,2, with the first human cases reported in 19863.  
1.1 DISEASE 
Of the four alphaviruses in Australia, only Ross River virus (RRV) and BFV are known to 
cause disease in humans4. The incubation period of BFV is 7-10 days post exposure. While 
the majority of BFV infections are subclinical and inapparent1, the clinical presentations 
include a range of non-specific symptoms include rash, fatigue, joint pain, myalgia and 
fever. These symptoms are similar in presentation to an RRV infection, mimic rheumatoid 
arthritis or other viral infections (Table 1 and 2)2,5.  
Table 1. Symptomology and geographic distribution of alphaviruses 
Alphaviruses Arthralgia Fever Rash Where BFV is endemic 
Chikungunya + + + Middle East, Africa, Asia, Oceania, 
Australia 
O'nyong-nyong + + + East Africa 
Ross River + + + Australia, New Zealand, South Pacific 
Islands 
Barmah Forest + + + Australia 
Sindbis + + + Europe, Africa, Middle East, Asia, 
Australia 
 
Table 2. Symptoms of other common viral infections that cause similar symptoms to 
infections with alphaviruses 
Other viruses Arthralgia Fever Rash Other symptoms 
Rubella + low-grade +  
Parvovirus B19 + - -  
Coxsackie viruses + + + Myalgia 
Echovirus + + - Myalgia 
1.2 EPIDEMIOLOGY AND TRANSMISSION 
BFV became a nationally notifiable disease in 19956. Since then, notifications of infection 
have been reported in all states and territories across Australia7. The first outbreak of BFV 
was reported in the NT in 1992, with subsequent outbreaks in southwest WA in 1993-948, 
NSW in 19959 and Victoria in 200010. Whilst BFV disease is notifiable in every jurisdiction, 
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the majority of notifications come from the Australian east coast and the Northern 
Territory6,10.  
BFV is an arbovirus, being transmitted by the female of several mosquito species, 
including, Aedes vigilax and Culex annulirostris4. Both BFV and RRV are sustained in 
mosquito-mammal lifecycles, with the kangaroo being implicated as the main vertebrate 
host for RRV11.  Whilst the viraemia in humans is short lived, previous outbreaks have 
found the propagation of the virus in a man-mosquito-man cycle11. BFV is known to be 
endemic in northern Queensland, the NT, and in the southwest and Kimberley regions of 
WA13. However, disease distribution is only known because of regular mosquito 
monitoring and enhanced case surveillance7. Molecular epidemiology has found that the 
circulating BFV strain is homogenous throughout Australia12. The understanding of 
distribution of BFV is based upon disease notifications and vector monitoring, and because 
of this, there may be possibility that there is unknown transmission and exposure risk13.  
 EFFECT OF WEATHER 
Areas with traditionally little BFV activity which experience variable weather patterns 
may experience fluctuations in mosquito abundance. The geographic distribution of 
mosquito species and their seasonal activity is determined largely by rainfall and 
temperature. Warmer and wetter conditions may lead to extended vector distribution, 
habitat, and abundance. For example, a wetter season may increase the abundance of Ae. 
camptorhynchus, the saltmarsh mosquito, a known vector of both BFV and RRV. However, 
too much rain may potentially flush away larvae or enables their consumption by fish. The 
effect of climate change on vector-borne disease is complex11.  
1.3 LABORATORY DIAGNOSIS 
The current national case definition for a BFV infection requires laboratory evidence 
without any clinical or epidemiological confirmation (Appendix 1)14. This laboratory 
evidence can be: 
 the isolation of BFV, OR 
 the detection of BFV by nucleic acid testing, OR 
 IgG seroconversion or a significant increase in antibody level or a fourfold or 
greater rise in titre to BFV, OR 
 detection of BFV-specific IgM, in the absence of RRV IgM, unless BFV IgG is also 
detected, OR 
 detection of BFV-specific IgM in the presence of BFV IgG 
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The national case definition is based upon the detection of antibodies in serum 
(serology)6, as PCR is not a reliable diagnostic test because the virus is not usually present 
once symptoms develop. Enzyme immunoassays (EIA) are the most common method used 
for detection of antibodies. Other laboratory methods of diagnosis include neutralisation 
assays, haemagglutination inhibition (HI) assays and immune-fluorescence assays (IFA), 
however at present there are only two laboratories in Australia performing these tests, as 
they are time-consuming and require expertise to read and interpret the results (D Smith, 
personal comm., Oct 2013).  
Immunoglobulin (Ig) M is a marker of recent infection, whilst IgG is a marker of long term 
immunity. EIA detects IgG and IgM antibodies specific to BFV within a serum sample. A 
single serological result should not be relied upon as it does not differentiate between 
current and previous infections. A single IgM positive sample alone does not indicate 
recent infection; a confirmatory positive IgG result or a 4-fold increase in IgG titre is 
required, usually taken two weeks after the initial test. Currently confirmatory testing for 
convalescent IgG is rarely conducted (D Smith, personal comm., Oct 2013).  
There is only one commercially available EIA kit for the detection of BFV antibodies, the 
PanBio EIA IgM kit, which is manufactured by Alere SD. An evaluation performed by 
Cashman et al., questioned the validity of the commercial EIA kit due to a high false 
positive rate (19% [7/37]), and suggested the collection of information on travel history 
and risk exposure be included into the case definition1.  Information regarding the date of 
onset, clinical presentation and travel history could also be used in making a diagnosis13.  
1.4 BACKGROUND 
From October 2012 the rate of BFV notifications noticeably increased across all 
jurisdictions and peaked in April 2013. These notifications came from areas which did not 
normally experience arboviral disease, such as metropolitan areas. In many jurisdictions 
these notifications did not match the geographical distribution of mosquitoes as 
determined by jurisdictional mosquito surveillance programs and the arboviral 
surveillance programs of WA and NT did not identify any BFV transmission within 
mosquito populations in the metropolitan regions.  
In July 2013, the CDNA formed the BFV Working Group (WG) to identify reasons for 
dramatic increases in BFV notifications across Australia. During the first teleconference 
the fallibility of the commercial test kit used for sero-diagnosis of BFV was question which 
lead to the survey of laboratories across Australia and the evaluation of the commercial 
test kit.  
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2. METHODS 
2.1 DATA ANALYSIS  
Notification data from January 1 2000 until December 31 2013 were extracted from the 
NNDSS by the Office of Health Protection at the Commonwealth Department of Health. The 
data variables received are listed in Table 3. Population data are publicly available from 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and were downloaded from the website15.  
Data were divided into two categories: 
 Pre-outbreak = from Jan 1, 2001 until September 20, 2012 
 Psuedo-outbreak = from October 1, 2012 until December 31, 2013 
Table 3. Definitions of data variables received from the National Notifiable Diseases 
Surveillance System, Australia (as of August 2014) 
Data type Definition 
Age at onset  
(years) 
 
The age of the individual as reported to the health authority or the 
calculated age at onset, using date of birth.  In calculating the age in 
years, the value has been rounded down to the nearest whole year. 
Sex The current sex of the individual. 
Statistical Area   
Level 4 (SA4)  
 
SA4s are required to have large populations of over 100,000 people in 
order to enable accurate estimates. For this reason, in rural areas 
SA4s generally cover large areas. SA4s are aggregations of whole 
Statistical Area Level 3 boundaries and fit within whole jurisdictional 
boundaries.  
Remoteness  
Areas (RA) 
The Remoteness structure comprises of six categories, each of which 
identifies a non-contiguous region in Australia, being a grouping of 
Statistical Area Level 1 sharing a particular degree of remoteness. The 
degree of remoteness was determined using the Accessibility/ 
Remoteness Index of Australia. 
Notifying state  
or territory 
This field contains information on the State / Territory that sends the 
notification. 
Specimen date This is the date when the first laboratory specimen was taken. 
Notification  
received date 
This is the date when the notification of disease was received by the 
communicable diseases section of the relevant health authority.  
NNDSS derived  
Diagnosis Date 
 
This is the date represents either the onset date or where the date of 
onset was not known, the earliest of the specimen collection date, the 
notification date, or the notification receive date.  
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Table 3 cont. Definitions of data variables received from the National Notifiable Diseases 
Surveillance System, Australia (as of August 2014) 
Data type Definition 
True onset date This is the earliest date the person exhibited symptoms. 
Confirmed status 
 
The confirmation of the disease as per the CDNA case definition. 
According to the BFV case definition, only confirmed cases should be 
notified though the dataset does contain ‘probable cases’. 
There are several caveats associated with NNDSS data, as they only represent a proportion 
of the total number of cases occurring in the community. Detailed explanations of 
associated limitations of NNDSS data are provided in Appendix 7.  
The 1 October 2012 was chosen as the arbitrary point as after this date the notification 
rate increased above what was considered normal. Each variable in the dataset was 
analysed to determine if there was a difference between pre-outbreak and pseudo-
outbreak periods that may indicate that cases occurring during the pseudo-outbreak were 
different to those prior to the pseudo-outbreak.  
Data were received by email and stored in Microsoft Excel. Data were cleaned and 
analysed using STATA 13.0 (Statacorp, Texas) using appropriate statistical methods, 
including t-test, z-tests for continuous data. Linear regression and added-variable plots 
were used to detect trend in notification rates across years. Graphs were produced in 
Microsoft Excel and STATA 13.0.  
Shape files of SLA4 were downloaded from the ABS website15. Maps were created using 
QGIS desktop version, 2.2.0-Valmiera (GNU General Public License). SLA4 location data 
were extracted from the provided NNDSS data and converted to a csv file. Annual rates 
were calculated using ABS population data. Total notified cases per SLA and ranges for the 
disease rate are represented on each map. 
Climate data was obtained from the Australian Bureau of Meterology website22.  
2.2 CDNA WORKING GROUP 
The BFV WG convened twice by teleconference on 25 July 2013 and 7 November 2013, 
both with Dr Paul Armstrong as chair of the meeting.  
 SURVEY OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LABORATORIES 
In September 2013, an online survey was sent to all jurisdictional CDNA representatives 
who were requested to distribute the survey to all public and private laboratories within 
their jurisdictions.  
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The survey was administered using the Survey Monkey online survey provider to 
ascertain testing procedures for BFV serological samples, referral patterns of laboratories 
which do not perform BFV testing, whether laboratories had noticed an increase in 
positive BFV results, the batch number information of commercially-available tests kits 
used throughout 2012 and 2013, and the interpretative comments issued with test results 
to treating doctors (Appendix 2).   
 PATHWEST LABORATORY EVALUATION 
Three laboratory evaluations of the PanBio BFV EIA kit were performed by Dr David Smith 
at PathWest Laboratory Medicine WA (Appendix 3). The first evaluation was of PanBio EIA 
BFV-IgM only positives referred to PathWest from a private laboratory for confirmatory 
testing by IFA, considered to be the gold-standard. The second evaluation was performed 
using IFA, with samples found to be BFV-IgM only positive from a different private 
laboratory. A third more complete evaluation was performed in August 2013 to compare 
the PanBio BFV IgM EIA kit with the PathWest Laboratory in-house HI and IFA-IgM tests.  
Sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value (PPV) and negative predictive value (NPV) 
of the PanBio EIA kit were determined by Dr David Smith. The evaluation included 100 
samples negative for HI and IFA IgM antibodies to RRV, BFV and Chikungunya virus 
(CHIKV) (ie. ‘true negative’ samples); 30 samples positive for BFV IgM by IFA and HI, 30 
samples positive for RRV IgM, and 30 samples positive for CHIKV IgM (ie. ‘true positive’ 
samples). Where results were conflicting, the original tests were repeated.  
 COLLATION OF JURISDICTION-SPECIFIC STUDIES 
2.2.3.1 Victorian case investigations 
The Victoria Department of Health performed investigations into the notifications of BFV 
in Victoria by investigating the confirmed and rejected notifications of BFV to the Health 
Department according to the case definition, looking at the epidemiology and location of 
the case.  
2.2.3.2 Northern Territory case series 
The NT Department of Health performed follow-up on 79 cases of BFV from early 2013 (a 
sample of convenience) and assessed them against two formulated cases definitions for an 
acute arboviral infection; one that was specific and one that was broader (Appendix 4) 
2.2.3.3 Mosquito surveillance 
Interviews were conducted with coordinators of mosquito surveillance programs in NT 
and WA by members of the CDNA.  
  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Notifications of BFV infection by month and year of diagnosis and state or territory , Australia, 2008 to 2013 (NNDSS supplied data, May 2014) 
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3. RESULTS 
 NUMBER OF NOTIFICATIONS 
From 1 Jan 2001 until 30 September 2012 (pre-outbreak), there were 17,634 notifications 
of BFV to NNDSS, with an approximate average annual notification rate of 1,469 
notifications per year (Figure 1, previous page). From 1 October 2012 until 31 December 
2013 (pseudo-outbreak), there were 4,910 notifications of BFV to NNDSS, more than three 
times the average mean notification rate for the last 12 years (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Number of notifications of BFV pre-outbreak and during the pseudo-outbreak 
(NNDSS supplied data, May 2014) 
 SEX 
Across the whole study period, more females were notified with BFV than males, 51.5% 
(n= 11,605) compared to 48.5% (n = 10,926). However, when those notifications made 
during the pseudo-outbreak were removed from analysis, more men (n= 8,937; 50.7%) 
were notified than women (n = 8,684; 49.3%). During the pseudo-outbreak period, women 
were 1.4 times more likely to be notified with BFV than men (RR 1.4, 95%CI 1.3 – 1.5, p 
<0.01). 
 AGE 
The age of those who were notified during the pseudo-outbreak were significantly lower 
than pre-outbreak. The mean age of cases notified pre-outbreak was 42.1 years, which was 
significantly lower than the mean of 44.8 years for people notified during the pseudo-
outbreak (p <0.01). There were significantly more notifications from those in the 10-19, 
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between 50-59 and 60-69 (p <0.05). There was no statistical difference in the other age 
groups (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Histogram of 10-year age groups for pre-outbreak and during the pseudo-
outbreak (NNDSS supplied data, May 2014) 
 JURISDICTIONS 
The proportion of notifications across the eight jurisdictions were statistically different 
pre-outbreak when compared to during the pseudo-outbreak (p <0.01). There were 
significantly less notifications from NSW (p <0.01), and significantly more in both the NT 
and WA (p <0.01). The rate of BFV notifications per 100,000 persons reflects these 
findings (Figure 4). Individual charts for each jurisdiction are presented in Appendix 5.  
 REMOTENESS AND STATISTICAL AREA LEVEL 
Notifications from major cities increased significantly during the pseudo-outbreak. In 
2013, 45% of BFV notifications came from people residing with metropolitan areas. Maps 
1 and 2 illustrate the change in rate of BFV notifications in each SLA4, with increases along 
the east coast from Newcastle to Cairns, including metropolitan Brisbane, as well as in 
Darwin and southwest WA. Rate change data for each SLA4 is provided in Appendix 5. 
 EFFECT OF WEATHER  
Overall, the summer of 2012-13 was the warmest on record nationally. The annual rainfall 
was slightly below average inland and east, whilst above average for the east coast, 
northern Tasmania and parts of WA. There were flooding events along the east coast in 
northern NSW and tropical Queensland – both of these areas experienced increased rate of 
notifications during the pseudo-outbreak, as seen in Map 222. Whilst these events do not 
detract from the fallibility of the EIA kit, it may represent an increase in true cases.    
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Figure 4. Rate of Barmah Forest notifications per 100,000 persons for each 
jurisdiction, 2003 – 20013 (NNDSS supplied data, May 2014) 
 
Figure 5. Rate of Barmah Forest notifications per 100,000 persons for each remoteness 
area, 2003 – 20013 (NNDSS supplied data, May 2014) 
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 Map 1. Mean annual notification rate 2001 – 2012, for BFV 
by statistical area level 4 per 100,000 populations. Data 
obtained from ABS and NNDSS (2014) 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 Map 2. Mean annual notification rate 2013, for BFV by 
statistical area level 4 per 100,000 populations.  
Data obtained from ABS and NNDSS (2014) 
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 COLLATION OF JURISDICTION-SPECIFIC STUDIES 
3.1.7.1 Mosquito surveillance 
Details of mosquito surveillance programs for each jurisdiction were obtained and are 
listed in Table 4. Mosquito surveillance is routinely carried out in most jurisdictions. 
Two jurisdictions - WA and NT - noted that the pattern of notifications did not match the 
distribution of BFV mosquito vectors, nor were they identifying any BFV within mosquito 
populations in the metropolitan regions (C Johansen & P Markey, personal comm., Jan 
2014). 
3.1.7.2 Victorian case investigations 
Of the confirmed cases in Victorian endemic areas with IgM+/IgG- results, none of the 22 
cases had clinically compatible symptoms with epidemiological links. There were a further 
28 cases with IgM+/IgG- results, and seven of these had a low positive IgM result. Victoria 
Health Department rejected a further 32 cases based upon several clinical and 
epidemiological indicators. Of 25 re-bleeds performed, there were no cases of 
seroconversion demonstrated (B Sutton, personal comm., July 2013).  
3.1.7.3 Northern Territory case series 
The NT found that approximately 26% (confirmed and probable cases combined) 
reported symptoms compatible with an acute infection when marked against their specific 
case definition and that approximately 47% of cases reported symptoms compatible with 
an acute infection when marked against their broader case definition (P Markey, personal 
comm., July 2013) (Appendix 5). 
 SURVEY OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LABORATORIES 
Overall, 29 laboratories responded to the survey; 14 from NSW, four each from 
Queensland and Tasmania, three from Victoria, two from South Australia and one each 
from ACT and WA. The response rate was unable to be calculated as the number of 
laboratories that received the survey and did not participate is unknown. However, if the 
number of laboratories accredited by NATA for serological testing is used as the 
denominator, it could be estimated that the response rate to this survey to be 29.9%15.  
From those laboratories that responded, 20 laboratories specified they referred specimens 
for BFV testing to other laboratories, and nine laboratories performed testing in-house. Of 
the nine laboratories that performed testing in-house who responded to the survey, eight 
indicated they use the Alere PanBio EIA kit.  
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Table 4. Mosquito surveillance programs for each jurisdiction – information 
supplied by the National Arbovirus and Malaria Advisory Committee (NAMAC)  
Jurisdiction Program 
NSW New South Wales Arbovirus Surveillance and Vector Monitoring Program: 
mosquito trapping occurs from mid-spring to mid-autumn (November to 
April) 
NT Northern Territory Mosquito Borne Disease Control Program: 21 trapping 
sites throughout Darwin urban area, six traps in Nhulunbuy, three in 
Tennant Creek, four in Katherine, three in Alyangula on Groote Eylandt, and 
six in Alice Springs 
Queensland Mosquito monitoring is performed by some local councils. Opportunistic 
trapping is carried out by the University of Queensland, the Tropical Public 
Health Unit network within Queensland Health and Queensland Institute of 
Medical Research 
SA Mosquito surveillance and control activities are conducted in partnership 
between South Australia Health, University of SA, Local Government and 
Biosecurity SA 
Tasmania No state-wide systematic mosquito abundance, virus isolation or sentinel 
animal surveillance activities are undertaken due to the relatively low risk 
of arbovirus transmission in the state. However, mosquito collections are 
undertaken in Sorell Council region during high risk periods over January 
to March 
Victoria Eight councils undertake mosquito surveillance as part of the standard 
mosquito monitoring program; six councils are located along the Murray 
River; one is a coastal site and the other is within metropolitan Melbourne. 
Additional mosquito surveillance also occurs in the Geelong area. The 
mosquitoes are collected weekly as part of the standard program and sent 
on cold storage to Department of Environment and Primary Industries for 
identification, enumeration and virus isolation. 
WA Mosquito trapping is undertaken by the UWA Arbovirus Surveillance and 
Research Laboratory (ASRL) in collaboration with the Mosquito-borne 
Disease Control group of WA Health 
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Five of the eight laboratories that used the PanBio kit reported an increase in positive 
and/or borderline positive results since early 2013. One laboratory reported an increase 
of borderline positives from 2.5% in 2012 to 9.5% in 2013. One laboratory provided 
primary test data, showing a sharp increase in both positive and borderline positive 
(equivocal) results from November 2012, peaking at 47% positive in March 2013, without 
a return to baseline (Figure 6).  
Batch numbers were provided by six of the eight laboratories using the PanBio kit. 
Identical batches appear to have been used during the increase of BFV notifications from 
October 2012 – March 2013. Interpretative comments issued with test results were 
provided by eight of the nine responding laboratories in this survey. A detailed summary 
of results from the survey is provided in Appendix 6.  
 
Figure 6. Number of IgM positive and borderline data provided by one of the private 
laboratories which used the Alere PanBio BFV EIA kit, November 2012 - June 2013 
 PATHWEST LABORATORY EVALUATION 
The first laboratory evaluation of PanBio EIA BFV-IgM only positives referred to PathWest 
for confirmatory testing showed 0/47 were confirmed by IFA, indicating a false positive 
rate of 100%. The second evaluation, with a further 24 samples referred to PathWest, 
were also all negative for BFV IgM by IFA.  
The third evaluation compared the PanBio kit with HI and IFA for BFV, RRV and CHIKV. 
The BFV-IgM EIA detected 29/30 IFA BFV-IgM positive samples, yielding a sensitivity of 
96.7% (95% CI 80.9 – 99.8%). All 160 samples were negative for BFV IgM by IFA, and the 
analysis yielded a specificity of 96.9% (95% CI 92.5-98.8%). As the specificity for the all 
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the analysis was pooled and yielded a specificity of 96.9% (95% CI 92.5-98.8%). The BFV-
IgM EIA detected 29/30 IFA BFV-IgM positive samples, yielding sensitivity of 96.7% (95% 
CI 80.9 – 99.8%) (Table 5). 
Table 5. IFA-IgM and EIA BFV-IgM results from the third laboratory evaluation 
IFA-IgM status EIA BFV-IGM Signal/Cut-off ratio  
BFV  RRV CHIKV Ratio ≤ 1.0 Ratio>1 
Neg Neg Neg 97 3 
Neg Pos Neg 29 1 
Neg Neg Pos 29 1 
Total 155 5 
 
Using a prevalence of genuine (or ‘true positive’) IgM of 1% in the population being tested 
(ie. the positivity rate for samples from WA patients sent directly to PathWest over this 
period), the PPV for the PanBio EIA IgM is estimated at 24.0%, and the NPV at 99.9%. It is 
important to note that the batches of the test kits used in this evaluation were not the 
same batches implicated in the increase of positive results from October 2012. 
Notwithstanding, the results of this evaluation reveals that under normal circumstances 
the kit meets the prescribed manufacturers specifications. A full report of the results is 
provided in Appendix 4. However, it should be noted that the batches of PanBio BFV IgM 
EIA kits used in this laboratory evaluation are not the same as those used by the 
laboratories during the pseudo-outbreak, and as such, the results may be different.   
4. DISCUSSION 
This investigation aimed to determine the reason/s for the pseudo-outbreak of BFV and if 
a specific demographic pattern would support that a pseudo-outbreak of BFV was 
occurring. This may then act as an early warning system for future increases in BFV 
notifications outside of the norm.  
4.1 ANALYSIS OF NNDSS DATA 
Most arboviral infections occur seasonally; in Australia the peak season is December – 
March. As the beginning of this outbreak occurred outside of the traditional season for 
arboviral infections, it was thought important to compare whole year data rather than just 
during the peak season. The mean notification rate was used for comparison of 
notifications across Australia, years and outbreak periods to take into account the 
variation of populations within states and across time.  
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 AGE AND SEX 
Flexman et al., states that the typical age range for alphaviruses infection is between 20 – 
60 years, with illness uncommon in children13. In reports of previous BFV outbreaks, the 
age and sex distribution have been similar to the typical range. In the 2002 outbreak in the 
Gippsland region in Victoria, there were 23 males and 24 females interviewed, with 51% 
of the cases aged between 20-49 years9. In a retrospective analysis of notifications from 
1993-2003 reported in Queensland, 71% of those notified with BFV were aged between 30 
and 59 years16.  
In this analysis there were statistically significant differences in the age and sex of those 
notified with BFV during the pseudo-outbreak when compared to the previous 12 years. 
Whilst the median age of notifications in this analysis were significantly lower for those 
notified during the pseudo-outbreak, the interquartile range of notifications was 28 – 54 
years, which is within the typical range of 20-60 years suggested by Flexman et al13. 
 GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION  
The majority of notifications during the pseudo-outbreak originated from metropolitan 
areas (44.6%). Whilst there was an increase in the number of notifications from outer 
regional and rural Australia, the analysis of geographic distribution of any arboviral 
disease is affected by several issues.  
4.1.2.1 Reporting 
Using the residential postcode of cases to plot incidence may misrepresent the true 
location of exposure, leading to inaccurate understanding of the disease distribution and 
epidemiology7,13. Ehkles et al. interviewed 30 people notified with BFV in the Hunter New 
England region. Whilst 22 cases lived within a known endemic BFV region, seven the 30 
did not, but reported being bitten by mosquitoes when in an endemic region7.  
Enhanced case surveillance regarding travel history or risk exposure would increase the 
knowledge of exposure and the understanding of disease distribution7,17,18. Areas which 
showed a decrease in BFV notifications during the pseudo-outbreak performed enhanced 
case surveillance to confirm the diagnosis, for example, the Victorian case investigations19. 
However, the current NNDSS database would not be capable of maintaining such 
information, and such data would better serve the local jurisdictions in awareness of 
current arbovirus activity.  
4.1.2.2 Serological testing 
Serological diagnosis of BFV is subject to certain limitations including high false-positive 
rate and the need to confirm recent infection through demonstrated seroconversion13. It 
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should be noted that not all jurisdictions report IgM+ only results, which would impact the 
proportion of notifications. In Victoria, IgM+ only notifications are followed up and second 
serological samples are requested to demonstrate seroconversion. Consequently, false 
notifications in the surveillance system are not as common in Victoria19.  
As exposure history or symptom onset data is not routinely collected, people with 
persisting symptoms may be tested after the acute phase of the disease and be wrongly 
classified as occurring during the off-season18. It is less common for BFV symptoms to 
persist than RRV, however Flexman et al.  states that at least 10% of cases have joint pain 
for more than 6 months13.  
4.1.2.3 Natural habitat and vector distribution 
The range of mosquito species confirmed as vectors of BFV is wide and similar to RRV, 
with the majority of important vector species being associated with coastal wetlands, 
saltmarshes and swamplands7. Aedes notoscriptus, which is an urban mosquito, has also 
been demonstrated to be a competent vector for BFV in laboratory experiments20. People 
living within 3-5 km of saltmarshes or wetlands are at a greater risk of being exposed to 
BFV21.  
There is uncertainty as to what the natural reservoir of BFV in Australia is. Whilst low 
levels of neutralising antibodies have been detected in kangaroos, wallabies, possums, 
horses, dogs and cats after experimental infection, the detected circulating virus level is 
considered too low for mosquitoes to be infected with the virus when bitten. The genetic 
similarity of BFV strains across Australia suggests an avian or bat host7. The disease may 
be introduced into a region through mosquitoes, viraemic humans/stock, birds, or some 
other animal host. This may be one explanation of the change in geographic distribution.  
4.2 CHANGING THE NATIONAL CASE DEFINITION 
Methods to improve the specificity of the current national case definition include requiring 
a second convalescent serological sample, or the inclusion of clinical evidence of typical 
symptoms of a BFV infection. Revisions of the national case definition are currently being 
considered by the National Case Definition WG of CDNA.  
 REQUIRING SECOND CONVALESCENT SAMPLE 
The change of the national case definition to require either the seroconversion to BFV IgG+ 
(if the primary result was BFV IgM+ only) or a 4-fold increase in BFV IgG titre from 
original titre (if the primary result was BFV IgM+/IgG+) in the absence of RRV IgM 
appears on the surface to be a simpler choice than the introduction of clinical evidence, 
but still increases the specificity of the case definition and reduces the potential of false 
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positive notifications. Changes to automated notifications and/or decision trees by 
laboratories for notifying results to jurisdictional notification databases would be 
required; however, the difficulty of this depends upon the set-up of data delivery by the 
laboratories to the jurisdiction. More importantly, requiring a second sample depends on 
the patients returning for a second test and the Doctors being willing to ask their patient 
to have the second test.  
 INCLUSION OF CLINICAL EVIDENCE 
Currently BFV is a laboratory-notified disease, with positive IgM results submitted to the 
jurisdictional health department directly. For example, currently in WA, BFV notifications 
are submitted to the Western Australia Notifiable Infections Disease Database (WANIDD) 
through automated downloads from testing laboratories and instantly set as “confirmed” 
status.  
As previously recommended by Cashman et al., the national case definition could be 
changed so that clinical symptoms of fever with either rash or joint pain would be 
included in the levels of evidence for a diagnosis of BFV1. Changes to the case definition 
requiring diagnosing clinicians’ submitting evidence or a Public Health Unit (PHU) 
following up a case for information would require changes to the operation of 
jurisdictional notification databases. At present, notifiable diseases that require further 
information to submit a notification are often under-reported. 
 EFFECT ON PREVIOUS NOTIFICATIONS 
Should the case definition of BFV be changed to increase the specificity, a decision would 
need to be made as to whether it is retrospectively applied from October 2012 in order to 
remove false-positive results from NNDSS, “clean up” the data and re-calibrate the 5-year 
rolling mean (which is often used as the baseline rate to determine outbreaks). However, 
the data required to apply the new case definition may not exist within NNDSS (ie, clinical 
evidence and/or IgG results) and therefore potentially true cases may be removed. 
Caveats for NNDSS BFV notification data from October 2012 until the end of 2013 should 
be applied so that any future analysis of the data from that period would take into account 
this pseudo-outbreak.  
 EFFECT ON OTHER ALPHAVIRUSES 
As mentioned in the introduction, RRV is very similar to BFV in both physiological and 
epidemiological determinants. Therefore, any change to the national case definition of BFV 
to include clinical indicators or a secondary IgG results could also be considered for the 
national case definition for RRV.  
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4.3 PATHWEST LABORATORY EVALUATION 
While the sensitivity and specificity of the test kit batch evaluated by PathWest Laboratory 
were in keeping with the manufacturer’s description, the population who are tested for 
BFV-IgM have a low pre-test probability of true infection, estimated at less than 1%, 
yielding a low PPV of 24%. Subsequently, most positive tests using the PanBio IgM test kit 
are likely to be false positive results. Therefore, the PanBio BFV IgM EIA test kit is not fit 
for the purpose of the detection of genuine IgM to BFV in populations with a very low risk 
(ie. pre-test probability) of infection. It should be noted that in the absence of IgM in the 
PanBio EIA test has a very high NPV, and so is fit for exclusion of genuine IgM in this 
population. 
As the known distribution of BFV is only within Australia, the commercial competition for 
producing testing kits is low. Because of this, Alere PanBio is the only manufacturer of a 
commercial test kit for BFV IgM and/or IgG. Other methods of testing for BFV are more 
expensive, time consuming and require a certain level of expertise which private 
laboratories may not have. As mentioned earlier, two laboratories in Australia do perform 
alternative methods of testing serum for BFV IgM. A potential possibility to reduce the 
false-positive rate would be the referral of positive samples to one of the two laboratories 
that don’t use the PanBio kit for confirmation of results. Whilst this suggestion is 
physically feasible – one laboratory in NSW and one in WA could cover all jurisdictions– it 
is unlikely to occur, as political and financial reasons, such as who would fund the 
confirmatory test as it would not be covered by Medicare, would obstruct such measures 
being introduced. The referral of tests for confirmation would also affect the timeliness of 
the results and subsequent notifications, which could impact upon public health action.  
4.4 ONLINE SURVEY RESULTS 
Whilst the response rate was potentially quite low (it is unknown how many laboratories 
the survey was distributed to), the results provided insight into the BFV WG as to how 
many laboratories use the PanBio kit, which batches were used during the time period of 
increased notifications, and the standard interpretive comments included in reports sent 
to requesting practitioners regarding serological BFV results.  
4.4.1.1 Batch Use 
The increase of notifications seen from October 2012 which peaked in March 2013 
correlated with the use of batch numbers recalled by Alere in September 2013 (Appendix 
3).  
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4.4.1.2 Interpretive Comments 
Whilst differing in length, the overall message of a second sample being required for 
confirmation was consistent in seven of the eight interpretive comments for BFV 
IgM+/IgG-, RRV IgM-/IgG- results (Appendix 3).  
4.5 RECALLS BY ALERE 
The Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) are responsible for ensuring the tests kits 
used for diagnosis within Australia are safe and fit for their intended purposes under the 
Therapeutic Goods Act 1989.  At the time of investigation, the TGA were approached by 
the working group in order to assist in the investigation into the reliability of the test kit.  
In September 2013 a recall was made by Alere, the manufacturer of the PanBio BFV kits 
(TGA recall issue: RC-2013-RN-00967-1), citing that these kits “may yield an increased 
number of false-positives”23. Alere claims to have performed a validation for the 
performance of the PanBio EIA kit in concordance with the method provided in the kits 
instructions for use, and states that previous investigations have shown that the use of the 
PanBio kit on automated platforms may further increase the proportion of false-positive 
results. Alere indicates that any changes made to the test method, including the use of 
automated platforms, must be validated “in-house” (i.e., specifically for the laboratory 
performing the testing according to their method) in accordance with the laboratories 
quality assurance guidelines23.  
In the communication with laboratories, Alere claimed that “testing of the affected lots 
with internal QC samples has shown that their performance is consistent with product 
manufactured over the past several years. However, after testing of these lots with newly 
sourced, characterised reference samples, it is concluded that there has been a shift in the 
seroepidemiology of the patient population that is currently being tested. The issue has 
been corrected for future lots by adjusting the assay cut-off” [Alere recall notice, 
unpublished work, 13 Sept 2013].  
A second recall of the BFV kit took place in October 2013 (TGA recall issue: RC-2013-RN-
01106-1), involving the batches which replaced those from the primary recall25. Alere 
states in the recall notice that “internal investigations of the affected lot number indicate 
that the performance of this lot may change over time leading to an increased number of 
false positive results”, specifically a decrease in the long-term stability of the positive 
control24.  
Both of the recalls by Alere were made in consultation with the TGA. The TGA deemed the 
recalls as Class II recalls where “the product deficiency could cause illness, injury or result 
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in mistreatment”, but not potentially life-threatening or leading to a serious risk to 
health25.  
 OTHER ARBOVIRUSES 
The quality of the PanBio EIA kit for other arboviruses, particularly for RRV, was 
questioned by the BFV WG during discussions, as it is possible that the reduction in quality 
also affects the diagnosis of other arboviruses by EIA. In April 2013, the PanBio Dengue 
IgM EIA kit was recalled (TGA RC-2013-RN-00358-1) due to “complaints of invalid test 
runs due to results falling outside the cut-off value customer acceptance range leading to 
an invalid test”26. Any evaluation of arbovirus test kits should take into consideration 
whether there are other diagnostic methods and/or commercial test kits available (e.g., 
Meddens DEB-ELISA for RRV) which should also be included in any evaluation.  
4.6 PUBLIC HEALTH ACTION 
Individual jurisdictions advised the clinicians and laboratories regarding the 
interpretation of results from the PanBio BFV EIA test kit. In WA, letters describing the 
potential issue of false positive results and thereby suggesting that “a diagnosis should not 
be made unless a convalescent sample is taken and seroconversion or a rising IgG is 
demonstrated, or the result is confirmed by a different method” were sent to the heads of 
laboratories (P Armstrong, person comm., October 2013).  
Public health action against arboviruses is currently based upon notification numbers, 
mosquito investigations and statistical modelling. PHUs currently work with local 
governments to implement mosquito reduction programs. Warning statements are 
released to the media to inform people when and where there is an increased risk of 
mosquito-borne disease exposure and provide information for mosquito-bite avoidance.  
In the event of a true epidemic of any mosquito-borne disease in Australia, the 
epidemiology of disease transmission within mosquitoes would be evident. Actions which 
could be taken in this event include the implementations of programs to reduce the 
numbers of mosquito larvae and their breeding sites, fogging the mosquito adults, re-
zoning of land-use to prevent human habitation within mosquito-dense areas, and 
building regulation changes to require the installation of flyscreens on doors and 
windows.  
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5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
From the results of the analysis of NNDSS data, it is clear that health agencies should 
investigate the accuracy of BFV notification data when the mean age of notifications 
decreases and the proportion of females being notified increases. Changes in the 
geographic distribution of BFV should be investigated in conjunction with vector and 
animal host studies to determine the possibility of BFV transmission within metropolitan 
and urban areas. The effect of weather should be further investigated to determine the 
influence on geographic distribution of vectors. For future “outbreaks” if BFV, the 
demographic and geographical distribution of mosquitoes needs to be analysed and 
compared with the “pseudo-outbreak” data of this study.  
The evidence collated in this investigation suggests that the poorly performing Alere EIA 
test kit lead to an increase in false positive IgM results and thereby an increase in BFV 
notifications. This can only be surmised, as the batches in question were not evaluated. In 
the laboratory evaluation conducted by PathWest, the sensitivity and specificity of the 
Alere EIA IgM kits was within the parameters stated by the manufacturer, however, 
because the pre-test probability of a person being tested for BFV infection is so low 
(estimated by PathWest to be <1%), the PPV is very low, meaning that the rate false 
positive results will be high. The Alere (formerly PanBio) EIA test kits have had a 
chequered history, with at least two episodes in the past three decades where the 
performance became substandard. With this all in mind, the notification of BFV from a 
single IgM result should be interpreted with caution.” 
5.1 RECOMMENDATIONS 
These recommendations have been put forward to the BFV WG for further consideration. 
It should also be noted that the findings from this report formed the basis for a briefing for 
the CDNA, who were in a position to decide what further action was required.  
Recommendation 1: That samples that are unclear are referred for confirmation 
Neutralisation assays, HI assays and IFAs are considered to be the gold-standard for 
alphavirus antibody detection6. Whilst the commercial EIA kit has been validated against 
these methods, in some circumstances a sample is “borderline” or equivocal, that is, near 
the optical density (OD) cut-off point for a positive result. Throughout the pseudo-
outbreak we saw an increase in these samples. We recommend that laboratories send 
samples that are unclear or have OD readings that are close to the cut off to a reference 
laboratory for confirmation 
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Recommendation 2: That there is an analysis of mosquito and virus distribution 
data for the same period 
In this analysis we observed a shift in the geographic distribution of notifications across 
the 12-year study period. However, relying solely upon notification data to understand the 
distribution of arboviruses is fraught with issues, as discussed previously. To fully 
understand the shift in geographical distribution, , jurisdictions should consider collating 
and analysing mosquito trap site data and compared to human case numbers using 
geographical information system (GIS) software to determine if the virus distribution has 
also shifted.  
Recommendation 3: That the Department clean and/or produce caveats for the 
2012/2013 data for future analysis 
If the case definition of BFV is changed to require a second sample, it may be applied 
retrospectively from October 2012 to “clean up” the data and re-calibrate the 5-year 
rolling mean. However, if this data is not available, caveats for NNDSS BFV notification 
data from October 2012 until the end of 2013 could be applied for future analysis.  
Recommendation 4: That a validation of commercial kit for RRV diagnosis is 
performed 
Selvey et al questioned the fallibility of the RRV commercial test, stating “it is clear that 
detection of IgM in the absence of IgG using the commercial EIA test should be interpreted 
with caution as there is a high chance that it is a false positive”18. As the method of 
antibody detection is the same as that for BFV, it is reasonable to assume that there may 
be issues with the reliability of antibody detection and should be evaluated against the 
gold-standard methods.  
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7. APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1 – NATIONAL CASE DEFINITION FOR BARMAH 
FOREST VIRUS INFECTION, EFFECTIVE 1 JANUARY 2013 
REPORTING 
Only a confirmed case should be notified. 
CONFIRMED CASE 
A confirmed case requires laboratory definitive evidence only. 
LABORATORY DEFINITIVE EVIDENCE 
Isolation of Barmah Forest virus 
OR 
Detection of Barmah Forest virus by nucleic acid testing 
OR 
IgG seroconversion or a significant increase in antibody level or a fourfold or greater rise 
in titre to Barmah Forest virus 
OR 
Detection of Barmah Forest virus-specific IgM, in the absence of Ross River virus IgM, 
unless Barmah Forest virus IgG is also detected 
OR 
Detection of Barmah Forest virus-specific IgM in the presence of Barmah Forest virus IgG 
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APPENDIX 2 – SURVEY OF LABORATORIES FOR TESTING AND 
REPORTING OF BARMAH FOREST VIRUS  
This year it has been noted that there is an Australian-wide increase of Barmah Forest 
virus (BFV) notifications and laboratory reports compared with previous years with 
considerable variability across the jurisdictions.  
Investigations to date suggest that the poor performance of the only available commercial 
test kit for Barmah Forest Virus serology testing is at least partially responsible.  
The Communicable Disease Network of Australia is seeking further information about the 
testing and criteria for reporting of BFV and about any concerns you may have about the 
performance of your test kits.  
This brief survey seeks to obtain information to determine the extent of this problem and 
determine its possible causes. 
1. Do you test for BFV infection at your laboratory?  
☐ Yes (go to question 3) 
☐ No (go to question 2)  
2. If you answered NO to question 1, to which laboratory(ies) do you refer 
specimens for BFV IgM testing? 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
The following questions need only be answered if you answered YES to question 1 
3. What test kits/methods do you currently use for BFV IgM? 
☐PanBio  
☐Other commercial assay: ________________________________________________________________________ 
☐In-house assay, specify: _________________________________________________________________________ 
4. If using the PanBio kit, what batch number(s) is/are you currently using? 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
5. On what date did you start using these batches? _____/________/_________ 
6. What automated platform do you use for performing your EIA tests? 
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________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
7. On what date did you start using this equipment? _____/________/_________ 
8. Have you noticed any increase in the rate of IgM positivity any problems with 
your BFV-IgM assays? 
Yes ☐ (go to question 9) 
 No ☐ (go to question 11)  
9. If you answered YES to question 8, was the change noticed at any particular 
date? _____/________/_________ 
10. Are you able to provide any more details about the nature of the changes (e.g. 
increase in number of IgM positives, the percentage positive rates, the 
signal/cutoff ratios)?  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
11. If using the PanBio kit, do you follow the result interpretation guidelines as per 
the kit insert? Yes ☐           No ☐ 
12. Which of the following criteria do you use for Barmah Forest (BFV) IgM results: 
a. to report to a requesting doctor that results are consistent with recent infection?  
☐ IgM alone 
What comment do you add? _______________________________________________________________________ 
☐ both IgM and IgG  
What comment do you add? _______________________________________________________________________  
☐ seroconversion or a rise in IgG on paired samples 
b. for notification to state Health Departments (as per local public health legislation) that 
results are consistent with recent infection? 
☐ IgM alone  
☐ both IgM and IgG  
☐ seroconversion or a rise in IgG on paired samples 
  
158 
 
 
Thank you for completing this section of the survey. If you are not participating in 
the extended survey (see below) then please submit your survey response.  
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We are seeking some more detailed information form laboratories that are willing and 
able to participate. If you are interested, would you please answer the following questions 
about your ability and willingness to provide this? 
  Yes No Not available 
1A. Are you willing to send patient serum samples to the state PHLN 
lab for further testing?  
If YES: 
☐ ☐ ☐ 
 a. Samples from the past year? ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 b. Samples from previous years? ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 c. IgM positive, IgG negative samples? ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 d. IgM positive, IgG positive samples? ☐ ☐ ☐ 
2A. The previous batch numbers for up to the last five years, 
including inclusive dates when these batches were used? 
☐ ☐ ☐ 
3A. The percentage positive rates for current and past BFV-IgM 
testing, ideally for the last five years and by kit batch number? 
☐ ☐ ☐ 
4A. The information for up to the last five years regarding the 
number/proportion that are IgM +/IgG – and IgM +/IgG +? 
☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
If you are happy to assist but do not have the resources available to get the information 
and/or samples, please contact (insert name and details)  
Once completed please fax or scan and email the survey to (insert name and details) 
 
Many thanks for your assistance with this 
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APPENDIX 3 – LABORATORY EVALUATION OF THE PANBIO EIA 
FOR THE DETECTION OF BARMAH FOREST VIRUS IGM 
Background: In WA, the number of notifications of BFV infection to the Department of 
Health for late 2012 and early 2013 was dramatically higher than that seen in previous 
years and was at the same level as RRV notifications.  Most of these notifications occurred 
in areas without other evidence to suggest increased BFV activity, and were based on the 
detection of IgM to BFV in the absence of IgG using the PanBio EIA test. Furthermore 
testing at PathWest using an in-house HI test and an IFA-IgM was showing the usual low 
rates of positive tests.  Similar experiences with this test were subsequently identified in 
other jurisdictions. Laboratories varied in whether they notified BFV-IgM only samples, so 
that this problem was reflected to varying extents in the jurisdictional notification figures. 
The possibility that these may be false positive IgM results was investigated as false 
positive results may lead to patient misdiagnosis as well as inaccuracies in disease 
notification. 
Current Status: An initial evaluation of PanBio EIA BFV-IgM only positives referred to 
PathWest for confirmatory testing showed that 0/47 confirmed, indicating a false positive 
rate of 100%. 
PathWest undertook an evaluation of the PanBio BFV IgM EIA kit in comparison with their 
in-house HI and IFA-IgM tests. The specificity evaluation included 100 samples negative 
for HI and IFA IgM antibodies to Ross River virus (RRV), Barmah Forest virus (BFV) and 
chikungunya virus (CHIKV), 30 samples positive for BFV IgM by IFA and HI, 30 samples 
positive for RRV IgM , and 30 samples positive for CHIKV IgM Where results were 
conflicting, the original tests were repeated 
Sensitivity: The BFV-IgM EIA detected 29/30 IFA BFV-IgM positive samples, yielding 
sensitivity (95% CI) of 96.7% (80.9 – 99.8%) 
Specificity: 160 samples were negative for BFV IgM by IFA 
IFA-IgM status EIA BFV-IGM Signal/Cutoff ratio  
BFV  RRV CHIKV Ratio ≤ 1.0 Ratio>1 
Neg Neg Neg 97 3 
Neg Pos Neg 29 1 
Neg Neg Pos 29 1 
Total 155 5 
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As the specificity for the all IgM negative samples and the samples containing RRV-IgM or 
CHIKV-IgM are similar, the analysis has been pooled and yielded a specificity of 96.9% 
(92.5-98.8%) 
This data cannot be used to calculate the positive and negative predictive values, as the 
samples are not representative of the population who have diagnostic samples taken (ie 
they have been specifically chosen you have more positive patients than are present in our 
diagnostic population. 
The positive rate for samples from WA patients sent directly to PathWest over this period 
of time was <1%. Using a prevalence of genuine (or ‘true positive’) IgM of 1% in the 
population being tested, the predictive values for the PanBio EIA IgM are estimated to be: 
Positive predictive value (PPV): 24.0%  
Negative predictive value (NPV): 99.97%  
In some populations (eg the Perth metropolitan area) the prevalence of genuine BFV IgM 
is much lower than 1% and the PPV would be therefore be lower than 24.0%. 
In summary, the performance of the PanBio EIA IgM was similar to that described by the 
manufacturer. However, the population who are tested for BFV-IgM have a very low 
prevalence of true positive IgM, yielding a very low positive predictive value.  Therefore, 
the test is not fit for one of its purposes i.e. the detection of genuine IgM to BFV in 
populations with a very low risk (ie. pre-test probability) of infection. Supporting evidence 
is required before a reactive IgM on this test can be interpreted as indicating recent or 
recent past BFV infection. 
The absence of IgM in the PanBio EIA test has a very high negative predictive value, so the 
test is fit for exclusion of genuine IgM in this population. 
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APPENDIX 4 – INVESTIGATION CASE DEFINITIONS USE BY THE 
NORTHERN TERRITORY  
1) Clinical case definition for acute infection (specific) 
Overview 
An acute illness characterised by polyarthralgia and often but not always associated with 
fever, polyarthritis, rash, myalgia, lymphadenopathy and fatigue. 
Definition 
Onset later than 4 weeks before the test, AND 
Peak of disease within 4 days of onset (arbitrary definition of acute), AND 
Pain in more than one small joint (ie excludes knees, elbows and hips), AND 
At least 2 of the following: 
 Fever 
 Evidence of arthritis – redness, heat or swelling in at least one joint. 
 Rash 
 Myalgia – muscle pain as distinct from joint pain 
 Lymphadenopathy 
 
Probable 
Same as above except only need one of the list at the end, OR 
Same as above with 2 from the list but pain restricted to only large joints (but >1 joint) 
  
2) Clinical case definition for acute infection (broad) 
Overview 
An acute illness characterised by polyarthralgia and often but not always associated with 
fever, and rash. 
Definition 
Onset later than 8 weeks before the test, AND 
At least 2 of the following: 
 Fever 
 Rash 
 Polyarthralgia 
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APPENDIX 5 – ADDITIONAL TABLES AND GRAPHS FROM 
ANALYSIS OF NNDSS BFV NOTIFICATION DATA 
 
Figure 1. 10 year age distribution for BFV notifications for each year, 2001 – 2013 
Table 1. Notifications of BFV to the NNDSS per jurisdiction for each year, 2001 - 2013 
Year ACT NSW NT QLD SA TAS VIC WA Total 
2001 2 404 37 590 8 1 20 82 1,144 
2002 0 390 23 401 4 0 58 44 920 
2003 1 451 14 870 2 0 9 19 1,366 
2004 2 377 20 580 7 0 14 70 1,070 
2005 0 461 50 660 28 1 17 63 1,280 
2006 8 653 133 960 196 0 31 179 2,160 
2007 6 567 91 830 60 0 26 86 1,666 
2008 7 539 75 1,234 39 1 31 217 2,143 
2009 3 361 116 808 37 2 17 142 1,486 
2010 3 255 83 895 43 3 53 72 1,407 
2011 3 471 64 866 140 2 210 150 1,906 
2012 1 353 83 983 51 0 38 196 1,705 
2013 7 439 411 2,228 76 3 77 1,050 4,291 
Total 43 5,721 1,200 11,905 691 13 601 2,370 22,544 
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Figure 2. Rate of notifications per 100,000 persons for the Northern Territory, 2003 – 2013 
 
 
Figure 3. Rate of notifications per 100,000 persons for New South Wales, 2003 – 2013 
 
 
Figure 4. Rate of notifications per 100,000 persons for Western Australia, 2003 – 2013 
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Figure 5. Rate of notifications per 100,000 persons for Queensland, 2003 – 2013 
 
Figure 6. Rate of notifications per 100,000 persons for South Australia, 2003 – 2013 
 
Figure 7. Rate of notifications per 100,000 persons for Tasmania, Victoria and the ACT, 2003 
– 2013  
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Table 3. Change in rates for each SLA4 in Australia, 2001 - 2013 
SLA4 01-12 2013 difference SLA4 01-12 2013 difference 
Adelaide –  
Central and Hills 
0.22 0.00 decreased Moreton Bay – N 2.40 8.33 increased 
Adelaide – N 0.13 0.00 decreased Moreton Bay – S 1.95 2.94 increased 
Adelaide – S 0.12 0.00 decreased Mornington Peninsula 0.02 0.27 increased 
Adelaide – W 0.07 0.00 decreased Murray 0.59 1.34 increased 
ACT 0.09 0.00 decreased New England/NW 0.63 2.91 increased 
Ballarat 0.03 0.00 decreased Newcastle/  
Lake Macquarie 
0.54 0.63 increased 
Barossa – Yorke 0.29 0.00 decreased North West 0.60 0.00 decreased 
Bendigo 0.16 1.05 increased NT – Outback 2.76 11.04 increased 
Brisbane – E 1.41 3.75 increased Other Territories 37.71 24.16 decreased 
Brisbane – N 1.15 2.99 increased Perth – Inner 0.30 0.43 increased 
Brisbane – S 0.65 2.03 increased Perth – NE 0.39 1.54 increased 
Brisbane – W 0.82 1.26 increased Perth – NW 0.35 1.26 increased 
Brisbane - In City 0.93 0.62 decreased Perth – SE 0.50 1.24 increased 
Bunbury 1.50 4.43 increased Perth – SW 0.75 2.86 increased 
Cairns 3.16 7.37 increased Qld – Outback 5.41 11.32 increased 
Capital Region 0.85 0.35 decreased Richmond – Tweed 4.20 7.69 increased 
Central Coast 0.40 0.94 increased Riverina 0.37 0.00 decreased 
Central West 0.23 1.48 increased Shepparton 0.52 0.60 increased 
Coffs Harbour/  
Grafton 
4.06 7.94 increased SA – Outback 0.45 0.00 decreased 
Darling Downs/ 
Maranoa 
1.80 1.80 decreased SA – SE 1.23 0.84 decreased 
Darwin 4.37 11.29 increased South East 0.02 0.00 decreased 
Far West and Orana 0.75 0.00 decreased Southern Highlands/ 
Shoalhaven 
0.89 0.53 decreased 
Fitzroy 3.99 10.73 increased Sunshine Coast 4.01 8.38 increased 
Geelong 0.06 0.00 decreased Sydney - Baulkham 
Hills/Hawkesbury 
0.05 0.00 decreased 
Gold Coast 0.83 2.51 increased Sydney – Blacktown 0.03 0.00 decreased 
Hobart 0.02 0.35 increased Sydney - City and In S 0.03 0.00 decreased 
Hume 0.15 0.00 decreased Sydney - E Suburbs 0.02 0.00 decreased 
Hunter Valley  
exc Newcastle 
1.16 2.95 increased Sydney – In SW 0.01 0.00 decreased 
Illawarra 0.09 0.00 decreased Sydney – In W 0.04 0.00 decreased 
Ipswich 0.96 2.74 increased Sydney - N Syd/  
Hornsby 
0.04 0.19 increased 
Latrobe - Gippsland 0.49 0.29 decreased Sydney - N Beaches 0.06 0.00 decreased 
Launceston/ NE 0.02 0.00 decreased Sydney – Out SW 0.02 0.00 decreased 
Logan - Beaudesert 0.84 2.45 increased Sydney - Out W/ 
Blue Mountains 
0.07 0.00 decreased 
Mackay 3.79 8.96 increased Sydney - Parramatta 0.01 0.00 decreased 
Mandurah 3.66 14.41 increased Sydney – Ryde 0.01 0.00 decreased 
Melbourne - In 0.03 0.14 increased Sydney – SW 0.01 0.00 decreased 
Melbourne - In E 0.03 0.21 increased Sydney – Sutherland 0.05 0.00 decreased 
Melbourne - In S 0.02 0.19 increased Toowoomba 0.76 3.61 increased 
Melbourne - NE 0.02 0.00 decreased Townsville 4.10 9.21 increased 
Melbourne - NW 0.02 0.00 decreased Warrnambool/SW 0.05 0.00 decreased 
Melbourne - Out E 0.01 0.00 decreased West/ North West 0.00 0.00 no change 
Melbourne - SE 0.01 0.00 decreased WA – Outback 1.23 3.91 increased 
Melbourne - W 0.01 0.00 decreased WA - Wheat Belt 0.74 2.24 increased 
Mid North Coast 5.09 8.74 increased Wide Bay 2.21 6.98 increased 
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APPENDIX 6 – REPORT ON FINDINGS FROM BFV LABORATORY 
SURVEY 
Thirty-four people completed the survey representing twenty-nine laboratories; 14 from 
NSW, 4 each from Queensland and Tasmania, 3 from Victoria, 2 from SA and 1 each from 
ACT and WA. Table 1 provides an overview of responses to the survey from those 
laboratories that perform BFV serology testing. Below are the results collected from the 
survey in response to the questions, which lists the responses from each laboratory that 
indicated it performed BFV testing.  
1. Do you test for BFV infection at your laboratory? 
Of the 29 laboratories represented in the survey, 20 referred the test to other laboratories 
and 9 performed the BFV serology. Laboratories have been de-identified and labelled Lab 
A – I (Table 1).  
2. If you answered No, which laboratory do you refer your specimens to? 
Laboratories which respondents indicated they referred their samples to include: 
 Douglass Hanly Moir (NSW) 
 Healthscope Pathology (VIC) 
 ICPMR, Westmead (NSW) 
 Pathology North (NSW) 
 Pathology Queensland 
 Pathology West 
 Sullivan Nicholaides Pathology (QLD) 
 VIDRL (VIC) 
 Viral Diagnostic and Referral Laboratory  (NSW) 
3. What test kits/methods do you currently use to test for BFV IgM? 
Seven of the nine laboratories that perform testing report using the Alere BFV kit. One 
laboratory reports performing Indirect ELISA using PanBio BFV microtitre wells, whilst 
the other reports using antibody class capture ELISA incorporating monoclonal 
antibodies.  
4. Do you use and automated platform to perform your EIA tests? If you do use a 
platform to perform your EIA tests, which platform do you use? On what date did 
you start using this platform? 
There appears to be no association in regards to self-reported increase in positives and 
those who use an automated platform (Table 1). 
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5. If you keep records of batch numbers used over time, please list those used since 
July 2012 along with dates they were used (if available). If no information is 
available, please write N/A 
Table 2 provides batch numbers and dates (where supplied) used in the laboratories 
which perform BFV testing. The increase of notifications seen from October 2012 which 
peaked in March 2013 correlates with the use of batch number 12114.  
6. Within the past 12 months, have you noticed any unexpected increase in the rate 
of IgM positivity with your BFV assay? If YES, when was this increase first noticed? 
Are you able to provide any more details about the nature of the changes (e.g. 
increase in number of IgM positives, the percentage positive rates, the signal/cutoff 
ratios)? 
Five laboratories indicated a noticed increase in BFV positive rates (Table 1), with the 
additional information supplied: 
 Lab C expressed that they had seen a “significant increase in the number of 
equivocal/low positive Barmah Forest Virus IgMs” as well as a “significant increase 
in the number of IgM positive samples that failed to seroconvert to IgG upon 
parallel testing with a second sample”  
 Lab I said their BFV IgM Bord/Pos with BFV IgG Negative specimens have 
increased from 2.5 % in 2012 to 9.5% for 2013. 
 Lab D said they had noticed an “increased percentage positivity rate”  
 Lab E provided laboratory percentage data 
 
7. If using the PanBio kit, did you follow the result interpretation guidelines as per 
the previous kit insert? 
All laboratories that use the PanBio kit indicate that they follow the results interpretation 
guidelines. 
8. The caveat on the bottom of laboratory reports 
Table 2 lists the responses from the laboratories for this question (Please note that the 
table is split).  
9. Would you be willing to participate? 
The laboratories B, D, G, H and I indicated their willingness to participate in further 
investigations of the rise in BFV.  
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Table 1. Results from those laboratories that indicated they performed BFV testing in the 
online survey.  
Laboratory State Test Platform Platform  
Start date 
Did you 
notice an 
increase? 
When? 
A NSW Antibody class 
capture ELISA 
incorporating 
monoclonal 
antibodies 
Triturus 2002 No -- 
B Qld PanBio (Alere) Evolis 2005 No -- 
C Qld PanBio (Alere) Tecan 
EVOlyzer 
2008 Yes 02/01/2013 
D SA PanBio (Alere) EuroImmun 
Analyzer I 
/Triturus 
EuroImmun - 
January 
2011, 
Triturus - 
2006 
Yes 02/01/2013 
E WA PanBio (Alere) No N/A Yes 12/01/2012 
F Qld Indirect ELISA 
using PanBio 
BFV (Alere) 
microtitre wells 
No N/A Yes 03/01/2013 
G NSW PanBio (Alere) Aausku SQ II 2013 No -- 
H NSW PanBio (Alere) No N/A No -- 
J NSW PanBio (Alere) BEP 2000 2002 Yes Early 2013 
N/A in the platform start date as those laboratories do not use an automated platform. --  in the 
“when” column indicate that no response was provided, as the laboratory did not report a noticed 
increase in IgM positivity rates.  
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Table 2. Reported list of batches used by laboratories that indicated they tested for BFV in 
the online survey 
Laboratory Batch Numbers When used 
B 11335   
12115   
12354   
15051   
05/04/12 – 26/09/12   
27/04/12 – 08/03/13   
09/03/13 – 19/05/13   
20/05/03 – 20/08/13 
H IgM 11335   
IgM 12114   
IgM 12354   
IgM 13051   
IgM 13234   
IgG 12039     
IgG 12191   
IgG 13044   
IgG 13205   
2/7/12 –5/10/12       
12/10/12 – 5/4/13   
12/4/13 – 13/6/13           
17/6/13 – 13/9/13       
19/9/13 – 27/9/13       
2/7/12 – 29/12/12         
4/1/13 –  13/6/13       
17/6/13 –  13/9/13      
19/9/13 –  27/9/13 
C 11335  
12114  
12115   
12354   
13051  
13140  
13234  
11/04/2012 – 16/08/2012  
16/08/2012 – 23/01/2013  
24/01/2013 – 13/02/2013 
14/02/2013 – 01/05/201 
 02/05/2013 – 07/08/2013 
07/08/2013 – 26/09/2013  
27/09/2013 – current 
I 11335  
12114  
12354  
13051  
13140  
13234  
11/04/2012 – 18/10/2012   
19/10/2012 – 01/03/2013   
01/03/2013 – 05/06/2013   
05/06/2013 – 26/08/2013   
26/08/2013 – 13/09/2013   
27/09/2013 – current 
E 11335  
12114  
11335  
12114  
12354  
13051  
13140  
01/07/12 – 1/11/12    
2/11/12 – 15/11/12   
20/11/12 – 06/12/12   
11/12/12 – 21/01/13   
23/01/13 – 26/04/13   
30/04/13 – 22/08/13   
26/08/13 – 17/09/13 
D 11335  
12039  
12114  
12354  
13051  
13140  
13234  
02/07/2012 – 22/10/2012  
08/11/2012    
29/10/2012 – 4/3/2013   
13/03/2013 – 17/06/2013  
06/05/2013 – 22/07/2013  
26/07/2013 – 16/09/2013  
27/09/2013 – current 
  
Table 3. Responses from laboratories that indicate they perform BFV testing to question 14: 
“What standard interpretative comments do you include your reports to a requesting practitioner that results are consistent with recent infection?”  
 B G C E F 
IgM+/IgG- (BFV); 
IgM+/IgG- (RRV) 
Serology may indicate recent 
infection with Ross River or 
Barmah Forest virus or false 
positive / non-specific 
stimulation of IgM. 
Recent BFV send 
convalescent 
In view of the positive Ross River Virus 
IgM, these results should be interpreted 
with caution.  Please repeat in 14 days. 
This profile may be 
consistent with either: 
The presence of an IgM 
response to both Ross 
River virus and Barmah 
IgM+/IgG- (BFV); 
IgM+/IgG+(RRV) 
Serological evidence of recent 
Ross River virus infection. 
Recent BFV send 
convalescent 
In view of the positive Ross River Virus 
IgM, these results should be interpreted 
with caution.  Please repeat in 14 days. 
This profile may be 
consistent with either: 
The presence of an IgM 
response to both Ross 
River virus and Barmah 
IgM+/IgG- (BFV); 
IgM-/IgG- (RRV) 
Serology may indicate recent 
infection with Barmah Forest 
virus or false positive / non-
specific stimulation of IgM. 
Recent BFV send 
convalescent 
These results are suggestive of either 
early infection, or false positive/cross 
reactive antibody. Please repeat in 14 
days. 
This profile may be 
consistent with either: 
Suggestive evidence of 
recent Barmah Forest 
virus (BFV). 
IgM+/IgG- (BFV); 
IgM-/IgG+ (RRV) 
Serology may indicate recent 
infection with Barmah Forest 
virus or false positive / non-
specific stimulation of IgM. 
Recent BFV send 
convalescent 
These results are suggestive of either 
early infection, or false positive/cross 
reactive antibody. Please repeat in 14 
days. 
This profile may be 
consistent with either: 
Suggestive evidence of 
recent Barmah Forest 
virus (BFV). 
IgM+/IgG+ (BFV) Serology may indicate recent 
infection with Barmah Forest 
virus or false positive / non-
specific stimulation of IgM. 
Serological evidence of past 
infection with Ross River 
virus. 
Recent BFV send 
convalescent 
Suggestive of recent infection. In a 
minority of cases, the IgM response 
persists beyond 6 months. 
This profile may be 
consistent with either: 
Result consistent with 
current Barmah Forest 
Virus (BFV) 
Seroconversion or 
a rise in BFV IgG 
on paired samples 
Serological evidence of recent 
Barmah Forest virus 
infection. 
Recent or Past BFV Tested in parallel with the specimen 
submitted on...  Seroconversion noted.  
Consistent with recent infection.  
(Similar comment applied to rise in IgG 
on paired samples). 
IgG seroconversion 
has occurred since the 
previous test on 
(insert date). 
Seroconversion 
consistent with acute 
BFV infection. 
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 D A I 
IgM+/IgG- (BFV); 
IgM+/IgG- (RRV) 
Serological evidence consistent 
with current or recent Barmah 
Forest virus infection. False 
positive IgM results may occur 
and infection should be 
confirmed by demonstration of a 
rising IgG level in a follow up 
sample collected in 10-14 days. 
IgM antibodies may persist for 
over 12 months. 
To determine the significance of these results please 
provide another serum sample in 14 to 21 days to 
demonstrate a rise in IgM and/or IgG seroconversion. 
When submitting additional samples please provide 
clinical and travel history as this assists interpretation. 
For further information please contact  
An isolated IgM positive for BFV and RRV may 
represent a false positive result, and must be 
interpreted against the clinical presentation and 
exposure history.  To confirm diagnosis, repeat 
serology for IgM and IgG in 2-3 weeks is recommended 
SIgM+/IgG- (BFV); 
IgM+/IgG+(RRV) 
Serological evidence consistent 
with current or recent Barmah 
Forest virus infection.False 
positive IgM results may occur 
and infection should be 
confirmed by demonstration of a 
rising IgG level in a follow up 
sample collected in 10-14 days. 
IgM antibodies may persist for 
over 12 months. 
To determine the significance of these results please 
provide another serum sample in 14 to 21 days to 
demonstrate a rise in IgM and/or IgG seroconversion. 
When submitting additional samples please provide 
clinical and travel history as this assists interpretation. 
For further information please contact  
An isolated IgM positive for Barmah Forest virus (BFV) 
may represent a false positive result, and must be 
interpreted against the clinical presentation and 
exposure history.  To confirm diagnosis, repeat 
serology for IgM and IgG in 2-3 weeks is 
recommended. A single sample with both IgM and IgG 
positive for Ross River Virus (RRV) may represent 
either acute or past infection as both IgM and IgG may 
persist for years following infection. Further 
serological testing is not helpful. A copy of this report 
will be forwarded to the Public Health Unit. 
IgM+/IgG- (BFV); 
IgM-/IgG- (RRV) 
Serological evidence consistent 
with current or recent Barmah 
Forest virus infection.False 
positive IgM results may occur 
and infection should be 
confirmed by demonstration of a 
rising IgG level in a follow up 
sample collected in 10-14 days. 
IgM antibodies may persist for 
over 12 months. 
These results provide presumptive evidence of early 
BFV infection. However, to confirm the result and to 
exclude the possibility of a false positive IgM we 
require another sample to be submitted at least 14 to 
21 days post onset to demonstrate IgG seroconversion. 
If submitting additional samples please provide 
clinical and travel history as this assists interpretation. 
If you have questions or concerns please contact  
An isolated IgM positive for Barmah Forest virus (BFV) 
may represent a false positive result, and must be 
interpreted against the clinical presentation and 
exposure history.  To confirm diagnosis, repeat 
serology for IgM and IgG in 2-3 weeks is recommended 
 
  
 D A I 
IgM+/IgG- (BFV); 
IgM-/IgG+ (RRV) 
Serological evidence consistent 
with current or recent Barmah 
Forest virus infection.False 
positive IgM results may occur 
and infection should be 
confirmed by demonstration of a 
rising IgG level in a follow up 
sample collected in 10-14 days. 
IgM antibodies may persist for 
over 12 months. 
The BFV results provide presumptive evidence of early 
BFV infection. However, to confirm the result and to 
exclude the possibility of a false positive IgM we 
require another sample to be submitted at least 14 to 
21 days post onset to demonstrate IgG seroconversion. 
If submitting additional samples please provide 
clinical and travel history as this assists interpretation. 
The RRV results suggest past infection with RRV or 
another closely related alphavirus. If you have 
questions or concerns please contact  
An isolated IgM positive for Barmah Forest virus (BFV) 
may represent a false positive result, and must be 
interpreted against the clinical presentation and 
exposure history.  To confirm diagnosis, repeat 
serology for IgM and IgG in 2-3 weeks is 
recommended. Consistent with a previous Ross River 
virus infection 
IgM+/IgG+ (BFV) Serological evidence consistent 
with current or recent Barmah 
Forest virus infection. False 
positive IgM results may occur 
and infection should be 
confirmed by demonstration of a 
rising IgG level in a follow up 
sample collected in 10-14 days. 
IgM antibodies may persist for 
over 12 months 
These results provide presumptive evidence of recent 
BFV infection. 
An isolated IgM positive for Barmah Forest virus (BFV) 
may represent a false positive result, and must be 
interpreted against the clinical presentation and 
exposure history.  To confirm diagnosis, repeat 
serology for IgM and IgG in 2-3 weeks is recommended 
Seroconversion or 
a rise in BFV IgG 
on paired samples 
N/A These results are indicative of recent BFV infection. A single sample with both IgM and IgG positive for 
Barmah Forest Virus (BFV) may represent either acute 
or past infection as both IgM and IgG may persist for 
years following infection.  Further serological testing is 
not helpful.  A copy of this report will be forwarded to 
the Public Health Unit 
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APPENDIX 7 – NNDSS DATA CAVEATS 
National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System 
Williams Request – May 2014 
Data Caveats 
 
It should be noted there are several caveats to the requested National Notifiable Diseases 
Surveillance System (NNDSS) data: 
General 
 A major limitation of the notification data is that, for most diseases, they represent 
only a proportion of the total cases occurring in the community, that is, only those 
cases for which health care was sought, a test conducted and a diagnosis made, 
followed by a notification to health authorities. The degree of under-representation of 
all cases is unknown and is most likely variable by disease and jurisdiction. 
 From 1 January 2009, the Communicable Diseases Network Australia implemented the 
Cross-border NNDSS Notification Protocol.  The Protocol establishes that notifications 
are reported by the jurisdiction of residence, regardless of the jurisdiction of diagnosis.  
In the instance that a case is usually resident overseas, the notification is reported to 
the NNDSS by the jurisdiction of diagnosis.  Data collected prior to the implementation 
of the protocol may therefore include unknown numbers of dual notifications in the 
NNDSS. 
 ‘Diagnosis date’ was used to define the period of analysis. This date represents either 
the onset date or where the date of onset was not known, the earliest of the specimen 
collection date, the notification date, or the notification receive date.  
 In interpreting these data it is important to note that changes in notifications over time 
may not solely reflect changes in disease prevalence or incidence. Changes in testing 
policies; screening programs, including the preferential testing of high risk 
populations; the use of less invasive and more sensitive diagnostic tests; and periodic 
awareness campaigns, may influence the number of notifications that occur over time.  
 Data for publication should be aggregated to ensure data cells containing fewer than 5 
in the numerator are not published. 
 
Case Definition and Notification to the NNDSS 
 The current case definition for Barmah Forest Virus (BFV), including any historical 
edits, is available at: https://www.health.gov.au/casedefinitions   
 In September 2003, new national case definitions for notifications reported to NNDSS 
were endorsed by the Communicable Diseases Network Australia, with nearly all 
jurisdictions implementing the new definitions in January 2004 (New South Wales 
commenced in August 2004).  Prior to the adoption of the national definitions, some 
jurisdictions used the 1994 NHMRC case definitions, some jurisdictions used modified 
definitions that were based on the NHMRC case definitions, and some others used 
definitions specific to the state for some diseases.   
175 
 
 BFV became nationally notifiable in 1995.  Northern Territory has been notifying BFV 
cases to NNDSS since 1997.   
 The requester will be aware of the issues with the potential for false positive diagnosis 
of BFV cases, since this relates to the project aims. However, it is worth noting that 
National Arbovirus and Malaria Advisory Committee advice is that a single positive 
IgM test result may be insufficient to give reasonable certainty of the notification being 
a true case, and further changes to the surveillance case definition may be 
recommended in the near future to require a re-bleed for confirmation. 
Age at onset (years) 
 The age of the individual as reported to the health authority or the calculated age at 
onset, using date of birth.  In calculating the age in years, the value has been rounded 
down to the nearest whole year. 
 
Sex 
 The current sex of the individual. 
 
Statistical Area Level 4 (SA4) & Remoteness Areas (RA) 
 Since 2011 the Australian Statistical Geography Standard (ASGS) superseded the 
Australian Statistical Geographical Classification (ASGC) and as a result of this change 
we only use ASGS correspondence files. 
 SA4 and RA are as per the current ABS correspondence files.  Please note that as there 
is not a precise one-to-one conversion from postcode to either SA4 and/or RA, we use 
the correspondence file to create a conversion file and determine the SA4 and/or RA 
which has the highest proportion identified to a single postcode. 
 
Notifying state or territory 
 This field contains information on the State / Territory that sends the notification. 
 
Specimen date 
 This is the date when the first laboratory specimen was taken.  
 
Notification received date 
 This is the date when the notification of disease was received by the communicable 
diseases section of the relevant health authority.  
 
NNDSS derived Diagnosis Date 
 This is the date represents either the onset date or where the date of onset was not 
known, the earliest of the specimen collection date, the notification date, or the 
notification receive date.  
 
True onset date 
 This is the earliest date the person exhibited symptoms. 
 
Confirmed status 
 The confirmation of the disease as per the CDNA case definition. According to the BFV 
case definition, only confirmed cases should be notified though the dataset does 
contain ‘probable cases’. 
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Chapter 5 
Outbreak Investigations 
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PROLOGUE 
MRSA 
MY ROLE 
I was approached by Alison Peterson (AP) in June 2013 to assist in the investigation of a 
cluster of cases of CA-MRSA. With the assistance of AP, I created a questionnaire on 
EpiInfo, and I compiled data from PathWest, questionnaire, and from the local PHU. With 
assistance from the outbreak team, I wrote and collated the report for this outbreak.  
LESSONS LEARNED 
This outbreak investigation was a collaborative effort between the HAIU at CDCD, the 
Wheatbelt PHU and an independent infection prevention and control professional. From 
this, I gained insight into the structure of the WA Health Department and the separation 
between the West Australian Country Health Service (WACHS) and the CDCD. I gained 
skills in working as part of a multi-disciplinary team, particularly regarding the 
importance of maintaining good communication between all team members and 
understanding the politics behind particular situations. 
Technically, I cemented the skills learnt at course-block regarding questionnaire design, 
EpiInfo and outbreak investigations. I discovered that not all outbreak investigations 
follow a classical “10 step” design.  
PUBLIC HEALTH IMPACT 
This outbreak highlighted the importance of infection prevention and control in 
occupational health and safety procedures, especially in high risk environments.  Also, this 
outbreak identified a need for a co-ordinated approach for the distribution of information 
about management of MRSA decolonisation to prevent further transmission.   
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Dr Naru Pal, Anne Foyer, Megan Reilly, Julie Pearson, Dr Geoffrey Coombs, Alison Peterson 
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NOROVIRUS 
MY ROLE 
I was asked by Dr Barry Combs in December 2013 to assist in the investigation of this 
outbreak.  I performed the interviews and collated the data. I also lead the writing of the 
final report.  
LESSONS LEARNED 
As this was my first foodborne outbreak investigation, I quickly learnt that you need to 
respond quickly to assess the risk of ongoing infection and gather information to assist 
public health action. I also came to understand and appreciate the importance of good 
communication and collaboration between agencies involved, especially when separated 
by vast distances, such as between the CDCD in Perth and agencies in the Kimberley, 
where the outbreak occured.   
PUBLIC HEALTH IMPACT 
This outbreak highlighted the importance of formal food handling and hygiene training for 
all food handling staff, including transient staff, and ensuring that ill staff members are 
excluded from food handling for a period of 48 hours post-cessation of symptoms.  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Dr Pippa Chigdzey, Dr Barry Combs, Ginny Montinero, Emma Caitlin, and Melanie 
Houghton 
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ABSTRACT 
MRSA 
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus, or MRSA, is a notifiable infection in WA. 
Specific strains of MRSA are known to be community-acquired (CA-MRSA). This report 
discusses a cluster of CA-MRSA cases associated with an abattoir. 
 
NOROVIRUS 
On 9 December 2013, the Kimberley Population Health Unit contacted the OzFoodNet at 
CDCD to assist in investigating reports of an outbreak of diarrhoea and vomiting after six 
people attended the emergency department following eating at a hotel restaurant.  
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ABBREVIATIONS 
Acronym Full text 
ACCESS  Australian Collaborating Centre for Enterococcus and Staphylococcus species  
AP Alison Peterson 
AW Anita Williams 
BC Dr Barry Combs 
CA-MRSA Community-associated methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
CDCD Communicable Disease Control Directorate 
D&V Diarrhoea and vomiting 
DNA Deoxyribonucleic acid 
EC Emma Caitlin 
ED Emergency department 
EHO Environmental health officer 
GP General Practitioner 
HAIU Healthcare Associated Infection Unit 
IPCC Infection prevention and control consultant 
IV Intravenous  
KPHU Kimberley Public Health Unit 
LA-MRSA Livestock-associated methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
MO Medical officer 
MRSA Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
OFN OzFoodNet 
PC Dr Pippa Chidzey 
PCR Polymerase chain reaction 
PHU Public Health Unit 
PPE Personal protective equipment 
PVL Panton-Valentine leukocidin 
WACHS West Australian Country Health Service 
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1. AN OUTBREAK OF COMMUNITY-ASSOCIATED 
MRSA IN ABATTOIR WORKERS 
 INTRODUCTION 
Community-acquired methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (CA-MRSA) infections 
are now prevalent in Australia and many other parts of the world1.  CA-MRSA strains have 
adapted to survive and spread efficiently in the community and can cause infections in 
healthy people who have not had exposure to healthcare systems. CA-MRSA can also be 
carried asymptomatically as normal flora in the nose, throat, axillae, and groin regions. CA-
MRSA primarily causes skin and soft tissue infections, but severe invasive infections 
including necrotising pneumonia, bacteraemia, osteomyelitis, endocarditis, pyomyositis 
and septic arthritis have also been reported2,3. Transmission of CA-MRSA is typically 
through direct infection, close and/or prolonged contact with carriers, tight living 
quarters, prolonged contact with carriers or poor personal hygiene4-7. Outbreaks of CA-
MRSA have been reported in different groups of people including sportsmen, school 
children, military personnel, healthcare workers, and intravenous drug users8-12.  
Since the early 1980s, methicillin-resistant S. aureus (MRSA) has been a notifiable 
organism in WA via laboratory notification. The WA Department of Health promotes a 
comprehensive state-wide MRSA management policy throughout, based on selective 
screening, isolation and decolonisation of patients and healthcare workers13. As part of 
this policy all MRSA isolates in WA are referred to the Australian Collaborating Centre for 
Enterococcus and Staphylococcus species (ACCESS) Typing and Research for strain 
characterisation.  
In 2012-13 CA-MRSA accounted for 85% of all MRSA isolated in WA14, with the ST93-IV 
MRSA strain, colloquially known as the Queensland (Qld) clone, was one of the most 
prevalent CA-MRSA strains characterised2,15 and is well established as a community-
associated strain throughout Australia3. The ST93-IV MRSA strain carries genes for the 
Panton-Valentine leukocidin (PVL), a toxin associated with white cell destruction and 
abscess formation2,3. 
In this report, we describe an outbreak of ST93-IV MRSA strain in a group of residents 
linked to an abattoir located outside a country town in Western Australia.  The abattoir 
employs people from the town and the surrounding areas, as well as itinerant workers, 
many of whom share accommodation. These workers often use sharp knives and/ or 
equipment with sharp edges that put them at high risk for injuries, particularly cuts to the 
hands, wrists and fingers. 
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In May 2013, several employees from the abattoir presented to the Emergency 
Department (ED) of the local hospital with wound infections following workplace injuries, 
which subsequently tested positive for MRSA. In June 2013, the infection control nurse at 
the local hospital alerted management at the abattoir and the local Public Health Unit 
(PHU), who recommended the appointment of an independent infection prevention and 
control consultant (IPCC) to advise the abattoir on infection prevention and control 
practices at the facility. The Communicable Disease Control Directorate (CDCD) of WA 
Health was later notified of the outbreak and undertook an advisory role, which included 
the formulation of an outbreak action plan that included the local PHU, the General 
Practitioners (GPs), ED clinicians and the independent IPCC.  
 METHODS 
1.2.1 ENVIRONMENTAL AND INFECTION CONTROL INSPECTION 
The independent IPCC conducted a risk assessment of infection prevention and control 
practices and processes at the abattoir. This assessment involved a walk-through of the 
facility observing the abattoir’s hand hygiene facilities and practices including 
maintenance of skin integrity, personal hygiene, selection and use personal protective 
equipment (PPE), environmental hygiene and laundering of uniforms. Recommendations 
were provided and a follow-up visit was conducted within five weeks to review progress 
with the implementation of the recommendations.  
1.2.2 LABORATORY METHODS 
Wound specimens for microbiological culture were collected from injured employees who 
presented at the ED of the local hospital or their GP. All MRSA isolates were referred to the 
ACCESS Typing and Research laboratory at Royal Perth Hospital. ST93-IV MRSA were 
identified using a combination of phenotypic and genotypic methods including mecA and 
nuc PCR, pulsed-field gel electrophoresis, multi-locus sequence typing, SCCmec typing, spa 
typing, PVL gene PCR and DNA microarray2.   
1.2.3 CASE FINDING 
A retrospective analysis of the incidence rate of ST93-IV MRSA within the region prior to 
the outbreak identified only sporadic cases within the community. The baseline rate of 
ST93-IV MRSA within the local community was established from these results, which 
determined that this in fact was an outbreak.  
A case definition was established as any person identified with community-acquired ST93-
IV MRSA infection or colonisation that was epidemiologically linked to the abattoir. In 
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order to identify all ST93-IV MRSA cases, CDCD provided the PHU with a line-listing of all 
MRSA in the region from the ACCESS Typing and Research laboratory in the previous 
seven months. The PHU and the IPCC liaised with the managers of the abattoir to identify 
employees on the list.  A short telephone interview with the identified staff members was 
conducted by the CDCD to obtain demographic information, their workplace practices, 
information regarding their infection including the site, their symptoms and any previous 
infections, their household members and discuss infection control measures and 
decolonisation treatment (Appendix 1). The PHU sent identified employees advisory 
letters and information about CA-MRSA infections, transmissions and decolonisation 
processes.   
1.2.4 CONTAINMENT MEASURES 
The ACCESS typing laboratory continued to inform the CDCD and PHU of all new MRSA 
isolates from the region to ensure on-going monitoring of the outbreak. 
A multi-modal approach was taken to contain the outbreak. The PHU contacted all ST93-IV 
MRSA cases to ensure that they had been seen by a GP or medical officer (MO) and 
infections were appropriately treated.  
An outbreak advisory letter and relevant WA Health information to support 
recommendations were distributed by the PHU to all GPs and hospital MOs in the region.  
The recommendations by WA Health included the correct management of known CA-
MRSA cases, decolonisation of cases and all of their household contacts following 
clearance of infection, clearance of infection before employees could work in the meat 
processing area and emphasis on obtaining specimens for culture of all people presenting 
to health services with skin and soft tissue infections. The managers at the abattoir were 
instructed to have a heightened awareness of skin infections occurring in employees and 
to report these to the PHU. The CDCD and the PHU liaised with the IPCC regarding 
recommendations for implementation at the abattoir.  
 RESULTS 
There were 22 ST93-IV MRSA cases epidemiologically linked to the abattoir in this 
outbreak; 15 abattoir employees and seven household contacts of infected abattoir 
employees. Of the fifteen cases employed at the abattoir, 12 worked on the slaughter floor 
and one was a maintenance officer, whilst the duties for two of the employees could not be 
established. There were three houses where cases shared accommodation, with some 
individuals moving between addresses.   
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The majority of cases (45%, n=10) had infections located on the arms and hands. Six cases 
had infections on the torso (axilla [3 cases], back, abdomen, and groin); four of these were 
household contacts. The remaining six cases had infections on the legs (n=4) and face 
(n=2). When recorded, boils and wound infections were the most common infection type. 
Four cases required incision and drainage of the abscess and treatment with IV antibiotics, 
with two of those cases requiring hospitalisation for seven days.  
Retrospective investigations found sporadic cases of ST93-IV MRSA associated with the 
workers dating back to December 2012; however the increase of cases presenting to the 
ED occurred between April and June 2013 (Figure 1).  The last case linked with the 
abattoir was in September 2013. 
 
Figure 1. Cases of ST93-IV CA-MRSA cases linked to the abattoir from Dec 2012 – Sept 2013 
The independent IPCC positive findings and improvements implemented at either the 
initial or follow-up site visits are described in Table 1. Although the abattoir management 
was proactive in minimising the risk of infection, their efforts were hampered by limited 
knowledge and available initial support to the company. Additional recommendations 
were provided by the IPCC to address the re-use of soap and alcohol-based hand rub 
reusable cartridges, dispensing of adequate volume of alcohol-based hand rub and the 
daily restocking of empty paper towel dispensers by contract cleaners. 
From follow-up interviews, all 15 cases and seven household contacts had decolonisation 
treatment. A letter and information were circulated by the PHU to GPs and ED clinicians 
again in August following the last two cases to remind them of the importance of obtaining 
specimens, management of positive cases, and to reassert the consistency of management 
across all health service sites.  
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Table 1. List of health and safety improvements implemented at the abattoir 
Strict enforcement of hand hygiene and boot washing procedures 
Wash facilities located at every entry/exit to meat processing area 
Installation of hands-free alcohol-based hand rub dispensers  
Hand Hygiene signage at all points of entry to amenity areas and facilities 
Thermal disinfection of knives in accordance with CSIRO requirements 
Staff room environmental surfaces and furniture cleaned and disinfected at the end of each day 
Increased consultation and monitoring of contract cleaners’ work performance 
Access to water-resistant dressings in the event of skin and soft tissue injury 
All staff uniforms laundered at local commercial laundry 
Labelling of individual staff lockers for storage of personal clothing 
Staff changes of clothing prior to commencing work and leaving work. 
 
 DISCUSSION 
This is the first report, to our knowledge, of a MRSA outbreak associated with abattoir 
workers in Australia involving a CA-MRSA strain. Whilst outbreaks of Staphylococcus 
species in abattoir workers have been long reported, previous outbreaks of MRSA have 
been livestock-associated (LA) strains, typically involving the strain ST39816. ST398 is the 
MRSA lineage most often associated with asymptomatic carriage in intensively reared 
food-producing animals, especially pigs16. Whilst the outbreak we have described occurred 
in a subset of the community linked to the local abattoir, it is unlikely that this outbreak 
was livestock-associated, as ST93-IV MRSA is the most frequently isolated CA-MRSA strain 
in Australia and not genetically related to the common LA-MRSA strain ST398. This 
outbreak should be regarded as an opportunistic outbreak of CA-MRSA amongst 
employees who often obtain cuts and abrasions in their workplace and spread to their 
household contacts.   
By the very nature of the job, abattoir workers are exposed to a variety of pathogenic 
organisms including Erysipelothrix rhusiopathiae, Bacillus anthracis, Coxiella burnetti, and 
Leptospira as well as zoonotic Staphylococcal and Streptococcal sepsis17,18. Although 
common in the 1970s and 1980s, reports of recent outbreaks in abattoir workers are now 
infrequent, possibly due to increased occupational health and safety regulations.  
The independent IPCC identified several risk factors that contributed to the outbreak, 
including the frequent cuts and abrasions to employees’ hands and forearms as the safety 
gloves provided impaired movement and were often not worn, a high proportion of 
transient workers shared accommodation, and workers socialised both during and outside 
of work hours.  The IPCC noted that there was increasing anxiety created in the workplace 
and local community due to the lack of information available regarding the outbreak and 
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the lack of coordinated effort in the face of increasing cases with local GPs unfamiliar with 
meat processing work-related illnesses and injuries leading to potential misdiagnosis of 
infections. Further complicating the situation were the cost implications for employer and 
employees in relation to MRSA screening, treatment and decolonisation, and the need for 
work exclusion until the employee’s infection had resolved. 
Although in WA it is not standard practice for an independent IPCC to be involved in an 
outbreak investigation, the timeliness of occupational health and safety measures 
instigated by the abattoir’s management on recommendation by the IPCC reduced the 
potential severity and length of the outbreak.  
 LIMITATIONS 
The lack of co-ordination between the PHU and other health services involved was 
identified as a major issue at the beginning of the outbreak, and information on treatment 
and management of these infections was varied and inconsistent. A uniform action plan 
and communication strategy were developed to include all health care providers, enabling 
workers to obtain the correct information and ways to access treatment and appropriate 
follow up.    
As some of these workers are recruited from overseas and English is their second 
language, effective communication efforts were difficult. Some workers were on casual or 
short-term contracts and were quite transient, so traceability of some cases was 
impossible. 
 CONCLUSION 
This outbreak of ST93-IV MRSA infection in an abattoir highlights the importance of 
infection control and occupational health and safety procedures in preventing CA-MRSA 
infections in high-risk workplaces. Additionally, this outbreak identified a need for a co-
ordinated approach for the distribution of information and management of decolonisation 
to prevent further transmission.   
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2. A NOROVIRUS OUTBREAK AT A HOTEL 
RESTAURANT 
 INTRODUCTION 
Noroviruses (previously called Norwalk-like virus) are small, non-enveloped viruses 
containing a single positive-stand RNA genome, approximately 7.7kb in size19, and are the 
most common causative agent for gastroenteritis20. The common symptoms of a norovirus 
infection include nausea, diarrhoea, vomiting and abdominal cramps, headache, chills, low 
grade fever, muscle aches and tiredness22. Incubation of norovirus is between 10 – 51 
hours; onset of the illness is sudden with symptoms lasting between 24–60 hours20,22. 
Although norovirus gastroenteritis is generally mild and of short duration, in some cases 
illness can be severe and sometimes fatal, especially among young children and the 
elderly20. The treatment for norovirus gastroenteritis, like that for other diarrheal 
illnesses, is oral rehydration with fluids and electrolytes, if the patient is alert and able to 
drink, or with intravenous fluids, if vomiting and dehydration are severe20,22. Norovirus is 
detectable in faeces and vomitus by RT-PCR or ELISA20. 
Norovirus can affect all ages and occur all year round, however outbreaks are more 
common during the colder seasons20. Outbreaks often take places in environments which 
favor person-to-person spread, such as nursing homes, day-care centres or hospital wards. 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that ∼50% of all 
outbreaks of norovirus infection are linked to ill food service workers. 
The virus is spread primarily through the faecal-oral route, however can also be spread 
through droplets of vomitus, contaminated fomites, person-to-person contact and 
environmental contamination19,23. Norovirus can withstand a wide range of temperatures, 
from freezing to 60°C, and persist on environmental surfaces, in recreational and drinking 
water, and in a variety of food items, including raw oysters and fruits and vegetables, for a 
long period of time20,23. Norovirus is highly contagious with a low infectious dose (approx. 
18 – 1000 viral particles) required to cause illness24.  
It is possible that norovirus can also spread via food if handled by an ill person with poor 
hand hygiene. Barker et al found that fingers can both deposit and acquire norovirus when 
they come into contact with environmental surfaces25, whilst Boxman et al demonstrated 
directly the presence of norovirus RNA on the hands of a food handler working in a 
restaurant associated with a recent outbreak26. The most frequently reported factor 
associated with the involvement of the infected worker was bare hand contact with the 
food and failure to properly wash hands27. Kuo et al found in an investigation of a 
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norovirus outbreak in Austria that the source of the norovirus was actually a staff 
member, who himself was asymptomatic, but his child was sick28; Asymptomatic 
infections can occur in approximately one third of infected persons19. 
Controlling outbreaks of norovirus pose major challenges20,24. Simple measures can be 
undertaken to prevent transmission of norovirus, such as cleaning contaminated surfaces, 
good hand hygiene, food handling and exclusion of symptomatic people. Changing gloves 
often and changing in between tasks decreases the chances of cross-contamination19. 
Those who have been ill with viral gastroenteritis should remain excluded from child care, 
school or work for a minimum of 48 hours after diarrhoea and/or vomiting stops20,22,26. 
Local health departments play a key role in educating restaurants and staffs in safe food 
handling procedures19. 
It was found that detergent-based cleaning with a cloth to produce a visibly clean surface 
consistently failed to eliminate NV contamination25. Bleach may be sufficient to inactivate 
the virus; Wiping benches with bleach (1 in 50 dilution of domestic bleach i.e. 1000 p.p.m.) 
is effective23. This study highlights the fact that detergent based cleaning without adequate 
disinfection carries the risk of increasing rather than reducing the risk of infection 
transmission25. 
 BACKGROUND 
OzFoodNet (OFN) at CDCD was notified by Dr Pippa Chidzey (PC) from the Kimberley 
Population Health Unit (KPHU) on 10 Tuesday December 2013 that six people had 
presented to a regional hospital emergency department (ED) with diarrhoea and/or 
vomiting (D&V) on Monday 9 December. Five of those had eaten at a local hotel restaurant 
and one was a staff member of the hotel.  
PC asked if OFN would assist with the investigation; Barry Combs (BC) asked Anita 
Williams (AW) to lead the investigation. PC provided OFN with the initial line listing and 
contact details of the six people who had presented to the ED on Monday 9 December.  
 METHODS 
2.3.1 OUTBREAK TEAM  
An outbreak investigation team was formed in response to the notification of the cases. 
The outbreak investigation team included: 
 Anita Williams (AW), OFN 
 Dr Barry Combs (BC), OFN 
 Emma Caitlin (EC), Environmental Health Officer (EHO) in a Kimberley shire 
 Staff at the PathWest Enteric and Molecular Diagnostic laboratories 
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2.3.2 SETTING  
The restaurant was situated within a hotel in a Kimberley town in northern WA. The 
restaurant was open for breakfast and dinner; however, all-day dining is available from 
the bar. The restaurant could seat 120 patrons. The restaurant did not normally take 
bookings.  
2.3.3 INTERVIEWS 
AW interviewed the five patrons (who had presented at the ED) of the hotel restaurant on 
10 December using a hypothesis-generating questionnaire (Appendix 2). A further three 
contacts of the patrons were interviewed on the 10 December. On 13 December, another 
case of D&V who presented to the local ED after consuming food at the hotel restaurant on 
the 10 December was interviewed.   
This questionnaire contained questions about their illness – the onset date and time of 
their symptoms, details of their symptoms, duration of illness and food/drink consumed at 
the hotel and other venues. Ill people were also asked if they used the toilet whilst at the 
hotel, and whether they had had contact with anyone experiencing gastroenteritis in the 
past four weeks.  
2.3.4 CASE DEFINITION  
A case was defined as a person who became ill with D&V within 48 hours of consuming a 
meal at the hotel restaurant from 8 – 11 December 2013. Of the 10 people interviewed, 
there were eight people who met the case definition. This case definition was derived in 
discussion with the OFN team after performing the first 6 interviews.  
2.3.5 LABORATORY TESTING 
Sample pots for faecal specimens were provided to all the cases who presented to the local 
ED to take home and return with specimens. However, samples were only submitted by 
three cases. These were sent to PathWest and tested for enteric pathogens including 
Salmonella, Campylobacter, Shigella, norovirus, rotavirus, and adenovirus.   
2.3.6 COMMUNICATION 
Constant communication with members of the outbreak team was kept through emails 
and telephone calls. A timeline of important outbreak events is listed in Table 2. 
 
192 
 
Table 2. Details of activity and communications by outbreak team for this investigation  
Date Time  What Happened 
10/12/13 08:55 AM PC of KPHU rang BC to notify OFN of potential outbreak 
 09:03 AM BC emailed AW to ask to investigate 
 09:28 AM PC emailed EC at local council to initiate environmental health 
investigation 
 10:00 AM AW began telephone interviews of cases 
 10:35 AM AW emailed EC to initiate contact between OFN and local council 
11/12/13 ALL DAY AW performed telephone interviews 
12/12/13 ALL DAY AW followed up cases to finalise length of illness 
 12:00 PM AW rang PathWest to ascertain how many samples were submitted for 
testing 
 14:30 PM PC emailed OFN of another case presenting to Derby ED 
13/12/13 09:45 AM AW performed telephone interview with case presenting previous day 
  EC from local council issued an improvement notice on hotel 
17/12/13 12:00 PM PathWest reported that all three samples had norovirus detected 
  Outbreak investigation report finalised 
 RESULTS 
2.4.1 EPIDEMIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS 
A total of 10 patrons and three staff were interviewed by the outbreak team in this 
investigation (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Epicurve for onset of illness for patrons and staff at hotel restaurant 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
5/12/13 6/12/13 7/12/13 8/12/13 9/12/13 10/12/13 11/12/13 12/12/13 13/12/13
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
ca
se
s
Date of symptom onset
Staff
Patron (Sunday)
Patron (Tuesday)
AW conducted interviews 
PC notified OFN 
EC visited premises 
193 
 
Two of the 10 patrons interviewed did not present with D&V, however they did report 
nausea and a general feeling of being unwell (Table 3) and were subsequently determined 
not to be cases. Symptoms were self-reported, as per the questionnaire.  
Table 3. List of symptoms experienced by patrons in this outbreak  
Symptoms Cases  
[n = 8] 
Non-cases 
 [n = 2] 
Nausea 6 2 
Abdominal pain and cramps 7 2  
Fever 6 (2 unsure) 1  
Headache 3 1  
Lethargy/tiredness 8  2  
Diarrhoea 8  -- 
Vomiting 8  -- 
Chills 4  -- 
A variety of meals were consumed by cases, with hot chips and the side salad in common 
across all the cases (Table 4). The two patrons who were not cases reported eating hot 
chips but not their side salads. Of the cases, five were male and three were female, with a 
median age of 31.5 years (range 21 – 59 years). Onset of illness in patrons was on 9 
December and the median incubation period was 29 hours (range 24.5 – 43 hours). The 
median length of duration of diarrhoea was 27.5 hours and for vomiting was 4 hours. No 
patrons reported illness prior to attending the hotel or had contact with anyone who had 
gastroenteritis prior to visiting the hotel. The hotel does not take bookings for meals so 
other cases could not be identified. No statistical analysis was performed as only a small 
number of patrons was identified.  
Table 4. Foods consumed at the hotel restaurant by patrons. Mains were served with salads 
Meal ILL NOT ILL  Meal ILL NOT ILL 
Fish and chips 3 2  Chicken parmigiana 1 -- 
Chicken burger with chips 2 --  Consumed any salad 8 2 
Beef burger with chips 1 --  Tartare sauce 3 2 
Steak with chips  1 --  Aioli -- 2 
2.4.2 MICROBIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS 
All three faecal samples tested positive for norovirus by PCR and no other pathogens were 
detected.  
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2.4.3 ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH INVESTIGATIONS 
On 10 December 2013, the KPHU notified the EHO of the suspected outbreak. Under the 
Food Act 2008 (the Food Act), the EHO from the Kimberley Shire Council was the 
appropriate enforcement person and agency for the environmental health investigation. 
EC, an authorised officer under the Food Act, conducted an assessment at the hotel 
restaurant on 10 December, and found breaches to standard hygiene policies, including 
unclean benches and floors, inadequate signage regarding hand washing and no records of 
food handling training for staff. 
On investigating the staff, EC discovered that one member of staff presented to the local 
ED on 6 and 7 December but still attended work on 8 December, and was subsequently ill 
in the hotel toilets that were also used by patrons. It was also revealed that on 9 December 
a further seven staff presented with gastroenteritis, including one member of staff which 
presented to the local ED. 
Of those further seven staff one staff member was a kitchen hand and one staff member 
worked at the bar. Both staff members reported vomiting in the hotel toilets whilst at 
work. EC met with staff to discuss adequate hand washing and food handling techniques 
but only interviewed three staff members using the standardised questionnaire.  All 
interviewed staff reported episodes of vomiting and diarrhoea.  
The staff at the hotel consisted mainly of backpackers and overseas workers and, as such, 
the hotel had a high turnover rate of staff and no official records of adequate food handling 
training. An improvement notice was issued to the hotel on Friday 13 December by EC, 
along with a training kit for food handlers. EC also advised management on cleaning and 
sanitising and exclusion periods for ill staff. Training of the staff was discussed again with 
the hotel in early January 2014.  
For this investigation, EC did not collect food samples as there was no food leftover from 
the implicated dates. Currently in WA there are no methods of detecting norovirus in non-
human specimens. No food or environmental swabs were taken for investigation of other 
potential pathogens.  
 DISCUSSION 
The evidence obtained in this outbreak investigation suggests that patrons are likely to 
have become ill from food contaminated with norovirus. It was determined for the 
pathogen to be norovirus as the three samples submitted for laboratory analysis norovirus 
positive and the symptoms, duration of illness and incubation period among other patrons 
were norovirus-like.   
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Although it is possible for transmission to occur through exposure to contaminated 
environments, such as toilets, it was decided not to be the means of transmission in this 
outbreak as not all cases reported using the toilet at the restaurant and so foodborne 
illness to be most likely. There appears to have been person-to-person transmission 
among staff before transmission to the patrons. The staff that reported being ill at work 
indicated they were infectious while preparing food. As the onset dates for the staff 
preceded those of the patrons, the transmission was likely from the staff to patrons. 
Patrons who attended the hotel from 8 to 13 December are likely to have become ill from 
eating contaminated food such as salad, eaten by all cases and not eaten by two well 
patrons. The salad was a green salad, and any norovirus contamination would not have 
been inactivated prior to eating. However, staff members were ill in toilets and so patrons 
may have been infected via contaminated environmental surfaces.  Many more patrons 
may have become ill, but as there were no booking lists this could not be established.  
By issuing the hotel an improvement notice, the hotel was forced to clean the premises, 
minimising any environmental norovirus contamination. Educating the food handlers and 
hotel staff regarding possible control measures, hand hygiene and exclusion of ill staff 
prevents possible cases in the future. WA Health provides information for food handling 
premises in their Operational Directive “OD 0303/10: Guidelines for exclusion of people 
with enteric infections and their contacts from work, school and child-care settings”29.  
2.5.1 LIMITATIONS 
The main limitation of this investigation was the small number of patrons able to be 
contacted, as there was no booking list, and the EHO only interviewed three of the seven ill 
staff. This investigation could be classified as a case-series as there were insufficient cases 
and controls to proceed with an analytical study, which may have more accurately 
determined the mechanism of transmission.  Ultimately this investigation contains 
multiple co-factors and biases, such as potentially poor hand hygiene by patrons using the 
restaurant bathroom facilities, that could not be avoided.  
At the time of this investigation, testing for norovirus in environmental swabs or food 
samples was not available. There was no left over food available for testing for other 
potential pathogens.  
Whilst there was consistency in laboratory results from the three faecal samples 
submitted for analysis, these samples were collected from only three of the eight cases and 
did not include any of the ill staff members or non-case patrons.  
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 CONCLUSION 
Despite the fact that no specific vehicle being identified, the investigation provided an 
opportunity for education of the owners and staff of the hotel restaurant about 
appropriate food handling and the guidelines for exclusion of people with enteric 
infections and their contacts from work. This x study emphasises the need for continual 
assessment of restaurants to ensure staff have adequate food safety training, and 
highlights the need for the development of testing capabilities of non-human samples for 
norovirus.   
 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 On-going training for food handling staff at the hotel restaurant (current and future 
staff members) 
 Ensuring ill staff stay away from work for 48 hours post cessation of 
gastrointestinal illness 
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Hotel Outbreak Questionnaire V2-staff 
 
 
 
 
 
The Department of Health is investigating gastroenteritis among patrons who attended the 
Hotel and hotel staff on Sunday 8 December 2013. Infectious gastroenteritis can be caused by 
bacteria, viruses and protozoa and transmitted from person to person, from animal to person 
or by food. (see link www.public.health.wa.gov.au/2/597/2/gastroenteritis_fact_sheet.pm). 
We would be grateful if you could answer some questions about food you ate at the Hotel and 
if you became ill afterwards.  
“The investigation is conducted under the Health Act, 1911 and any identifying information 
you provide will be kept strictly confidential.” 
 
Note: To help identify the cause of the outbreak, it is important that both WELL and ill 
people fill in this questionnaire.  
 
Instructions 
 
1) Save this document to your computer. 
2) Fill in the questionnaire, regardless of whether or not you were ill as it is important to 
compare the food eaten by ill and not ill people.  
3) Mark the appropriate Yes/No/Don’t know response by placing a X in the box. 
4) Save the questionnaire containing your responses. 
5) Please email the completed form back to ozfoodnetwa@health.wa.gov.au as an 
attachment. 
6) If you have difficulty filling in the form using the check boxes, you can print off the 
form, fill it in by hand, scan the document, and email it back to us.  Or post the 
completed form back to OzFoodNet WA, Communicable Disease Control Directorate, 
PO Box 8172, Perth Business Centre, WA, 6849. 
 
Personal Details 
Staff: Yes □ |   Staff occupation  
Patron: Yes □ |    Date(s) and time of Hotel visit                                               AM/PM 
First Name:                                                                  Last Name:    
When did you arrive in the Kimberley (tourist)? 
Contact phone number:    
Age:  Sex:    Male / Female 
 
 
Office use only 
Interviewer___________________ 
Date info entered_____/_____/___ 
Communicable Disease Control Directorate 
Department of Health 
Government of Western Australia 
 
 
ID No. 
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Please indicate the Yes/No/Don’t know choices by marking the box “□” with a X  
 Yes No Don’t Know 
A. Did you attend the Hotel on Sunday 8 December? 
□ 
 
□ 
 
□ 
 
 
Part A – Recent Illness 
 Yes No Don’t Know 
1. Have you been unwell with gastroenteritis 
(diarrhoea, vomiting and/or abdominal cramps) in the 
four weeks before or on Sunday 8 December? 
If Yes fill in Question 3 
□ 
 
□ 
 
□ 
 
2. Have you been unwell with gastroenteritis 
(diarrhoea, vomiting and/or abdominal cramps) after 
the Sunday 8 December? 
If Yes fill in Question 3 
□ 
 
□ 
 
□ 
 
 
3. Did you have any of the following symptoms in the last four weeks?  
(include date of onset and time of onset) 
 Yes No 
Don’t 
Know 
Onset Date 
Time of Onset (use 24 
hour clock) 
Diarrhoea (3 or 
more loose stools 
in 24hrs 
□ □ □ ____ / ____ / ______  
Blood in stools □ □ □ ____ / ____ / ______  
Nausea □ □ □ ____ / ____ / ______  
Vomiting □ □ □ ____ / ____ / ______  
Abdominal 
pain/cramps 
□ □ □ ____ / ____ / ______  
Fever  □ □ □ ____ / ____ / ______  
Headaches □ □ □ ____ / ____ / ______  
Tiredness □ □ □ ____ / ____ / ______  
Chills □ □ □ ____ / ____ / ______  
Other symptoms □ □ □ ____ / ____ / ______  
Please Specify _________________________________________  
 
4. How long did your diarrhoea symptoms last? ____ day/s. 
 
  How long did your vomiting symptoms last? ____ day/s. 
 
 Yes No Don’t 
Know 
Specify 
5. Did you seek medical attention?  □ □ □ Name of doctor: 
6. Did you provide a stool sample? □ □ □  
7. Were you hospitalised? □ □ □ Where? 
8. Are you still having diarrhoea?  □ □ □ Number of days 
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 Yes No 
Don’t 
Know 
9.  Have you taken any medication given to you by the 
hospital or bought at chemist ?  
□ 
 
□ 
 
□ 
 
If yes, specify?    
10. Has anyone from your family or friends been 
unwell with gastroenteritis (diarrhoea, vomiting 
and/or abdominal cramps) in the last four weeks? 
□ 
 
□ 
 
□ 
 
If Yes please specify name, contact details, symptoms 
and date of first symptom  
 
   
 
 Consumption of food and beverages 
 
We are interested in finding out what you ate and drank at the Hotel 
Entree  
  
Main  
  
Dessert  
  
What food was shared  
  
Drinks  
 
 
 Yes No Don’t Know 
11. Do you have any special dietary requirements (e.g. 
vegetarian, gluten free…..) 
□ 
 
□ 
 
□ 
 
If yes, please specify what type    
12. While at the Hotel on 8 December did you visit the toilet? □ 
 
□ 
 
□ 
 
13.  Did you eat food at any other venues on Sunday 8 
December or Monday 9 December? 
□ 
 
□ 
 
□ 
 
If yes to eating elsewhere specify place, time and food eaten    
    
 
 
Thank you 
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1. PROLOGUE 
1.1 CONTEXT 
There are two teaching requirements in this course: 
 prepare and conduct a case study for first year MAE students or other 
epidemiology training program, as part of the second year subject ‘Issues in 
Applied Epidemiology’ 
 each student must prepare at least one (and participate in all) “lesson from the 
field” (LFF)  
1.2 MY ROLE 
1.2.1 ISSUES IN APPLIED EPIDEMIOLOGY 
For the teaching assignment of “Issues in Applied Epidemiology” I worked with Tim Sloan-
Gardiner to present a lesson on “Critical Appraisal of Scientific Literature” to the first-
years during our 3rd course-block in March 2014. Tim and I created a power-point which 
discussed the basics and the why’s of critical appraisal, as well as a document with 
instructions, examples and questions for the teaching session.  
During the teaching session, Tim and I presented the overview to the first-years, after 
which we split the group into two groups and each took a group through the document of 
examples and questions.  
1.2.2 LESSONS FROM THE FIELD 
For my LFF I presented on “Sample Size and Power Calculations”, creating an overview 
document on the why and how of sample size and power calculations, and three example 
exercises for participants to complete. On 16 July 2014 I discussed with the participants 
(the 2013 MAE cohort plus two from the 2014 cohort) my LFF via teleconference, any 
challenges they had in understanding the how-to of calculations and completing the 
example exercises.  
1.3 LESSONS LEARNED 
1.3.1 ISSUES IN APPLIED EPIDEMIOLOGY 
In this exercise, I learnt that to obtain group consensus takes a lot of time and effort – Tim 
Sloan-Gardiner did an amazing job in organising this project, from the initial discussions of 
what we should do as a group to the first failed attempt of teaching videos to our final 
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teaching session to the first years. I also learnt that having a good partner is the key for 
success – Tim and I worked well together, as we both had the same vision for what we 
wanted to get across in our session and communicated well.  
1.3.2 LESSONS FROM THE FIELD 
Previous to my LFF, I knew the basics of sample size and power calculations as I used 
them in my ethics application for my epidemiological research project. However, in 
writing up my LFF I learnt the context of why, and that these calculations are estimations 
and not to be taken as gospel, as recruitment and attrition can be affected by a multitude 
of things. I also learnt that creating example questions is very hard and time consuming.  
1.4 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Katrina Knope, Tim Sloan-Gardiner, Courtney Lane, Dr Niki Foster and Hayley Roberts  
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2. CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE 
Anita Williams and Tim Sloan-Gardiner for the MAE Teaching Exercise, 3rd Course-block 
March 2014 
2.1 BACKGROUND 
Critical appraisal is defined as the “application of rules of evidence to a study to assess the 
validity of the data, completeness of reporting, methods and procedures, conclusions, 
compliance with ethical standards, etc.”1.  It is an important skill for a field epidemiologist 
to have and will be the subject of an assignment in the coming year. 
Essentially, it is the process of systematically scrutinising research to judge the validity of 
the researchers’ findings and to assess the worth and relevance of the public health 
implications. Just because a paper is published in a peer reviewed journal, does not mean 
the findings are trustworthy or relevant. 
There are many different resources available for critically appraising peer reviewed 
literature, and we will focus on the Critical Appraisal Skills Programme (CASP, www.casp-
uk.net) critical appraisal framework. 
2.2 OUTLINE 
The training is proposed to occur via an interactive face-to-face teaching session. This 
session is expected to take approximately 40 minutes. Prior to the session, students will be 
given a peer reviewed paper and the CASP framework to read. 
The first part of the session will cover some background on what critical appraisal is and 
why it is important, including where to find CASP resources.  
The second part will involve a tutorial style session (split into groups) where students 
used the CASP framework to critically appraise the ‘pre-reading’. Due to the time 
allocation, we will be unable to appraise the paper with the entire framework. As we will 
be following on from the teaching session on Selection and Measurement Bias we will add 
to this by focussing on the framework questions that specifically look at potential sources 
of selection and measurement bias in the paper. 
The last part will get the students to assess the validity of the papers findings given the 
potential sources of selection and measurement bias identified through the framework 
questions. Further readings/references will be provided. 
We will do a wrap/quiz up at the end to test the learning objectives. 
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2.3 AIM 
To provide an introduction into critically appraising peer reviewed literature using the 
CASP critical appraisal framework. 
2.4 LEARNING OBJECTIVES 
By the end of the video, students should be able to: 
 describe what is critical appraisal; 
 explain why critical appraisal is important; 
 recognise the CASP critical appraisal framework;  
 recognise where to look in a paper to answer the framework questions that 
specifically look at potential sources of selection and measurement bias; and  
 appraise the value of a paper and assess any public health implications arising from 
it. 
2.5 LESSON TIMELINE  
1. 10 minutes presentation 
2. 25 minutes group work 
3. 10 minute whole group discussion 
 
2.6 REFERENCE 
1. International Epidemiological Association. A Dictionary of Epidemiology, 5th Edition. 
Porta M, editor. New York: Oxford University Press; 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
3. TEACHING EXERCISE HAND-OUTS 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
219 
 
4. CRITICAL APPRAISAL POWERPOINT 
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5. LESSONS FROM THE FIELD: POWER AND SAMPLE 
SIZE CALCULATIONS  
5.1 WHAT ARE “POWER” AND “SAMPLE SIZE”? 
5.1.1 POWER CALCULATIONS 
Power might sound like something you imagine the coach of an AFL team calculating for 
the output of players from the game stats, or the engineers at Red Bull looking at the 
output of a new Formula One car, but for research studies, calculating the power is 
important for determining the probability of whether the study will detect an association 
of a particular size if it truly exists in the general population1.  
The power of a study is the “chance of getting a significant result when some effect is 
really present”2 or the probability that the null hypothesis is rejected, if a specific 
alternative hypothesis is true3. If you choose a power close to 100% means that there is 
very little risk that we shall miss a truly existing difference. A power of 65% means there 
is a 35% risk that our study will fail to find a truly existing association between exposure 
and outcome4.  
The power of any statistic is dependent upon several factors: 
 The alpha () level you’ve established for the test – that is, the chance you’re 
willing to accept of making a type 1 error 
 The actual magnitude of the effect in the population, relative to the amount of 
noise in the data 
 The size of the sample 
The power of a study is one minus the probability of a type-II error – saying there is no 
association when one truly exists (denoted by β).  It is important to note the following 
things:  
 For all statistical tests, power always increases as the sample size increases, if other 
things (such as alpha level and effect size) are held constant.  
o Very small samples very seldom produce significant results unless the 
effect size is very large. 
o Conversely, extremely large samples are almost always significant unless 
the effect size is near zero.  
 For all statistical tests, power always increases as the effect size increases, if other 
things (such as alpha level and sample size) are held constant.  
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o For very large effect sizes, the power approaches 100 percent. For very 
small effect sizes, you might think the power of the test would approach 
zero, but it does not go down all the way to zero; it is actually the alpha 
level of the test. Keep in mind that the alpha level of the test is probability 
of the test producing a significant result when no effect is truly present.  
 For all statistical tests, sample size and effect size are inversely related, if other 
things (such as alpha level and power) are held constant.  
o Small effects can be detected only with large samples; large effects can 
often be detected with small samples.  
5.1.2 SAMPLE SIZE 
When designing a study, one of the first questions is “how many people will I need in my 
study?” and that is followed by a second question: “what for?” - The answer to the second 
question influences the answer to the first. Calculating a sample size is dependent upon 
what kind of study you are performing and how you plan to analyse your results4. Whilst 
for statisticians, an n of greater that 30 is usually sufficient for the Central Limit Theorem 
to hold, this may be unrelated to the objective of detecting a biologically significant effect5.  
5.2 WHY CALCULATE? 
Too often studies are carried out, with large amounts of money, time and other resources 
invested into the project, only find that from the beginning there were too few subjects to 
obtain meaningful results6. Whilst some may say that “bigger is better”, in reality logistical 
and financial considerations constrict the size of a study; however, if the size is too small, 
an association between exposure and outcome may be missed due to statistical 
insignificance. Ideally, a study should be large enough to have a high probability (power) 
of detecting any associations if any should exist. Human research and ethics committees 
now require sample size and power calculations before giving approval; the size of a 
sample must be sufficient to accomplish the purpose of the project without being larger 
than necessary2,7.  
5.3 HOW DO WE CALCULATE? 
5.3.1 POWER 
Power calculations are a crucial part of the design of any research project. There is no set 
rule as to how much power a study should have, but in general most people would 
probably want a minimum of 80% power and many would aim for 90%1. You do not want 
your study to be underpowered (with a high risk of missing real effects) or overpowered 
(larger, costlier, and more time-consuming than necessary). You need to provide a 
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power/sample-size analysis for any research proposal you submit for funding or any 
protocol you submit to a review board for approval - as long as you can justify why you are 
using this power, e.g. prevalence or limited resources, then the ethics committee will be 
satisfied2. You can also calculate the power of a study after you have performed it to show 
that the sample size used was sufficient.  
5.3.2 SAMPLE SIZE 
The first step in calculating a sample size is to determine what kind of study you are going 
to perform.  
Molutusky7 discusses three approaches to choosing a sample size for your study 
1. Ad hoc 
2. Conventional 
3. Adaptive trials 
If you take the ad hoc approach – collect some samples and analyse some data, then the p 
value and CIs cannot be interpreted; if the null hypothesis is true then chance of obtaining 
a statistically significant result is greater than 5%.  
Adaptive trials analyse the data in the midst of the study to determine further actions – 
this approach is often performed in large clinical trials7. However, in this exercise, we are 
going to remain conventional.  
For all sample size calculations, the following information is needed8: 
 The null hypothesis – what you are trying to determine 
 The type of study you are performing 
 Required level of statistical significance of the ability to detect a difference – the 
power 
 Acceptable error, or chance of missing a real effect – the alpha () 
 Magnitude of the effect under investigation – effect size 
 Amount of disease in the population – baseline probability 
 Relative size of the groups being compared 
When calculating a sample size, it is always safer to round upwards. It is important to 
remember that these are estimates of what is required, and life gets in the way7. Typical α’s 
and β's chosen for power calculations are 0.05 (two tailed) and 0.80 respectively9. 
Sometimes you will not know the exact figures required when calculating, and that is 
where an educated guess based on previous information is necessary or the smallest 
sample that is of any clinical interest needs to be defined7.  
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It is important to note that different calculators use different equations and ultimately this 
is an estimate of the size required; it is not gospel. By calculating the sample size required, 
it answers the question “If I use n subjects, what information can I learn?” and might show 
that it may just be impossible to determine what you are looking for7. 
5.3.2.1 Two ways to do things 
1) You could be old-school and perform the calculations by hand; the formula differs 
depending on the type of study you are going to perform. The World Health Organisation 
(WHO) has written up a “cookbook” for determining sample size in health studies (Lwanga 
and Lemeshow, 1991), and Kasiulevičius, Šapoka, and Filipavičiūte have also written a 
great article on calculating size for each of the different study types5.  
2) Or you could use a calculator. There are many programs out there that calculate sample 
size – it is just a matter of choosing the appropriate one. EpiInfo has one, as does 
OpenEpi.com, and there are a multitude of other websites that can perform this task (see 
statpages.org). Or, you could download a program, such as “Power and Sample Size” (see 
“helpful resources”).   
5.4 THINGS TO BE MINDFUL OF… 
5.4.1 THIS LOVELY TABLE  
Table 1. Possible outcomes of an epidemiological study1,2 
 the truth (based on entire population) 
No association Association 
your 
conclusion 
(based on 
your sample) 
No Association 
Correct 
Type-II error 
(probability = β) 
Association Type-I error 
(probability = α) 
Correct 
5.4.2 CLUSTER AND MULTI-STAGE SAMPLING 
Cluster or multi-stage sampling methods require a larger sample size to achieve the same 
precision, to take into account any affect the structure or design of the study may have on 
the accuracy of the results10.  
5.4.3 ATTRITION 
Not everyone who says they will participate will participate. Or they may withdraw half-
way through the project. It would be a shame if this occurred and subsequently the power 
of your study became too low to identify statistical significance. Therefore, it is wise to 
oversample by 10 – 20% of the computed numbers, depending on anticipated rate of 
attrition10.  
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5.5 REFERENCES FOR LFF 
1. Webb P, Bain C. Essential Epidemiology, 2nd Edition. Cambridge Uni Press; 2011. 
2. Pezzullo J. Biostatistics for Dummies. For Dummies; 2013. 
3. STAT507 – Epidemiological Research Methods, Lesson 9.7 - Sample Size and 
Power for Epidemiologic Studies, Penn State University: 
https://onlinecourses.science.psu.edu/stat507/node/64 (accessed 30/06/14) 
4. Giesecke J. Modern Infectious Disease Epidemiology, 2nd Edition. Hodder Arnold, 
2002. 
5. Kasiulevičius V, Šapoka V, Filipavičiūtė R. Sample Size Calculation in 
Epidemiological Studies. Gerantologija. 2006;7(4):225-231.  
6. Gordis L. Epidemiology, 4th Edition. Saunders Elsevier; 2009.  
7. Motulsky H. Intuitive Biostatistics, 2nd Edition. Oxford University Press; 2010. 
8. Bonita R, Beaglehole R, Kjellström T. Basic Epidemiology. World Health 
Organization; 2006. 
9.  Hulley, SB and Cumming, SR. Designing Clinical Research. Williams & Wilkins. 
1988. Baltimore, MD. Chapter 12 and 13. 
10. Naing L, Winn T, Rusli B. Practical Issues in Calculating the Sample Size for 
Prevalence Studies. Archives of Orofacial Sciences. 2006; 1(1):9-14.  
11. Gregg M. Field Epidemiology, 3rd Edition. Oxford University Press; 2008.  
 
5.6 OTHER USEFUL RESOURCES  
Lwanga S, and Lemeshow S. Sample Size Determination in Health Studies: a Practical 
Manual. World Health Organisation; 1991. 
PS - Power and Sample Size calculator 
http://biostat.mc.vanderbilt.edu/wiki/Main/PowerSampleSize 
http://statpages.org 
http://powerandsamplesize.com/ 
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6. LFF QUESTIONS: POWER AND SAMPLE SIZE 
CALCULATIONS 
6.1 WHAT YOU’LL NEED 
A computer with EpiInfo, PS software or internet access – openepi.com 
6.2 EXAMPLE 1 – DESCRIPTIVE STUDY SAMPLE SIZE 
You want to determine the prevalence of asymptomatic Clostridium difficile carriage in 
nursing home residents. The organisation you are working with has 600 residents in their 
facilities. You have performed a literature review and determined that the mean 
asymptomatic carriage rate of C. difficile in nursing homes from other studies is around 
17%. You will be performing all your own laboratory work.  
1. What would the sample size be at the power of 
a. 80% = 81 
b. 95% = 122 
c. 99% = 237 
2. Which would you choose and why? What would determine the reasoning behind 
you choosing a smaller/larger study? 
I chose the 95% power for this study for a few reasons – 95% is more ethically defensible 
than 80%. I was capable of taking over 100 samples and the need to perform within 24hrs 
is important. Approx. 25% of residents will open their bowels in (half of 50%) = 150, so 
99% is unattainable and unnecessary.  
The main point of this question was that sample size calculations are an estimate. 
6.3 EXAMPLE 2 – COHORT STUDY POWER CALCULATION 
You have conducted a follow-up cohort study for an outbreak of S. enteritidis that occurred 
one year ago in a village of 9,004 inhabitants. The cause was traditional cream cakes, all 
made in the same baker’s shop to celebrate Saint John’s Eve. A total of 1243 persons were 
affected; about 40% were Torroella residents, 40% from other villages of the same county, 
and 20% visitors. Questionnaires were sent to 1878 potential participants – 677 had 
experienced S. enteritidis gastroenteritis, and 1201 had not. 267 exposed and 330 non-
exposed returned the questionnaires. After 12-months, dyspepsia had appeared in 46 of 
267 exposed participants and 11 of 330 controls. Similarly, at 12-months, IBS had 
appeared in 31 of 266 exposed participants and in 5 of 333 controls. 
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For each outcome answer these questions: 
1. What was the risk ratio (with 95% CI) detected? 
Dyspepsia 
E
x
p
o
su
re
 
Outcome 
 Yes No Total 
Yes 46 221 267 
No  11 319 330 
Total 57 540 597 
Risk Ratio: 5.2 
CI: 2.7 -9.8 
IBS 
E
x
p
o
su
re
 
Outcome 
 Yes No Total 
Yes 31 235 266 
No  5 328 333 
Total 36 563 599 
Risk Ratio: 7.8 
CI: 3.1-19.8 
2. What was the power of your study? 
Exposed: Dyspepsia= 17.23%, IBS= 11.65% 
Unexposed: Dyspepsia= 3.33%, IBS= 1.5% 
3. Is this sufficient to say S. enteritidis gastroenteritis could lead to post-infectious 
dyspepsia/IBS? Why/why not? 
Based straight off the above figures, it could be possible to state that S. enteritidis could 
lead to dyspepsia and IBS, however there are several confounding factors and biases in the 
study which should be addressed before drawing this conclusion.   
6.4 EXAMPLE 3 – CASE CONTROL STUDY 
You want to conduct an experiment to determine if singing happy birthday before 
consuming cake makes it taste better. You want two equal groups, randomly assigned to 
each group – singing (case) or no singing (control).  
1. How many cases and controls do you need assuming your study will have 80% 
power, you want to detect an odds ratio of 2.0 or greater, you want equal number 
of cases and controls (r=1) and the proportion of happiness in the control group is 
20%? 
173 cases and 173 controls = 346 participants 
2. What power would your study have if you were limited to 100 people total (cases 
+ controls), you had equal ratio of cases and controls, and the odds ratio for more 
likely to enjoy cake was 6? (You will need to then work backwards for this: figure 
out the percentages of exposure in each group and then use this to calculate the 
power) 
50 cases and 50 controls, with 60% of cases and 20% of controls enjoying cake, with a 
power of 99% 
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